By Devan Payne
Paramount Skydance (Paramount) is set to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD) in a massive $110.9 billion deal expected to close in Q3 2026, creating a major entertainment conglomerate with over 200 million combined streaming subscribers. In November 2025, WBD began evaluating strategic alternatives to a previously planned corporate split. Multiple bids were submitted, which led to two rounds of bidding wars between Paramount, Netflix, and Comcast. On December 1, 2025, Netflix submitted an offer to purchase Warner Bros. studios and HBO Max for roughly $83 billion, or $27.75-per-share. WBD signed a merger agreement after deciding to move forward with the Netflix deal. In an attempt to thwart the Netflix deal, Paramount submitted another all-cash offer, which included equity backing from investors and major banks. On February 17, 2026, WBD reopened negotiations with Paramount after it was granted a seven-day waiver to submit a "best and final" offer from Netflix. During this time, Paramount submitted an offer of $31 dollar-per-share. WBD considered Paramount's increased bid to be the superior offer, triggering a four-business-day period during which Netflix could improve its offer, which Netflix declined to do, thus making Paramount the winner of the bidding war.
The merger of Paramount and WBD presents a major threat to democracy and media diversity. It could concentrate too much influence over news, film, and television in one company. Allowing more mergers in the already highly concentrated movie industry could harm filmmakers, industry workers, and change the industry itself, especially if Paramount follows through on its promise to Wall Street to make deep cuts. Paramount owns several cable and broadcast networks, including CBS, The CW, Nickelodeon, MTV, Comedy Central, CMT, VH1, Showtime, Paramount Network, and Logo TV. The top U.S. news stations currently are Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC, CBS, and NBC. If the WBD merger succeeds, Paramount will own two major news stations, CNN and CBS, along with their local stations. CBS includes CBS News and Stations, which owns CBS News and many local stations across the U.S., like WCBS-TV (New York), KCBS-TV (Los Angeles), WBBM-TV (Chicago), and WBZ-TV (Boston). CNN covers HLN, CNN International, and CNN en Español.
The merger has not been finalized, and there is still time for shareholders and other individuals to act. The key actions for shareholders are to (1) vote against the merger, since the merger requires approval from WBD shareholders. Shareholders can vote against the deal to stop the merger from going through. (2) Shareholders and other individuals can pressure regulators. People can advocate for the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to block the deal, arguing that it creates an anti-competitive media conglomerate. (3) People can engage State Attorneys General. California’s Attorney General and others are reviewing the deal for antitrust concerns. Shareholders and other individuals can lobby these officials to challenge the merger, since it could impact industry competition, and limits consumer choice, and violate antitrust laws. (4) Shareholders can raise concerns about deal structure. The merger has been criticized as a "rotten deal" because of the issues with the high level of debt involved in the acquisition and the involvement of foreign entities in the financing. The deal is expected to close on April 23, 2026, at which time WBD shareholders will vote on the merger that will unite Paramount and WBD.
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Artificial intelligence has rapidly become a defining feature of corporate strategy. Public companies now routinely describe AI as a driver of growth, efficiency, innovation, and competitive advantage. Earnings calls, investor presentations, and periodic filings increasingly reference AI-enabled products, operational improvements, and strategic positioning. At the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission has made clear that disclosures involving AI must be accurate, complete, and grounded in fact.
For investors and securities attorneys, the SEC’s approach has helped open the door to a growing category of securities litigation focused not only on exaggerated AI capabilities, but also on understated AI-related risks. Recent enforcement actions, regulatory commentary, and newly filed securities class actions suggest that AI disclosures are entering a familiar trajectory. Indeed, AI-related filings were one of the largest trend category in securities class action litigation in 2025, and accounted for a disproportionate share of total market capitalization losses, underscoring how consequential these cases have become for investors and companies alike.[1] While regulators debate whether additional guidance is necessary, private litigants are already testing how long-standing disclosure principles apply when AI materially affects a company’s operations, revenue, or risk profile.
In 2024, the SEC brought two enforcement actions against investment advisers alleging that they overstated their use of artificial intelligence. Those actions[2] alleged that the advisers marketed AI-driven investment strategies and analytics that were either nonexistent or materially exaggerated.
In announcing the settlements, then-Chair Gary Gensler cautioned against so-called “AI washing,” emphasizing that companies may not invoke AI as a marketing tool without substantiation. Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal likewise stressed that claims about emerging technologies would be scrutinized under traditional anti-fraud standards. These actions sent a clear signal that AI-related representations are material to investors and subject to the same disclosure obligations as any other operational claims.
The SEC has continued this enforcement trajectory into 2025. In January 2025, the SEC settled an action against Presto Automation, Inc. for allegedly misrepresenting the capabilities of its AI-powered restaurant ordering technology, including falsely claiming that its system eliminated the need for human intervention when in fact the vast majority of orders still required it. In April 2025, the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice filed parallel civil and criminal actions against Albert Saniger, the former CEO of Nate, Inc., alleging that he raised more than $42 million from investors by falsely claiming his mobile shopping app used AI to complete purchases automatically, when transactions were in fact processed manually by overseas contractors.[3] Together, these actions confirm that AI washing enforcement is a sustained priority, not a passing focus.
Against that backdrop, the SEC’s December 4, 2025 Investor Advisory Committee meeting offered a revealing contrast. Citing a lack of consistency in contemporary AI disclosures that is “problematic for investors seeking clear and comparable information,” the Committee voted in favor of recommending that the SEC issue guidance requiring issuers to define AI, disclose board oversight mechanisms, and report on how AI deployment affects their operations and consumer-facing activities. However, despite that vote, SEC Chair Paul Atkins and Commissioner Hester Peirce both delivered remarks signaling skepticism about adopting prescriptive AI-specific requirements. Their comments stressed that the SEC’s existing disclosure framework is sufficient to inform investors about AI’s impact on a business, and warned that technology-specific mandates could chill innovation or discourage companies from accessing public markets.
These remarks framed AI as simply another business input that should be captured, if material, by existing disclosure rules. According to this view, investors could rely on general requirements concerning material risks, trends, and uncertainties, without the need for tailored AI guidance. From a securities litigation perspective, however, this framing understates how AI-related disputes are likely to arise. The central question in most securities cases is not whether the SEC has adopted AI-specific rules that companies were required to follow, but whether companies made statements that were materially misleading in light of information known at the time. Indeed, the framework invoked at the December 2025 meeting is exactly what plaintiffs currently rely on when bringing securities claims. When companies speak about growth, stability, traffic, margins, or strategic resilience, they must ensure that those statements are not misleading in light of known AI-related risks. The absence of prescriptive SEC rules does not insulate issuers from liability when optimistic narratives conflict with internal data or external developments.
A securities class action filed in June 2025 against Reddit illustrates how these issues are already playing out.[4] Reddit relies heavily on traffic generated through Google Search. When Google introduced AI-powered search features, including AI Overviews, users increasingly received answers directly from Google’s interface without clicking through to external websites. According to the complaint, this zero-click dynamic materially reduced Reddit’s traffic and advertising revenue.
Rather than alleging that Reddit overstated its own AI capabilities, the complaint focuses on what the company allegedly failed to disclose. Plaintiffs contend that Reddit repeatedly reassured investors that the impact of Google’s AI initiatives was manageable and temporary, while downplaying information suggesting a more permanent disruption to its business model. Analysts later downgraded the stock after concluding that Google’s AI tools posed a lasting threat to Reddit’s traffic-dependent revenues.
The Reddit action is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects a shift away from prior AI-washing claims toward allegations of understated AI-related risk. The theory is not that Reddit promised too much about AI, but that it failed to adequately disclose how AI developments outside its control were already affecting core business metrics.
Second, the alleged risk arose from AI deployed by a third party. Google’s implementation of AI search features altered referral patterns across the internet, with direct consequences for companies dependent on search traffic. The case underscores that AI-related disclosure obligations are not limited to a company’s internal technology. AI adoption by customers, suppliers, competitors, or platform partners can create material risks that must be addressed when companies speak publicly about performance or outlook.
The Reddit lawsuit is not an isolated event. A securities class action was filed against Apple around the same time, alleging that the company made misleading statements concerning the timing and readiness of AI-powered Siri enhancements for the iPhone 16.[5] That complaint similarly focuses on the disconnect between public assurances and the alleged realities of AI development and deployment. Apple has since moved to dismiss the action, arguing that there was no proof its executives knew at the time that the features would be significantly delayed — a defense that will test how courts evaluate the line between optimistic forward-looking statements and actionable misrepresentations in the AI context. Together with earlier AI-related suits, these cases demonstrate that artificial intelligence issues are likely to become a recurring source of securities litigation exposure.
As AI becomes more deeply embedded across industries, courts are likely to see an increasing number of claims alleging that companies failed to disclose the operational risks associated with rapidly evolving AI technologies. These risks may arise from a company’s own AI initiatives, from delays or limitations in AI development, or from the adoption of AI by third parties that alters competitive dynamics, user behavior, or revenue streams.
The SEC’s Division of Examinations has reinforced this trajectory. In its fiscal year 2026 examination priorities, released in November 2025, the Division identified AI as a top focus area, signaling that it will scrutinize whether companies’ AI-related disclosures, supervisory frameworks, and controls align with their actual practices.[6] While new SEC leadership has cautioned against prescriptive AI-specific requirements, the existing disclosure framework remains fully capable of supporting securities fraud claims where companies minimize or misstate AI-related risks. Investors are increasingly attentive to how AI affects corporate performance, sustainability, and competitive positioning, and disclosures in this area are now subject to heightened scrutiny by both regulators and private litigants.
The Reddit lawsuit may represent the leading edge of this trend. It provides a blueprint for future AI-related securities actions focused on undisclosed or understated AI risks, including risks arising from third-party AI adoption beyond a company’s direct control. For plaintiff-side securities attorneys, these cases signal fertile ground for claims, particularly where companies provide confident or reassuring narratives that conflict with internal data or known external developments.
[1] According to Cornerstone Research, AI-related filings reached 16 in 2025, more than the 2024 total, and accounted for 57% of the total Maximum Dollar Loss Index for the year, reflecting the outsized financial stakes of AI-related securities litigation. Alexander Aganin et al., Cornerstone Research & Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Securities Class Action Filings—2025 Year in Review 2, 5 (Jan. 28, 2026), https://www.cornerstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2025-Year-in-Review.pdf.
[2] SEC Press Release No. 2024-36, Advisor Charged with Fraud for Claiming to Use AI When Making Investment Decisions (Mar. 18, 2024); SEC Press Release No. 2024-57, SEC Charges Investment Adviser with Fraud for Falsely Claiming to Use AI (Apr. 26, 2024).
[3] See SEC Press Release No. 33-11352, SEC Charges Restaurant Technology Company with Making Misleading Statements About AI Product (Jan. 14, 2025); SEC v. Saniger, No. 25-cv-02937 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 9, 2025).
[4] Tamraz. v. Reddit, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05144 (N.D. Cal. filed June 18, 2025).
[5] Tucker v. Apple Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05197 (N.D. Cal. filed June 20, 2025).
[6] The SEC’s Division of Examinations identified AI as a top priority in its fiscal year 2026 examination priorities, released in November 2025, signaling that it will scrutinize whether companies’ AI-related disclosures, supervisory frameworks, and controls align with their actual practices. See SEC Div. of Examinations, Fiscal Year 2026 Examination Priorities (Nov. 17, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/files/2026-exam-priorities.pdf.
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By Noah Gemma
What happens when a Maryland board leaves money on the table in a sale and public stockholders are shortchanged? Stockholders may wish to challenge such corporate decisions in court, but Maryland law does not always make that easy.
The recent Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P. v. Travel Centers of America Inc. (“Special Situations”), 2025 WL 3280907 (Md. App. Nov. 25, 2025), decision illustrates the numerous hurdles that stockholders and their attorneys may need to overcome when challenging a board’s decision to reject a higher bid and accept of a facially inferior bid. The Special Situations decision centered around a stockholder challenge to the board of directors’ (“Board”) of Travel Centers of America Inc. (“Travel Company”) decision to sell Travel Company to BP Products North America, Inc. (“BP”) for $86 per Travel Company share (“Merger”), despite the fact that ARKO Corp. (“ARKO”) offered a topping bid of $92 per share.
I. Background To The Merger
A. Travel Company Introduction
Travel Company was a publicly traded full-service travel center network incorporated in Maryland. It offered diesel and gasoline fuel, truck maintenance and repair, restaurants, travel stores, and parking services.
Travel Company was also the subsidiary and largest tenant of Service Properties Trust (“Service Properties”). Service Properties had a right of first refusal to acquire any interest the Company owns in any travel center before the Company sold or leased that travel center.
B. BP’s $86 Per Share Offer and Merger Agreement
On February 7, 2023, BP offered $86 per share to purchase Travel Company. Following a Travel Company Board meeting on February 8, 2023, Travel Company’s financial advisor notified BP on February 9, 2023 that the Company would agree to BP’s proposal on the condition that the parties negotiate a satisfactory merger agreement. BP and Service Properties apparently negotiated and reached agreement between February 11 and 15. On February 15, 2023, the Travel Company Board accepted the negotiated deal and signed the merger agreement (“Merger Agreement”). Also on February 15, 2023, Travel Company issued a press release announcing the Merger.
C. ARKO’s $92 Per Share Topping Proposal
Less than one month later, on March 14, 2023, ARKO submitted a topping proposal to acquire Travel Company for $92 per share. ARKO planned to finance the transaction through cash, external financing, and lines of credit. ARKO contemplated a thirty-day timeline to conduct due diligence and sign the requisite documentation. ARKO was also prepared to enter into lease documentation substantially similar to BP's agreement.
Notably, Special Situations does not state that ARKO’s bid required Service Properties to permit Travel Company to assign its leases, and did not require any special arrangements with Service Properties.
A few days later, the Board met to discuss ARKO's proposal with its financial and legal advisors. During this meeting, they discussed how the Merger agreement with BP provided that Travel Company could entertain an unsolicited offer that the Board deemed superior or that could reasonably be expected to lead to a superior proposal. The Board considered the proposal and decided to meet again the following week.
On March 22, 2023, the attendees from the previous Board meeting reconvened. The Board’s Chairman informed the Board that Service Properties opposed the deal with ARKO and would not engage in negotiations with or consent to assigning Travel Company’s leases to ARKO. After an executive session, Travel Company’s independent directors concluded that ARKO's proposal was not a superior proposal and could not reasonably be expected to lead to one as outlined in the Merger agreement. The Board reconvened and determined to inform ARKO that its proposal was not superior.
In April 2023, ARKO and Travel Company exchanged correspondence about whether ARKO could make a superior offer under the Merger agreement.
On May 1, 2023, Travel Company issued a press release stating that the Board was recommending that the stockholders vote for the BP transaction. On May 10, 2023, the stockholders voted to approve the transaction with BP.
II. The Stockholder’s Lawsuit
On January 5, 2024, certain Travel Company stockholders (“Plaintiffs”) filed a three-count Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court for breach of fiduciary duties against the Board and other defendants, alleging that the Board breached their fiduciary duties by:
On May 8, 2024, the Circuit Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that it the complaint failed to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed.
III. The Special Situations Decision
The Special Situations decision is from an intermediate appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which upheld the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint reasoning that Plaintiffs failed to overcome the business judgment rule.
A. Maryland’s Codified Standards of Director Conduct
The Maryland General Assembly codified directors’ fiduciary duties, thus requiring directors to act:
Md. Code (1975, 2014 Repl. Vol., Supp. 2024), § 2-405.1(c) of the Corporations & Associations Article (“CA”).
This three-prong standard is “the sole source of duties of a director to the corporation or the stockholders of the corporation, whether or not a decision has been made to enter into an acquisition or a potential acquisition of control of the corporation or enter into any other transaction involving the corporation.” CA § 2-405.1(i).
The General Assembly also codified the business judgment rule: an “act of a director of a corporation is presumed to be in accordance with [CA § 2-405.1(c)].” Special Situations explained that a plaintiff can overcome the rebuttable presumption of the business judgment rule by adequately alleging fraud, bad faith, or a director conflict of interest.
B. Plaintiffs’ Failure to State a Claim
Special Situations held that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege bad faith, anddid not fault the Board for deferring to Parent’s preferred bidder because Parent “had a contractual right to veto the Company assigning its leases. [Parent] informed the Directors that it would only consent to transfer the leases if satisfied with a potential buyer’s creditworthiness,” and ARKO did not satisfy Parent’s preferred level of creditworthiness. Special Situations continued to reason that “[w]hat happened here was that the Directors recognized that [Parent] would have to approve the ultimate purchaser, and they proceeded with a bidder that the Directors concluded met [Parent’s] criteria—BP. This decision was entitled to the business judgment presumption.”
Special Situations also did not fault the Board for rejecting a topping bid. It reasoned that although ARKO's offer was higher, directors of Maryland corporations are not required to act solely on the “amount or type of consideration that may be offered or paid to stockholders of the corporation in an acquisition or a potential acquisition of control of the corporation.” CA § 2-405.1(f)(5)(ii).
With regard to director conflicts,Special Situations effectively reasoned that even if Plaintiffs adequately alleged sufficient director conflicts, such conflicts were ratified by Travel Company’s stockholder vote approving the Merger. Special Situations reasoned that Travel Company’s stockholders were fully informed in approving the Merger.
Although Special Situations holds that “[r]atification in Maryland arises under statutory law,” the statute it cites in support of this assertion makes plain that “a contract or other transaction . . . is not void or voidable . . . ” if ratified by stockholders. CA § 2-419(a)–(b). Arguably, the plain language of this statute permits stockholders to ratify void or voidable contracts or transactions, not director actions that breach their statutory fiduciary duties.
III. Special Situations Potential Forward-Looking Impact
Although Special Situations is an intermediate Maryland Appellate Court decision that could potentially be overturned by the Maryland Supreme Court, ithighlights a structural reality that public stockholders may find alarming: Maryland law may provide exceptionally weak judicial oversight of board conduct in sale transactions, even when a board chooses a materially lower bid. A few potential consequences of this ruling stand out.
First, the decision suggests that Maryland courts may not only accept virtually any explanation offered by a board, but may even supply one on the board’s behalf. Special Situations appears to have drawn the defendant-friendly inference that Parent “would have to approve the ultimate purchaser” of Travel Company, because a fact that does not appear to be supported by the record, because:
To the extent necessary, future plaintiffs may potentially attempt to distinguish Special Situations by explaining why limited operational control (i.e., lease assignments) does not automatically translate to corporate-level veto power over mergers.
Second, public stockholders may also find the decision’s reliance on stockholder approval as a cure-all for conflicts to be troubling. The opinion appears to collapse the distinction between (1) stockholder ratification of a transaction and (2) stockholder ratification of director conduct. The decision relies on CA § 2-419—a statute that addresses ratification of otherwise void or voidable transactions—to ratify alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. Under the plain text of the statute, however, it appears that stockholders may ratify transactions, not fiduciary misconduct. By extending ratification beyond the statute’s scope, the Appellate Court may have effectively insulated directors from judicial review whenever a board-approved transaction is later accepted by stockholders, even if the vote occurred under structural coercion, time pressure, or a lack of practical alternatives. This broad reading may further weaken the already limited tools available to Maryland stockholders seeking accountability.
Maryland investors who have suffered losses may consider these developments in the law and should consult qualified counsel to explore their legal options.
Disclaimer: This memorandum is provided by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. Prior results may not be predictive of future outcomes.
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Directors of public companies receive generous compensation for relatively little work, with average awards of cash and stock worth more than $300,000 per year.[1] Boards and companies justify these awards, in part, by pointing to the onerous duties and obligations of these directors.[2] But these duties and obligations are tempered because many, if not most, public companies also relieve their directors of personal monetary liability for breaches of fiduciary duty that arise from mere negligence. The existence of an exculpation clause—a legal shield that protects directors from personal liability for mere carelessness—overwhelmingly leads to dismissal of lawsuits brought in Delaware and other states against independent directors when a stockholder does not specifically allege that such directors had a conflict of interest or intended to breach their fiduciary duties.[3] To survive, such claims require allegations that the actions resulted from the independent directors intending to do harm, intended to derelict their duties, or consciously disregarded their known duties.[4] In other words, that the director breached their duties in bad faith.
Stockholder lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duties often allege that a proxy statement or other disclosure document contained materially misleading misstatements. In many of these cases, however, particularly in cases involving a conflicted stockholder and a special committee, Defendants seek dismissal of claims against independent directors as exculpated. Because proxy statements typically fail to disclose the acts of independent directors with respect to the proxy statement itself, complaints also fail to allege specific facts supporting non-exculpated claims against those directors. Sometimes this is warranted, for example where a CEO misled a board about merger discussions, and thus the board understandably had no idea that disclosures were misleading.[5] But when independent directors can be alleged to have known about, but failed to correct, the misleading statements or omissions, dismissal on exculpation grounds is unwarranted.[6]
Such detailed allegations proved to be the difference when the Delaware Court of Chancery reinforced this principle in June of this year. In City of Sarasota Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings Inc.,[7] Chancellor Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick sustained claims against independent directors where a proxy statement failed to disclose potential conflicts of interest faced by a special committee’s financial advisors, Evercore and J.P. Morgan, and made false disclosures regarding the market outreach by those same financial advisors. At first, the Court of Chancery dismissed the lawsuit under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,[8] finding that the stockholder vote was fully informed.[9]
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this decision, finding that the proxy statement's failure to disclose Evercore's concurrent representations of two members of the acquiring consortium, J.P. Morgan's concurrent conflicts with the consortium members, and J.P. Morgan's receipt of $400 million in fees from those same members was material information, as was the Proxy Statement’s overstatement of Evercore’s involvement in counterparty outreach.[10]
In contesting the plaintiff’s renewed claims, the special committee members argued that it was not reasonably conceivable that withholding this material information reflected bad faith and thus the special committee members were exculpated.[11] But the Court of Chancery, in finding that the plaintiff plead non-exculpated claims, found that the proxy statement and complaint supported an inference that the special committee defendants intentionally withheld material information they had knowledge of, implicating bad faith.[12] And unlike in cases relied upon by the special committee defendants, other disclosures made in the proxy did not counteract such an inference of bad faith.[13]
This holding makes clear that, while Delaware law on the exculpation of independent directors represents a high bar, it is not insurmountable. Stockholders and attorneys seeking to hold independent directors accountable for their actions in approving a misleading proxy need to plead not only the materiality of the misstatement or omission, but also:
This requires not only the dedication of resources to uncover the truths hidden from the public, but careful attention to the facts that would contradict an inference of bad faith. For example, in a case cited by the defendants in Inovalon, the proxy did not disclose the board’s view of the company’s intrinsic value, a material piece of information, but did disclose that other factors took precedence over the intrinsic value, and that the board initially approved a negotiation range that included their view of the intrinsic value.[14] These disclosures, indicating to stockholders that the board believed the deal price was below the company’s intrinsic value, altered the total mix of information in such a way that contradicted any inference of bad faith.[15] Therefore, a complaint needs not only detailed and specific allegations of omission, but must also explain how the other disclosures made by defendants fail to contradict an inference of bad faith.
[1] Lawrence A. Cunningham & Carlos Juarez, Trends in Director Compensation, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Jan. 26, 2024) available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/01/26/trends-in-director-compensation/.
[2] Id.
[3] In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (2015).
[4] McElrath v. Kalanick, 224 A.3d 982, 991 (Del. 2020) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64, 66 (Del. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[5] See, e.g., In re Mindbody, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2020 WL 5870084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020) (dismissing claims against independent directors where the CEO and CFO allegedly manipulated the sales process by withholding and manipulating the information available to the board of directors).
[6] Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 691-92 (Del. Ch. 2014) (denying summary judgment where evidence supported a finding that directors knew of misleading omission and had opportunity to review the omitting proxy statement).
[7] 2025 WL 1642064 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2025).
[8] 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
[9] City of Sarasota Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., 2025 WL 1642064, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2025).
[10] City of Sarasota Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc., 319 A.3d 271, 292-304 (Del. 2024).
[11] Inovalon, 2025 WL 1642064 at *2.
[12] Id. at 4-5.
[13] Id. at 4.
[14] In re USG Corporation S’holder Litig., 2020 WL 5126671, at *27-28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020).
[15] Id.
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(Estimated time to read: 18 – 20 minutes)
I. Introduction
As a new National Hockey League season enters full swing, some securities litigators are reminded of “hockey sticks” of another type: those associated with recurring securities cases alleging “channel stuffing.” The “hockey stick” effect when a company engages in “channel stuffing” refers to a situation where a company floods its distribution channel with an overload of inventory (channel stuffing) to temporarily inflate reported sales figures, resulting in a graph of sales that looks relatively flat for most of the reporting period but shows a sharp, upward spike at the end, resembling a hockey stick. It is a form of “earnings management” to meet financial targets.
While appearing on its surface to be deceptive, “channel stuffing” (like a curved hockey stick) is not necessarily unlawful. But sometimes it can be. In September of this year—just in time for hockey season—the Second Circuit addressed some of the instances in which “channel stuffing” can give rise to liability in Gimpel v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 156 F.4th 1212 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025). That decision does not purport to address all the situations in which channel stuffing may be actionable, but it does provide some additional guidance, at least in the Second Circuit.
II. Gimpel v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc.
A. Facts
In Gimpel, plaintiffs brought a securities fraud class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Defendant Hain is a corporation that made and sold organic and natural food and personal care products, primarily to specialty and natural food distributors, supermarkets, and certain e-commerce retailers.
Plaintiffs alleged that, in order to meet Wall Street consensus revenue and earnings estimates, and facing stiffening competition, the Defendants engaged in “channel stuffing” practices, offering Hain's distributors significant concessions at the end of each fiscal quarter to take much more product than they needed, without adequately disclosing the practice or accounting for its financial implications to investors.
More particularly, plaintiffs alleged that, during the class period, as Hain saw during a quarter that its revenues would fall short of analyst expectations, Hain estimated the shortfall and enticed its distributors to accept more product toward the end of the quarter in order to meet projections by offering them various concessions, including (1) cash incentives of up to $500,000 for a single distributor for a single quarter, (2) product discounts of up to 20%, (3) extended payment terms, (4) reimbursements for excess product that spoiled or expired, and (5) an absolute right of return.[1] Defendants then directed Hain’s managers to ship the excess inventory to the distributors. By pulling forward these sales, Hain could report that it had met its projected financial results without disclosing its declining financial prospects. This practice also inflated present sales at the expense of future performance—robbing Peter to pay Paul.[2] Moreover, pursuant to the “absolute right to return” product with no obligation to pay, distributors would return substantial amount of product to Hain, only to have the process begin again, although with an increasingly larger deficit due to the prior quarter’s credits for returns and concessions.[3] Additionally, these practices raised serious accounting issues. For example, Hain negotiated these concessions “off-contract” and in “side agreements,” typically memorialized only in emails, but did not have effective internal controls to assess the accounting impact of these arrangements.[4]
Ultimately, the scheme began to unravel when, filled to the brim with inventory, Hain's distributors informed Hain that they would no longer accept more inventory than necessary. Around the same time, Hain’s newly appointed Treasurer discovered anomalies in Hain’s books and brought in external auditors to investigate. Hain then cut its annual guidance substantially and ultimately announced in August 2016 it would delay the release of its 2016 financial results because it had “identified concessions that were granted to certain distributors … [and] is currently evaluating whether revenue associated with those concessions was accounted for in the correct period,” as well as whether it should have recognized revenue associated with concessions when its products sold through the distributors to end customers, rather than at the time of shipment to distributors, as it had been doing.[5]
On June 22, 2017, Hain issued its belated annual report on Form 10-K for the 2016 fiscal year, as well as its quarterly reports on Form 10-Q for the first, second and third quarters of 2017, and admitted that “both [its] fiscal 2016 and fiscal 2015 net sales benefited from certain concessions provided to [its] largest distributors, including payment terms beyond the customer’s standard terms, rights of return of product[,] and post sale concessions, most of which were associated with sales that occurred at the end of each respective quarter.” Hain restated its historical financials, disclosing that it overstated its net sales by $167 million—2.1%, 2.9% and 1.9% in FY 2014, FY 2015 and for the nine months ending March 31, 2016, respectively—and its GAAP earnings per share by $0.13 for Fiscal Years 2014, 2015 and the first three quarters of FY 2016.[6]
On December 11, 2018, the SEC announced that it had entered into a consent decree with Hain wherein Hain admitted that it violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, which requires Hain to make and keep records that accurately and fairly reflect Hain’s transactions, and Section 13(b)(2)(B), which requires Hain to maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that transactions are executed in accordance with GAAP.[7] Investors sued for damages from the resulting stock price declines.
B. The District Court Decisions and the Second Circuit’s Initial Ruling Vacating and Remanding
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims multiple times, first granting leave to replead,[8] then with prejudice in In re Hain Celestial Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2020 WL 1676762 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (Splatt, J.) (“Hain II”). The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), which prohibit the “employ[ment of] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and “engage[ment] in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”[9] The District Court determined that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged an “absolute right to return” the products, which it held was dispositive to the “scheme liability” claims because “[c]hannel stuffing becomes a form of fraud only when it is used to book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but not really sold because the buyer can return them.”[10] The court then dismissed plaintiffs’ Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) claims (based on alleged materially false and misleading statements and omissions) because it had already determined that the channel stuffing scheme was legitimate.[11]
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the Hain II decision in In re Hain Celestial Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 20 F.4th 131 (2d Cir. 2021). The Second Circuit concluded that the District Court had erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ Rule 10b-5(b) claim because whether the channel stuffing scheme is itself fraudulent under 10b-5(a) or (c) is not dispositive to a Rule 10b-5(b) claim, which focuses “not on schemes, devices, or practices, but on statements made” and “does not require that conduct underlying a purportedly misleading statement or omission amount to a fraudulent scheme or practice.”[12] Accordingly, the Second Circuit clarified that plaintiffs’ theory of liability—i.e., “that [the] Defendants made statements attributing Hain’s high sales volume to strong consumer demand, while omitting to state that … Hain’s high sales volume was achieved in significant part [through] channel stuffing”—depended on whether “something said was materially misleading, either because it included a false statement of a material fact or because it omitted to state a material fact which omission rendered the things said misleading.”[13]
On remand, the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss was referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a report and recommendation recommending dismissal on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to plead (1) an actionable misstatement or omission, and (2) scienter.[14] The District Court largely adopted the Magistrate’s report and recommendation, stating that it “concur[red] with” the “threshold” recommendation finding that plaintiffs had failed to plead an actionable misstatement or omission” In re Hain Celestial Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2023 WL 6360345, at *14, 18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (Seybert, J.) (“Hain IV”), but—as the Second Circuit later pointed out—it “did not specifically adopt those portions of the R&R into its findings” and “explicitly adopted only the R&R's “scienter-related recommendations.”[15] Plaintiffs then appealed a second time.
C. The Second Circuit’s Present Ruling
On appeal, the Second Circuit reiterated that “[c]hannel stuffing is not necessarily fraudulent,” insofar as “[o]ffering distributors concessions is a common practice” and “there may be legitimate reason for a company ‘pressing for sales to be made earlier than in the normal course,’” “such as to ‘incite [its] distributors to more vigorous efforts to sell the stuff lest it pile up in inventory.’”[16]
The Second Circuit then articulated what may be regarded as a guiding principle, namely that “channel stuffing may become fraudulent when it is ‘done to mislead investors.’”[17] However, it recognized that “[p]arsing between ‘[a] certain amount of channel stuffing [that] could be innocent,’ … and illegitimate channel stuffing done to mislead investors has been no easy task for courts.”[18]
The Court cited two circumstances in which other courts had suggested that channel stuffing may be inherently illegitimate. First, the Court cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tellabs, where the Supreme Court suggested that a company “writing orders for products customers had not requested” is the “illegitimate kind” of channel stuffing.[19] Second, the Court pointed out that, on remand, the Seventh Circuit in Tellabs opined that channel stuffing becomes fraudulent “only when it is used ... to book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but not really sold because the buyer can return them” because the conditions of revenue recognition—the transfer of “ownership and its attendant risks”—have not actually occurred.[20]
The Second Circuit then turned to the circumstance it had discussed in its earlier Hain opinion, noting that “[a]s we previously explained in this case, a plaintiff proceeding under Rule 10b-5(b) may successfully plead securities fraud even when the alleged channel stuffing practices are not themselves ‘fraudulent or otherwise illegal’ because Rule 10b-5(b) focuses “on whether something said was materially misleading, either because it included a false statement of a material fact or because it omitted to state a material fact which omission rendered the things said misleading….”[21]
Specifically, the Court noted that “[i]n our Circuit, courts have recognized two relevant scenarios in which a company may incur liability under Rule 10b-5(b) in connection with channel-stuffing practices.” First, “district courts have recognized that channel stuffing may give rise to liability if it results in improper revenue recognition and, therefore, false financial statements and violations of GAAP.”[22] Improper revenue recognition could occur, for example, where a company offers its distributors the “right to return” product and fails to account for those returns, or if it does not properly recognize the costs associated with the incentives used to induce channel stuffing.[23] Second, regardless of whether a company restated results, it may make materially misleading statements about its financial success or inventory levels when it speaks about them without disclosing its reliance on channel stuffing.[24] As the Second Circuit stated, “[f]ailing to disclose the existence of channel stuffing, under this theory, is misleading because investors would want to know that revenue is not being driven by increased demand but by sales tactics that will likely prove unsustainable once distributors reach maximum inventory and the company can no longer flood them with product.”[25]
Having articulated these principles, the Court then turned to the facts before it. In beginning its analysis, it noted that under Rule 10b-5(b), defendants are liable for (1) outright false statements, as well as (2) misleading “half-truths.”[26] Synthesizing these principles, the Court concluded, first, that plaintiffs plausibly alleged that defendants had made a series of outright material misstatements about, inter alia, Hain’s financial results, compliance with GAAP, existence of effective internal controls, description of its revenue-recognition policies, and in Sarbanes-Oxley certifications in its SEC filings that those filings did not contain any untrue or misleading statements of material fact. Here, the Court noted that Hain’s restatement of its financial results and disclosure of related material weaknesses in its internal controls and accounting practices “suffice to establish that these statements were in fact false at the time they were made.”[27] Second, the Court concluded that defendants had made a series of actionable misleading, “half-true” statements by failing to disclose to investors their reliance on the channel stuffing practices when discussing Hain’s financial success and the inventory levels at its distributors. For example, Hain made repeated statements during the class period attributing its purported success to factors such as “strong demand for [its] organic and natural brands as demonstrated by the increasing consumption of [its] products,” “momentum for organic and natural products,” its “diverse portfolio of brands and products,” and “strong worldwide demand for [its products]”—but nowhere disclosed that it achieved its financial results in significant part by granting distributors credits, incentives, spoils coverage, or a right to return product.[28] Here, the Second Circuit cited cases holding that, by “put[ting] the reasons for the company’s success at issue, but fail[ing] to disclose a material source of its success, specifically the practice of channel stuffing, the[se] statement[s] [were] materially misleading.”[29]
Having found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged material misrepresentations and omitted material facts, the Second Circuit also went on to conclude that plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter and loss causation, as well as control person liability, and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings (specifically, that “this long-pending case should proceed to discovery.”).[30]
III. Implications
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Hain does not necessarily break new ground but does systematize at a minimum the Second Circuit’s approach to channel stuffing allegations in securities class actions. Several factors emerge as important considerations.
First, Hain reaffirmed the principle that channel stuffing is not necessarily per se fraudulent or actionable, but, to the contrary, may have legitimate purposes.
Second, Hain articulated the overarching principle that channel stuffing may become fraudulent when it is done to mislead investors.
Third, Hain cited two specific examples of instances where courts have suggested that channel stuffing may be inherently illegitimate: (1) where a company was “writing orders for products customers had not requested,” and (2) “when it [channel stuffing] is used ... to book revenues on the basis of goods shipped but not really sold because the buyer can return them.” Here, it is unclear whether Hain considered such practices to be a “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or an “act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person” for purposes of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) “scheme” liability, rather than under Rule 10b-5(b), but it is noteworthy that in discussing these examples, Hain added in a footnote that “because these provisions [Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)] are not before us, we do not consider the circumstances in which channel stuffing might become a fraudulent scheme in and of itself.”[31] Accordingly, this leaves the door open to more circumstances where channel stuffing may be considered inherently illegitimate.
Fourth, Hain reverted to the Second Circuit’s previous analysis of channel stuffing as actionable under Rule 10b-5(b) (regardless of whether it was inherently illegitimate) where defendants issue materially false statements or “half-truths” about it.
Fifth, Hain indicates that channel stuffing may be actionable under the “material misstatement” line of cases under Rule 10b-5(b) when it results in a restatement of financial results (constituting an admission of the “false statement” element of Rule 10b-5(b)), or other admissions of GAAP or other accounting violations, or potentially in other circumstances where a defendant acknowledges that a statement was rendered false due to defendants’ channel stuffing activity.
Sixth, Hain indicates that channel stuffing may be actionable under the “misleading half-truth” line of cases under Rule 10b-5(b), when a defendant fails to disclose that its reliance on channel stuffing rendering its statements materially misleading. A typical example of this may be where a defendant attributes the reasons for its purported success to other factors (e.g., high demand, product superiority, cost controls, etc.), while failing to disclose that a significant reason for that “success” was the use of channel stuffing (particularly where it includes costly give-aways or incentives such as “incentive payments” or absolute rights of return).
Seventh, relatedly, where a company engages in complex “give-aways” or incentives, there is a heightened danger that this will put the corporation at risk for adverse financial impact down the road—either from a “robbing Peter to pay Paul perspective, or by complicating the corporation’s accounting—i.e., heightening the risk that statements about effective accounting controls, or financial statements accurately portraying financial results, may actually be false when made.
Eighth, Hain underscored that a plaintiff still must satisfy the other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim to survive a motion to dismiss, such as pleading materiality, scienter, and loss causation.[32]
Ninth, as a caveat, particularly where there is no restatement of earnings, the sufficiency of plaintiff’s channel stuffing allegations may depend—as it does in many securities class actions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) pleading standards—on the particularity of plaintiff’s allegations, i.e., such that they render plaintiff’s allegations plausible (and their scienter allegations at least as plausible as any other competing inference).[33]
[1] Id. at 130.
[2] Id. Indeed, Hains’ “off-contract” incentive-based arrangements with two distributors accounted for 15% and 8% of Hain’s entire U.S. sales, respectively. Id.
[3] Id. at 131.
[4] Hain also utilized various credits and accruals—which it counted as revenue as soon as shipments left the warehouse—to offset sales deficits and further make revenues appear better than they were. Id. at 130-31.
[5] Id. at 131-32.
[6] Id. at 132-33.
[7] Id. at 133-34.
[8] Case No. 2:16-cv-04581 (ADS)(SIL), ECF No. 106 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2029) (“Hain I”).
[9] 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c); Hain II, 2020 WL 1676762 at *9.
[10] Hain II, 2020 WL 1676762 at *9-12.
[11] Id. at *12 (“This theory fails because its predicate is the illegitimacy of the channel stuffing practices the Court already found to be legitimate.”).
[12] Hain, 20 F.4th at 136-37.
[13] Id.
[14] In re Hain Celestial Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig. (“Hain III”), 2022 WL 18859055, at *34 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022) (Dunst, M.J.).
[15] Hain, 156 F. 4th at 135, 138, quoting Hain IV, 2023 WL 6360345, at *14, 18.
[16] Hain, 156 F. 4th at 136, citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 (1st Cir. 1999).
[17] Hain, 156 F.4th at 136, citing Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006). See also Hain, 156 F. 4th at 128 (“Channel stuffing is not necessarily illegal, but it may give rise to liability under the Exchange Act when a company engages in the practice to deceive investors.”).
[18] Hain, 156 F.4th at 136, quoting Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008).
[19] Hain, 156 F.4th at 136, citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325.
[20] Hain, 156 F.4th at 136-37, citing Makor, 513 F.3d at 709.
[21] Hain, 156 F.4th at 137.
[22] Id., citing Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Orthofix Int’l N.V., 89 F. Supp. 3d 602, 608-09, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (plaintiff stated claim where defendant engaged in channel stuffing to inflate revenue and later restated its financial results and admitted GAAP violations).
[23] Hain, 156 F.4th at 137.
[24] Hain, 156 F.4th at 137-38, citing Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 16, 31-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding that defendants’ statements about inventory levels, revenue growth, and price harmonization were actionable in light of channel stuffing allegations); San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Dentsply Sirona Inc., 732 F. Supp. 3d 300, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (statements about “the strength and sustainability of the company's earnings in general and demand for [the] products in particular” misleading if “much of [the company's] sales were due to channel stuffing”); In re Solaredge Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2024 WL 4979296, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2024) ("Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that it was misleading for [defendant] to attribute increased revenues in late 2022 to a variety of factors meanwhile omitting that part of the increase in revenues was caused by a practice of channel stuffing.”).
[25] Hain, 156 F.4th at 138.
[26] See Hain, 156 F.4th at 138-39. As the Second Circuit noted in Hain (at 139), for securities-fraud claims, “although ‘§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information,’ Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 [] (2011), once ‘a company speaks on an issue or topic,’ it must ‘tell the whole truth,’ Meyer v. Jinkosolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2014). That is, when a company does speak, it assumes ‘a duty to be both accurate and complete,’ Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 331 (2d Cir. 2002), and adequate disclosure is required to make other statements, ‘in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,’ Meyer, 761 F.3d at 250.”
[27] Hain, 156 F.4th at 139-40 (citations omitted).
[28] Id. at 141.
[29] Id., citing In re Solaredge Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2024 WL 4979296, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2024); see also San Antonio Fire, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 316 (statements discussing strength and sustainability of the company's earnings and demand for its products “would be misleading if (as alleged) the company was having trouble getting the materials to make the products, many of the products it did make didn't work, and much of its sales were due to channel stuffing”); Okla. Firefighters, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 33 ("[A] reasonable investor would likely have found it significant that ... revenues were driven by inflated channel inventory and not increased end-user demand because those forces fundamentally differ in sustainability.”).
[30] Hain, 156 F.4th at 143-51.
[31] Id. at 137 n.10.
[32] Id. at 137, 139, 143-51.
[33] See id. at 129, 138-39, 141, 143-44.
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(Estimated time to read: 8 – 10 minutes)
A recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in the case of Shih v. Amylyx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[i] is a significant victory for investors, offering a powerful reminder that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (PSLRA) "safe harbor" for forward-looking statements is not a license to mislead. The decision illustrates that the safe harbor is not a blank check for projections, that context is king when presenting data, and that failing to disclose material, negative facts can render optimistic growth statements misleading.
On September 30, 2025, the Court denied Defendant Amylyx Pharmaceuticals’s motion to dismiss, allowing the class action lawsuit to proceed to the discovery phase. The plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud center on Relyvrio, a drug developed by Amylyx for the treatment of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known as “Lou Gerhig’s Disease.” The complaint alleges that, following Relyvrio’s commercial launch in late 2022, Amylyx and its top executives projected strong market performance and growth potential for the drug while omitting critical information that undercut those projections, causing the company's stock to trade at artificially inflated prices. When the company finally revealed the high rate of patient discontinuations on November 9, 2023, its stock price plummeted by over 30% in a single day.
A Story of Misleading Growth and Hidden Discontinuations
Following the Relyvrio launch in late 2022, Amylyx reported seemingly strong initial uptake. For instance, the company reported that by March 31, 2023 "roughly 3,000 people" were on Relyvrio. By June 30, 2023, this number had grown to 3,800. These figures were presented as evidence of a successful launch and strong market demand, supporting the company's statements about a long "runway for growth."
The core of the plaintiffs' allegations is that these figures were deceptively presented. The company reported "net patients" or "net patients on therapy," which, by its nature, factors in discontinuations. However, plaintiffs allege this net metric was used to conceal an alarmingly high discontinuation rate. According to a former high-level Regional Business Director, by the time the company was reporting 3,000-3,800 net subscribers, over 9,000 patients had already been prescribed the drug. This vast, undisclosed gap between total prescriptions and "net" patients denoted a massive discontinuation rate of over 50%.
By omitting this crucial context, plaintiffs argue that Amylyx's statements about its growth potential were materially false and misleading. While investors were led to believe there was a "large untapped opportunity for growth," the undisclosed reality was that the drug had already reached a significant portion of the patient market (nearly one-third of the total addressable market), many of whom had already stopped taking it. This omission painted a picture of a “long runway” for growth when, in fact, the high dropout rate suggested a much more limited commercial future for Relyvrio.
The Court's Analysis: Where Optimism Ends and Fraud Begins
In its decision, the court carefully parsed the company's statements. It dismissed claims related to general statements of corporate puffery—such as executives being "thrilled" or "encouraged" by the launch. Investors typically don’t rely on these vague expressions of optimism. The court also found that the company's statements about the initial "bolus," or surge in demand, were not misleading because defendants had adequately communicated their uncertainty about its duration.
However, the court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that Amylyx's forward-looking statements about Relyvrio's growth potential, made in May and August of 2023, were actionably misleading.
The court reasoned that by the time Amylyx was assuring investors of a "large untapped opportunity for growth" and suggesting a vast market of remaining ALS patients, it was allegedly aware of the massive, undisclosed discontinuation rate. This allegation was key, as the company's optimistic projections were based on the premise of a large, unreached market. The court found that knowledge of an over 50% discontinuation rate would fundamentally undermine that premise. Therefore, the court concluded that omitting this crucial fact could render the company's optimistic growth projections misleading to a reasonable investor.
This analysis highlights the danger of selective disclosure, particularly when using "net" metrics. While Amylyx emphasized its growing "net subscribers," that number, presented in isolation, allegedly obscured a much darker reality. The court’s decision underscores a vital principle: a company cannot selectively present a metric to suggest success while hiding the alarming underlying components that tell a story of failure. The massive, undisclosed gap between total prescriptions and the "net" number of patients remaining on therapy was a critical piece of context that investors needed to properly evaluate the company's growth story.
This case serves as a crucial reminder that under securities laws, statements can be literally true and still be misleading.[ii] This legal principle extends far beyond the pharmaceutical industry. For example, a tech company might tout its total "registered user" numbers, which are literally true, but that statement could be misleading if the company fails to disclose a simultaneous, massive collapse in its "active" or paying user base. Similarly, a retail chain could announce "strong new store openings" while omitting the material fact that it is closing even more unprofitable stores. The central question is whether the omitted information was material and necessary to make the statements that were made, in light of all the circumstances, not misleading.
Key Takeaways for Investors and Litigators
The Amylyx decision offers several key observations:
This ruling is a critical step forward for the shareholders of Amylyx. With the motion to dismiss denied, the case now proceeds to discovery, where plaintiffs will have the opportunity to obtain internal documents, emails, and testimony to prove these strong allegations of fraud.
[i] Shih v. Amylyx Pharms., Inc., No. CV 24-12068-NMG, 2025 WL 2807756 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2025).
[ii] E.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 47 (2011) (omitting information that suggested primary source of revenue was at risk rendered positive statements about future revenue growth misleading); Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc, 706 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Even a statement which is literally true, if susceptible to quite another interpretation by the reasonable investor[,] may properly be considered a material misrepresentation.”)
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(Estimated time to read: 10 – 12 minutes)
On August 29, 2024, a divided panel of judges for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a company may violate the federal securities laws if the company’s IPO registration statement only discloses favorable, but older financial results, without also disclosing more recent, unfavorable results and trends. The opinion, written by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., vacated and remanded an order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Robinhood concealed negative information from its registration statement concerning the quarter ended just before the IPO, but for which final results had not yet been fully disclosed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Note: some background information is sourced from beyond the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, for context.
Robinhood Markets Inc. (“Robinhood” or the “Company”) is an American financial services company headquartered in Menlo Park, California, co-founded in April 2013 by Vladimir Tenev and Baiju Bhatt. Invoking the popular folk hero’s stance of robbing the rich to give to the poor, Robinhood marketed itself as a haven for retail investors by offering fee-free trading in equities and other securities—i.e., not charging investors any commission fees for making trades, at a time when many competitor brokerages charged $7–10 per trade.[i] Instead, Robinhood employs a “payment for order flow” (“PFOF”) model, wherein market makers[ii] pay Robinhood for the opportunity to serve its many Monthly Active Users (“MAUs”), generating what the Company calls “transaction-based revenue.”[iii]
Prior to 2021, a majority of Robinhood’s transaction-based revenue came from customers’ conventional trading in stocks and options (specifically, over 90% of in 2020).[iv] In January 2021, an infamous “meme stock” event occurred, in which retail investors purchased vast numbers of shares in GameStop Corp. (NYSE ticker: GME), AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. d/b/a AMC Theaters (NYSE: AMC), and other companies—with large concentrations of such trading occurring on Robinhood.[v] GameStop in particular was the subject of a “short squeeze,” in which retail investors—many of whom organized and communicated via the Reddit forum /r/wallstreetbets (“Wall Street Bets”)—sought to coordinate a buying spree to force the price of GameStop stock, then heavily shorted by hedge funds, to rise sharply.[vi] The short squeeze was successful, causing the price of GME to double within a 90-minute period on February 24, 2021, and balloon nearly 200% in just one week. Robinhood, then preparing to IPO later that year, reacted on February 28, 2021 by, amongst other things, restricting and limiting trading on GameStop and nearly a dozen other stocks such that customers could only sell their holdings in the stocks, but not buy more.[vii] This move infuriated many Robinhood customers, who perceived the Company’s actions as favoring Wall Street over retail investors in contravention of Robinhood’s namesake’s ethos, causing significant numbers of customers to stop trading on the Company’s platform. In addition to increased equity trading in January 2021, Robinhood also allegedly observed a spike in users’ purchases of the meme cryptocurrency, Dogecoin, which similarly observed a significant drop-off in investor interest prior to the IPO.
As plaintiffs’ complaint alleged, Robinhood filed its registration statement for its initial public offering with the SEC, effective July 2, 2021, and filed a prospectus for the IPO on July 30 of that month. The two documents collectively formed the “offering materials” for potential investors to consider when weighing whether to invest in Robinhood’s IPO.[viii] These offering materials described massive year-over-year increases in Robinhood’s transaction-based revenue in its Q1 2021 (e.g., up 340%) and other metrics and key performance indicators (“KPIs”), including MAUs and cryptocurrency trading, but provided only partial, interim information for the Company’s Q2 2021 ended June 30, 2021 (shortly before the IPO). The offering materials also warned that Robinhood purportedly did not yet know whether the explosive growth and favorable metrics it had experienced in early 2021 would continue in post-IPO quarters. This came to a head on October 26, 2021, when Robinhood reported Q3 2021 financial results (and disclosed final results for Q2 2021), which revealed unfavorable, double-digit declines in performance and in most key metrics (including, notably, a jarring 61% decline in transaction-based PFOF revenue from equity trading).[ix] Upon this news, Robinhood’s stock price fell about 10%. Robinhood’s stock price continued to decline through the end of 2021 on related information.
On March 13, 2023, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint against Robinhood, certain of its executives including Tenev and Bhatt, and the underwriters of Robinhood’s IPO, which included Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Barclays, Wells Fargo, and more. The investors alleged that defendants had violated Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had caused Robinhood’s offering materials to be misleading to investors because they omitted material facts about Robinhood’s Q2 2021 financial results, KPIs, and other metrics, and negative trends therein (collectively, “interim” financial information), that were necessary to be disclosed to investors to make the offering materials not misleading.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION
The Ninth Circuit observed a split of opinion among the federal circuit courts of appeal concerning the issue of when IPO registrants have a duty to disclose financial information for an interim quarter (i.e., one that is either in progress, or one that has just ended but for which final results have not been disclosed). The First Circuit, in Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2), held that such duty arose only if an “issuer is in possession of nonpublic information indicating that the quarter in progress at the time of the public offering will be an extreme departure from the range of results which could be anticipated based on currently available information[,]”[x] (emphasis added), whereas the Second Circuit has expressly rejected this reasoning, instead holding that the test for when the duty to disclose arises is the same as the test for “assessing the materiality of an omission of interim financial information”—i.e., whether “a reasonable investor would view the omission as significantly altering the total mix of information made available.” Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning to “make the securities law in th[e Ninth c]ircuit clearer and more predictable[,]” noting that determining when an “extreme departure” had occurred was “far less” judicially administrable than the classic materiality standard for omissions, with which courts are familiar.[xi] The Ninth Circuit also noted that the case at hand involved Defendants’ failure to disclose actual, known interim results, distinguishing the situation from non-actionable cases that concerned undisclosed forecasts, plans, or projections made in the interim between quarters. As Judge Smith summarized:
Plaintiffs' theory concerns a prior time period (i.e., the time period during which Robinhood suffered from the risks that had allegedly come to fruition) and some subsequent event (i.e., the later time period during which the risks falsely portrayed as contingent actually came to pass).[xii]
The Ninth Circuit majority also noted that the First Circuit’s test caused counterproductive analysis by the district court, because the district court evaluated each of Robinhood’s metrics individually to see if there was an sufficiently extreme departure, rather than focusing on the “total mix” of the metrics, which is a more appropriate lens to determine a statement’s materiality.
The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court erred in applying the First Circuit’s “extreme departure” test in the context of plaintiffs’ allegations that Robinhood violated Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which requires registrant companies to provide “discussion and analysis” of the company’s “financial condition and results of operations,” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a), including specifically to “[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that are reasonably likely to have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b)(2)(ii). Rather, the Ninth Circuit directed that Item 303 has its own, lower bar for when the duty to disclose arises, which is when it is “reasonably likely” that the relevant, known trend, event, or uncertainty would occur.[xiii] The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s conclusion that Item 303 does not require disclosure of the interim results, but expressed no view on how plaintiffs would fare under this legal standard. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims based on violations of Item 105 of Regulation S-K.
Thus, given the district court had applied the wrong legal standard to evaluating whether offering materials are “misleading” under Section 11, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case in part, and remanded the case to the district court to re-evaluate under the clarified materiality standard.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case clarifies precedent in the circuit, by appearing to provide clearer pathways for IPO investors to hold companies and executives accountable when there is undisclosed, negative interim financial information being hidden during the IPO. Litigants in the Ninth and Second Circuits are likely to benefit from the predictably of a legal regime that aligns closer to the traditional concepts and tests for materiality than the First Circuit’s outlier approach.
[i] Stephanie Guild, 10 years and counting, Robinhood Markets Inc., Investors Guild, Dec. 20, 2023, https://robinhood.com/us/en/learn/weekly-rundown/5rbiv0URCXdKT8aaveaEbH/ (last accessed Oct. 22, 2025).
[ii] Andrew Bloomenthal, Understanding Market Makers: Roles, Profits, and Their Impact on Liquidity, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketmaker.asp (last updated Aug. 19. 2025).
[iii] Sodha v. Golubowski, No. 24-1036, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *8, 2025 WL 2487954, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).
[iv] Id. Robinhood’s fiscal quarters match calendar quarters.
[v] Id.
[vi] Rob Davies, GameStop: how Reddit amateurs took aim at Wall Street’s short-sellers, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/jan/28/gamestop-how-reddits-amateurs-tripped-wall-streets-short-sellers (Jan. 21, 2025); see also GameStop short squeeze, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GameStop_short_squeeze (last edited Aug. 10, 2025) (last accessed Oct. 22, 2025).
[vii] Maggie Fitzgerald, Robinhood restricts trading in GameStop, other names involved in frenzy, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/robinhood-interactive-brokers-restrict-trading-in-gamestop-s.html (Jan. 28, 2021).
[viii] Sodha v. Golubowski, No. 24-1036, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *10-11, 2025 WL 2487954, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).
[ix] Id., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *23-24, 2025 WL 2487954, at *7.
[x] Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996).
[xi] Sodha v. Golubowski, No. 24-1036, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *34, 2025 WL 2487954, at *11 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).
[xii] Id., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *30, 2025 WL 2487954, at *10.
[xiii] Id., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22270, at *45, 2025 WL 2487954, at *15.
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(Estimated time to read: 4 – 6 minutes)
By Noah Gemma
In the wake of the special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC” or “SPACs”) frenzy that is widely considered to have been value destructive for public investors,[1] a large swath of stockholder plaintiffs filed so-called “MultiPlan” putative class action claims challenging SPAC mergers that are alleged to be financially and procedurally unfair.
Generally, these MultiPlan class actions generally claim that “the SPAC's fiduciaries—motivated by financial incentives not shared with public stockholders—impaired the public stockholders’ right to divest their shares before the business combination occurred” for $10 per share.[2] Recently, the Court of Chancery has permitted almost all of the stockholder MultiPlan complaints to proceed to discovery and denied many motions to dismiss.[3]
Accordingly, a crucial issue going forward in many cases throughout the Delaware Court of Chancery will be how to measure monetary recovery for successful MultiPlan claims. A lesser-known Lordstown Motors decision may potentially shed some light on how the Court of Chancery will measure monetary recovery for such claims.[4]
In Lordstown Motors, the SPAC fiduciaries were sued in federal court for alleged violations of federal securities law, and they were also sued in Delaware for alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.[5] The defendants moved to stay the Delaware action pending resolution of the federal securities action under the so-called “McWane doctrine.”[6]
In applying the McWane doctrine, the Court of Chancery analyzed whether the federal and state actions had sufficient factual and legal overlap to grant the defendants’ motion to stay.[7] Lordstown Motors thus presented the Delaware Court of Chancery with the rare opportunity to analyze the appropriate measure of monetary recovery for MultiPlan claims before any of its MultiPlan cases reached trial.
Lordstown Motors explained that the measure of recovery for a MultiPlan claim may be “entirely different” from that of a federal securities claim.[8] A federal securities claim may seek recovery “for losses allegedly caused by the decline in [the SPAC’s] stock price from a class period high,” a price which may exceed the SPAC’s $10 redemption price.[9] Lordstown Motors explained that this is unlike the measure of recovery for a MultiPlan claim, which “could turn on the $10 redemption price (plus interest) relative to the value the class received in the de-SPAC transaction.”[10]
Although Lordstown Motors did not elaborate on its phrase “the value the class received,” other cases suggest that this may refer to the “tru[e] worth” of the class’s shares.[11] Read in this light, Lordstown Motors suggests that the appropriate measure of monetary recovery for successful MultiPlan claims is the $10 redemption price minus the true value of each share. SPAC investors who have suffered losses may consider these developments in the law and consult qualified counsel to explore their legal options.
Disclaimer: This memorandum is provided by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws. Prior results may not be predictive of future outcomes.
[1] See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 Yale J. On Reg. 228, 292 (2022) (“By the second quarter of 2021, SPAC share prices came back roughly to where they were before the bubble, with mean pre-merger share prices approximately at $10.00. Furthermore, those SPACs that merged in Q4 2020 and Q1 2021 and appeared to be great deals for investors have now soured. As of December 2021, the mean and median prices for those SPACs have fallen to $9.01 and $7.09, respectively. If investors had redeemed their shares and invested the proceeds in a market index, they would now have roughly $12.35 in value.”).
[2] In re Multiplan Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 268 A.3d 784, 792 (Del. Ch. 2022).
[3] See, e.g., id. (holding that complaint adequately alleges MultiPlan claim); Laidlaw v. GigAcquisitions2, LLC, 2023 WL 2292488 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2023) (same); Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC288 A.3d 692 (Del. Ch. 2023) (same); In re XL Fleet (Pivotal) S’holder Litig. Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0808-KSJM (Del. Ch. June 9, 2023) (same); Malork v. Anderson C.A. No. 2022-0260-PAF (Del. Ch. July 17, 2023) (same); Newbold v. McCaw C.A. No. 2022-0439-LWW (Del. Ch. July 21, 2023) (same); In re Finserv Acquisition Corp. C.A. No. 2022-0755-PAF (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2023) (same); Electric Last Mile Solutions, Inc. S’holder Litig. 2024 WL 223195 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2024) (same); Farzad v. Trasimene Capital, FT, LP II, C.A. No. 2023-0193-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2024) (same); In re Kensington-QuantumScape De-SPAC Litig, C.A. No. 2022-0721-JTL (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2024) (same); In re Nikola Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2022-0023-KSJM (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2024) (same); Lien v. Eagle Equity Partners II, LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0972-PAF (Del Ch. May 29, 2024) (same); Drulias et al. v. Affeldt et al., C.A. No. 2024-0161-BWD (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2025) (same); In re Archer Aviation Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 2024-0527-LWW (Del. Ch. July 21, 2025) (same); Gera v. Mende et al., C.A. No. 2024-06160-PAF (Del. Ch. July 29, 2025) (same).
[4] Lordstown Motors Corp. S’holder Litig., 2022 WL 678597 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022).
[5] See id.
[6] See id.
[7] See id.
[8] Id. at *5.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. In doing so, Lordstown Motors suggests that recovery for MultiPlan claims may exceed the losses caused by a decline in a SPAC’s trading price if the SPAC’s trading price exceeds the value the class the received in the SPAC transaction. If, for example, a SPAC’s trading price declines from $10 to $5 per share, but the MultiPlan class received $1 in value per share, then Lordstown Motors suggests that the class would recover $9 per share.
[11] MultiPlan, 268 A.3d, at 804 n.118.
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The two principal federal securities statutes under which civil plaintiffs may bring lawsuits for false and misleading statements or omissions of material fact are Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (“Exchange Act”), and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder (generally applicable to securities fraud cases), and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k (“Securities Act”) (generally applicable to disclosures in registration statements for public offerings).[1] Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, invoked less frequently, is closely related to Section 11 and applies to disclosures in prospectuses for public offerings.
Both Section 10(b) and Section 11 provide for liability for material misrepresentations and omissions, although they are worded slightly differently. Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful under Section 10(b) to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”[2] Section 11(a) makes it unlawful for “any part” of a registration statement, when effective, to contain “an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”[3] Thus, both statutes provide for liability not just for affirmatively false statements, but for the omission of material facts. Courts have uniformly held, however, that to hold a defendant liable for an omission, the defendant must have a duty to disclose that omitted information.[4] Such a duty is generally triggered either by (a) an affirmative statement that is materially misleading if the omitted information is not disclosed;[5] or (b) an independent duty to disclose the information, such as one derived from statute or regulation.[6]
One of the sources of such an “independent duty” to disclose information (or liability for so-called “pure omissions”) often invoked by plaintiffs in federal securities cases has been the SEC’s regulatory requirements for disclosures in a company’s filings with the Commission, particularly SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303,[7] which requires companies in the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of Operation” (“MD&A”) section of such filings to “[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that are reasonably likely to have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”[8] For example, a plaintiff may argue that discovering internal data showing significantly declining sales from a key customer, or that a key patent is under threat, would constitute facts requiring corporate disclosure, even if they do not render any prior statements false, but as “pure omissions.”
Until recently, courts, including courts of appeals, disagreed on whether failure to make a disclosure required by Item 303 could independently support a claim under Section 10(b). For example, in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Item 303’s affirmative duty to disclose in Form 10-Qs can serve as the basis for a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b).” The Second Circuit recognized that the language of Section 10(b) imposes liability where defendants “to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make … statements made … not misleading”—unlike Section 11 which also contains an alternative ground for liability where defendants “omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein.” However, it reasoned that because (i) “Form 10–Qs are mandatory filings that ‘speak ... to the entire market,’” and (ii) Item 303 disclosures are “required elements of those filings” that “give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through the eyes of management,” investors would interpret the absence of an Item 303 disclosure to imply the nonexistence of “known trends or uncertainties ... that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material ... unfavorable impact on ... revenues or income”—therefore omitting an item required to be disclosed in a 10-Q can render that financial statement “misleading,” satisfying the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.[9] Stratte-McClure added that to state a Section 10(b) claim, the omitted facts must still satisfy the “materiality” test set forth by the Supreme Court for Section 10(b) cases in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which took precedence over any notions of materiality indicated in Item 303.[10]
On the other hand, in In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that “Item 303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.” In so doing, the Ninth Circuit stuck to the statutory language of Section 10(b), stating that “‘[d]isclosure is required under [Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5] only when necessary “to make ... statements made, in the [sic] light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”’” Id. at 1054.[11] The Ninth Circuit in NVIDIA also cited the Third Circuit’s opinion by then-Judge Alito in Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2000), where the Court held that (i) Item 303 does not give rise to a separate cause of action (apart from Section 10(b) or 11), and (ii) because the test for disclosure under Item 303 “varies considerably from the general test for securities fraud materiality set out by the Supreme Court in Basic,” “a violation of SK–303’s reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.” Having decided the omitted facts were not material under Basic, Oran concluded there was no liability under Section 10(b).[12] Stratte-McClure seized on the “does not automatically” language to state that Oran meant that liability under Section 10(b) for a violation of Item 303 was not precluded, but was consistent with Stratte-McClure’s decision that a violation of Item 303 could support Section 10(b) liability so long as the omission was material under Basic, and indicated that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to “rely” on Oran for a blanket rule to the contrary.[13]
In 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this circuit split in Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys., 580 U.S. 1216 (2017), but soon dismissed the petition because the case settled. 585 U.S. 1001 (2018). Predictably, in 2023 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P.[14]
Macquarie involved a corporate subsidiary that owned liquid storage terminals. Relying on alleged violations of Item 303, plaintiffs alleged that the company’s public statements violated Section 10(b) because they omitted to disclose the extent to which the subsidiary relied on storing a fuel type that faced an international ban. Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor held that a violation of Item 303 can support a Section 10(b) claim only if the omission renders affirmative statements misleading, and that “[p]ure omissions are not actionable” under Section 10(b)—abrogating Stratte-McClure on this basis.[15]
Like the Ninth Circuit in NVIDIA, the Supreme Court stuck to the statutory text of Section 10(b). The Court stated, “[Rule 10b-5] prohibits omitting material facts necessary to make the ‘statements made ... not misleading.’ [I]t requires disclosure of information necessary to ensure that statements already made are clear and complete…. This Rule therefore covers half-truths, not pure omissions. Logically and by its plain text, the Rule requires identifying affirmative assertions (i.e., ‘statements made’) before determining if other facts are needed to make those statements ‘not misleading.’”[16] Macquarie’s holding on its face appears to foreclose liability for pure omissions that violated Item 303, but also pure omissions that arise from the violation of other statutes or regulations, since although the case arose in the context of an alleged Item 303 violation, the language of the decision was not so limited to Item 303 but appeared to cover “pure omissions” generally.
In so holding, however, the Court drew a distinction between the language of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, and Section 11, which appears to affirm that violations of Item 303 may be an independent basis of a Section 11 claim: “Statutory context confirms what the text plainly provides. Congress imposed liability for pure omissions in §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Section 11(a) prohibits any registration statement that ‘contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.’ 15 U.S.C. §77k(a). By its terms, in addition to proscribing lies and half-truths, this section also creates liability for failure to speak on a subject at all… There is no similar language in §10(b) or Rule 10b-5(b)).”[17]
Justice Sotomayor rejected an argument similar to that cited in Stratte-McClure, i.e., that “reasonable investors know that Item 303 requires an MD&A to disclose all known trends and uncertainties” and failure to make such disclosures thus renders the MD&A misleading. The Court stated that this argument failed “because it reads the words ‘statements made’ out of Rule 10b-5(b) and shifts the focus of that Rule and §10(b) from fraud to disclosure.” Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-235 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud”)). The Court also rejected the argument that without private liability for “pure omissions” under Rule 10b-5(b), there will be “broad immunity” for fraudulent omissions of information that Congress and the SEC require issuers to disclose, noting that plaintiffs were still free to bring such claims for half-truths, and the SEC still retained the power to prosecute “pure omissions” that violated Item 303.[18]
Accordingly, after Macquarie it appears clear that plaintiffs may not invoke violations of Item 303—and very possibly any other statute or regulation—as an independent basis for a Section 10(b) claim, but can bring such claims under Section 11.[19]
Nonetheless, after Macquarie, certain open issues remain, which are only beginning to be grappled with by the lower courts seeking to interpret Macquarie and whether and how it applies.
For example, although Macquarie expressly dealt with liability under Rule 10b-5(b), can a plaintiff ground liability for a Item 303 violation in Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) (scheme liability), which does not require that defendant make an “untrue statement … or … omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make … statements made … not misleading”? Although there is no post-Macquarie case yet directly on point, the answer is likely yes, but the facts of the case would have to overall rise to the level of a “scheme”, regardless of whether there was a “pure omission” or not; thus this may more of a theoretical than practical inquiry.[20]
Further, parties might still be able to use Item 303 as guide for what omissions render affirmative statements misleading.[21]
Additionally, what of Section 12(a)(2)? While Section 11 has fairly clear language imposing liability where defendants made “an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,” Section 12(a)(2)’s language is closer to Section 10(b), as it imposes civil liability on any person who “offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements ... not misleading.”[22] Yet, courts often say that “Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) are ‘Securities Act siblings’ with similar elements,”[23] as they both seek to ensure accurate and complete disclosure in public offerings to protect their integrity. Macquarie was wholly silent on Section 12(a)(2).
Prior to Macquarie, consistent with the notion that Sections 11 and 12 are “siblings with similar elements,” courts tended to analyze claims for “pure omissions” (including for violations of Item 303) that were brought under Section 11 and 12(a)(2), together, and without differentiating between the statutory language.[24] Further, in Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit noted that in Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commun’s, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012), and Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P., 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011), “we established that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for the purposes of liability under Section 12(a)(2).”[25] At least some other circuit courts of appeals appear to take a similar approach, rather than focusing on the linguistic distinction.[26] The Ninth Circuit in Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.1998), had also stated that “allegations which would support a claim under Item 303(a)(3)(ii) are sufficient to support a claim under section 12(a)(2).” At the same time, however, Stratte-McClure criticized the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent NVIDIA decision for, in seeking to distinguish Steckman from the Section 10(b) context, failing to recognize that Section 12(a)(2)’s language is indeed much closer to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 than to Section 11.[27]
There appear to be no cases post-dating Macquarie addressing this issue directly,[28] but it is likely that violations of Item 303 will continue to provide an independent basis for liability for Section 12(a)(2) claims in many jurisdictions, at least until the Supreme Court takes up that issue directly. This is largely because of (i) the courts’ historic treatment of Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims together, given their related goal of ensuring the strict integrity of public offerings, and (ii) Macquarie’s statement that one of the primary bases for its distinction of Item 303 in Section 10(b) versus Section 11 claims was that imposing liability for “pure omissions” under Section 10(b) would “shift[] the focus of [Rule 10b-5] and §10(b) from fraud to disclosure,” when “what [Section 10(b)] catches must be fraud.” Because Section 12(a)(2), like Section 11, is a statute that focuses on disclosure, not fraud, that rationale would not apply to Section 12(a)(2) claims.[29]
Since Item 303 requires the description of “known trends or uncertainties” reasonably likely to have a material impact, another remaining issue after Macquarie is whether, in Section 11 or 12(a)(2) cases, plaintiffs have to plead actual knowledge of such trends or uncertainties (or whether alleging facts indicating defendants “should have known” of them is enough), as well as whether such allegations are subject to the heightened pleading requires of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (for fraud allegations) or the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).
The tension here is that Item 303 requires the pleading of “known” trends, while Section 11 and 12(a)(2)—unlike Section 10(b) which requires pleading of scienter—are strict liability or negligence statutes.
There has been a growing trend of cases holding or suggesting that pleading of actual knowledge is required.[30] At the same time, some cases, even in the same appellate court, appear to call that into question, suggesting that something like an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, or in any event something less than scienter, may suffice.[31] The issue can arise, for instance, in cases alleging both Section 11 and 10(b) claims, where plaintiffs feel compelled to disclaim all allegations of knowing misconduct for their Section 11 claims so that they are not deemed to “sound in fraud” and thus become subject to heightened pleading requirements; but such a disclaimer might risk defendants’ argument that they have thereby also disclaimed the “knowledge” requirement of an alleged Item 303 violation. Courts sensitive to the issue have drawn a distinction between the “knowledge” requirement for the purposes of Item 303 (especially in the context of a Section 11 or 12(a)(2) claim grounded in strict liability or negligence), and “scienter” for the purposes of a Section 10(b) fraud claim. See Jianpu, 2020 WL 5757628, at *10 (“The issue is whether the … trends were ‘known’ for purposes of Item 303, not whether Defendants acted with fraudulent intent. The Amended Complaint's allegations are consistent with Plaintiff pleading obligations in alleging violations of Sections 11, 12, and 15; as noted above, these provisions have no scienter requirement.”).
Relatedly, generally it appears that plaintiffs need not plead such knowledge with the same heightened specificity requirements demanded by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), or the PSLRA, but should nonetheless include enough detail to render the inference of defendants’ knowledge “plausible” or “reasonable.”[32]
[1] Broadly speaking, Section 10(b), and its implementing regulation, SEC Rule 10b-5, prohibits deceptive practices (including false and misleading statements and omissions) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and requires a showing of scienter (fraudulent intent) on the part of the defendant, while Section 11 prohibits misstatements and omissions in registration statements for the public offering of securities, and imposes strict liability therefor on certain parties, such as the issuer. Section 11 typically applies to initial public offerings, or secondary offerings, while Section 10(b) applies to the trading of securities on the market, although it can also be applied to public offerings (which also implicate the “purchase or sale of securities”).
[2] 17 CFR §240.10b-5(b).
[3] 15 U.S.C. §77k(a).
[4] See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n. 17 (1988) (“[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b–5.”); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.1993) (“an omission is actionable under the securities laws only when the corporation is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts.”); Bond Opportunity Fund II, LLC v. Heffernan, 340 F. Supp. 2d 146, 157 (D.R.I. 2004) (“A duty to disclose does not arise merely because information may be of interest to investors.”).
[5] In Section 10(b) parlance, this is triggered if defendants “to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,” and in Section 11 parlance, it is triggered if defendants “omitted to state a material fact … necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”
[6] A third source of the duty to disclose may be where a corporate insider trades on confidential information. See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir.1992) (duty to disclose may arise when there is “a corporate insider trad[ing] on confidential information,” a “statute or regulation requiring disclosure,” or a corporate statement that would otherwise be “inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading.” (quoting Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1990) (en banc)); accord Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 285–86 (3d Cir.2000).
[7] In particular, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act requires issuers to file periodic informational statements. 15 U.S.C. §§78m(a)(1), 78l(b)(1). These statements include the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of Operation” (MD&A), in which companies must “[f]urnish the information required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K.” See SEC Form 10-K; SEC Form 10-Q.
[8] 17 CFR §229.303(b)(2)(ii) (2022). Additionally, Regulation S-K Item 105, 17 CFR §229.105 (formerly Item 503), requires that “[w]here appropriate,” a registrant “provide under the caption ‘Risk Factors’ a discussion of the material factors that make an investment in the registrant or offering speculative or risky,” and “[c[oncisely explain how each risk affects the registrant or the securities being offered.” Claims based on Item 303 and 105 are often treated together and involve similar issues. See, e.g., Panther Partners Inc. v. Jianpu Technology Inc., 2020 WL 5757628, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2020) (“The same facts underlying an Item 303 violation may also support an Item 503 [n/k/a Item 105] violation, and a court's rationale for determining the former may also support the same determination of the latter.”). This Article is limited to analysis of the more frequently invoked Item 303.
[9] 776 F. 3d at 102. See also Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2001) (assuming that Regulation S-K triggered disclosure obligation in Section 10(b) case but noting that adverse FDA letter postdated the 10-K omitting the alleged “known trend or uncertainty,” such that there was no Item 303 violation).
[10] Basic held that disclosure of contingent events is required “upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.” 485 U.S. at 238. The SEC has characterized a company’s disclosure obligations under Item 303 as follows: “(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required. (2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.” Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22430 (May 24, 1989).
[11] Citations omitted. See also Carvelli v. Ocwen Fin’l Corp., 934 F.3d 1307, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) (following NVIDIA).
[12] 226 F.3d at 288.
[13] 776 F.3d at 103.
[14] 600 U. S. __, 144 S. Ct. 479 (2023).
[15] 601 U.S. at 259, 266.
[16] 601 U.S. at 264.
[17] Id. at 264 (citing Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 186, n.3 (2015) (“Section 11’s omissions clause also applies when an issuer fails to make mandated disclosures—those ‘required to be stated’—in a registration statement”)).
[18] 601 U.S. at 265-66.
[19] See also In re Vroom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 862125, at *40 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2025) (“While Macquarie does not address a Section 11 claim, the Supreme Court acknowledged in that case that–in contrast to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act–‘Congress imposed liability for pure omissions in § 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.’”)
[20] See In re DiDi Global Inc. Sec. Litig.. 2025 WL 1909295, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2025) (magistrate’s report and recommendation to certify class including scheme liability claim based on omission); In re Mobileye Global Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 1126967, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2025) (“To ensure that claims of scheme liability do not ‘evade the pleading requirements imposed in misrepresentation cases,’ a plaintiff must plead ‘something beyond misstatements and omissions,’ that is, ‘something extra that makes a violation a scheme.’ Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Rio Tinto plc, 41 F.4th 47, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2022)”); In re Paysafe Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 1003322, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (“Scheme liability arises when defendants engage in deceptive conduct in conjunction with deceptive statements. See Lorenzo v. SEC, 587 U.S. 71, 78–82 (2019). To state a claim for scheme liability, a plaintiff must present facts showing (1) that the defendant committed a deceptive or manipulative act, (2) in furtherance of the alleged scheme to defraud, (3) with scienter, and (4) reliance.” (citations omitted)); Okla. Firefighters Pension and Ret. Sys. v. Musk, 779 F. Supp.3d 396, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“The Second Circuit has held that “misstatements and omissions can form part of a scheme liability claim, but an actionable scheme liability claim also requires something beyond misstatements and omissions, such as dissemination” (citing Rio Tinto, supra, 41 F.4th at 49 (emphasis in original); noting defendants argued that Musk’s failure to disclose his ownership stake was an omission not actionable under Rule 10b-5 and that by invoking scheme liability “Plaintiff is attempting and end-run around Rule 10b-5(b),” but that the court need not decide whether dissemination alone led to liability because defendants had engaged in other acts to perpetuate the scheme).
[21] See Macquarie, 601 U.S. at 258 (“the failure to disclose information required by Item 303 can support a Rule 10b-5(b) claim only if the omission renders affirmative statements made misleading.”); see also In re Sotera Health Co. Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 1648942, at *33 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2025) (similar).
[22] 15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2).
[23] See, e.g., In re SVB Fin’ Grp. Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 1676800, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2025); In re Sotera, 2025 WL 1648942, at *37.
[24] See, e.g., In re Dentsply Sirona, Inc. Sec. Litig., 665 F.Supp.3d 255, 288-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (discussing claims for violations of Item 303 under Section 11 and 12(a)(2) together).
[25] Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104; see also id. at 99 (noting Panther Partners and Litwin “held that Item 303 may provide a basis for disclosure obligations under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)”).
[26] See, e.g., J & R Mktg. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir.2008); Silverstrand Invs. v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 102-03, 107 (1st Cir.2013).
[27] Here, Stratte-McClure may have a point. NVIDIA sought to distinguish Steckman and Section 12(a)(2) from Section 10(b) cases by stating that (i) “as we acknowledged in Steckman…, ‘Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act ... differs significantly from Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.,” and (ii) “[l]iability under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act may arise from ‘omitt[ing] to state a material fact required to be stated.’ See 15 U.S.C. §§77k(a), 77l(b).” But Steckman had said Section 10(b) “differs significantly” from Section 12(a)(2) because Section 10(b) “has only an implied right of action,” while Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) “have express rights of action”—it was not suggesting that the disclosures provisions of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and Section 12(a)(2) were not similar. See Steckman, 143 F.3d at 1296. More significantly, in its quote, NVIDIA cuts off the rest of Section 12(a)(2)’s language, which goes on to say that a defendant is liable if he/she “omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”
[28] See In re Sotera, 2025 WL 1648942, at *37-39 (treating Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims together, including allegations of Item 303 violations thereunder, without distinguishing the statutory language of each, but holding allegations were insufficient under both sections).
[29] See also Ikanos Commun’s, 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the interrorem nature of the liability [Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)] create”); In re Sotera, supra note 28, 2025 WL 1648942, at *37-39.
[30] See Medina v. Tremor Video, Inc., 640 Fed. Appx. 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating in Section 11 case that “our precedents require allegations of specific facts from which we could draw the ‘plausible inference’ that defendants had actual knowledge of the trends or uncertainties at the time the registration statement was issued.”); Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2016) (same, in Section 10(b) case); see also Yi Xiang v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc. 254 F.Supp.3d 635, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (plaintiffs’ “allegation regarding the Deloitte news [sent to defendants] alert distinguishes this case from Medina, where plaintiffs relied purely on public information to allege that defendants had actual knowledge. The Deloitte news alert was a targeted e-mail sent to the Defendants that would have informed them about the tax change. The Court finds that these allegations give rise to a plausible inference that Defendants had actual knowledge as required by Item 303.”); In re Sotera, 2025 WL 1648942, at *39 (similar); Lilien v. Olaplex Holdings, Inc., 765 F.Supp.3d 993, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (similar). Most, though not all, courts have concluded that Item 105 also requires disclosure of only risks known to the issuer. Lian v. Tuya Inc., 2024 WL 966263, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2024) (citing cases going both ways).
[31] See Local #817 IBT Pension Fund v. XPO Logistics, Inc., 2022 WL 2358414, at *4 (2d Cir. June 30, 2022) (finding, in Section 10(b) case postdating Medina, that, where “Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants had actual knowledge of a duty to disclose” under Item 303, “[t]he issue is … whether, accepting Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true, those facts give rise to a strong inference that Defendants were subject to a duty to disclose so obvious that the failure to disclose was a ‘highly unreasonable’ and ‘extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.’”); see also Jianpu, 2020 WL 5757628, at *10 (stressing that pleading “known” facts for purposes of Item 303 under Section 11 is not as exacting as pleading scienter, which is not required under Section 11, but without articulating a standard).
[32] Medina, 640 Fed. Appx. at 48; Ikanos Commun’s, 681 F.3d at 121; Jianpu, 2020 WL 5757628, at *10 (although complaint did not allege that “‘any of the [D]efendants ... engaged in intentional or reckless misconduct or acted with fraudulent intent,’” Item 303 knowledge allegations sufficed where inference of knowledge was “plausible”); In re CPI Card Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 4941597, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that “[b]ecause plaintiffs are proceeding under strict liability and negligence theories, rather than asserting fraud, the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) … and the [PSLRA] do not apply,” Item 303 knowledge requirement satisfied where such knowledge was “reasonable to infer” and “plausible” from the facts alleged); Inovalon, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 643-44 (same).
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(Estimated time to read: 6 – 8 minutes)
By Amanda Foley
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §20(a) control person claims often play second fiddle—tagging alongside lead claims asserting securities fraud under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.[i] This ordinarily makes sense because §20(a) claims are predicated on a primary violation of the Exchange Act. As such, when any §10(b) claims survive a motion to dismiss, the corresponding §20(a) claims will usually survive as well. However, an often-overlooked aspect of control person liability occurs when a §10(b) claim has been dismissed as to the controlling person, but the motion to dismiss a §10(b) claim against a co-defendant has been denied.
When multiple defendants are named in a complaint and the court finds liability for some, but not all defendants, those found not liable for §10(b) violations can still be liable for control person claims. An example fact pattern is as follows: defendant A, the CEO, and defendant B, the CFO are alleged to have made false and misleading statements in violation of §10b-5 in reports filed with the SEC by defendant C, the company. In an order partially granting the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, the court finds the CEO liable for misrepresentations made with scienter. At this point, there is a primary violation of a controlled person (the company), which forms the basis of the control person claim. The court then goes on to find that CFO did not have scienter, and thus dismisses both the §10b-5 claim and §20(a) claim against the CFO.
Dismissing both claims could be incorrect, however, because the CFO could still be liable for the control person claim. For instance, if the CFO signed the annual and quarterly reports containing the alleged fraud, and the plaintiff alleged the CFO had control over the company, then the CFO can still be liable under control person liability for the company’s violations. Furthermore, because a “‘plaintiff does not have the burden of establishing that person’s scienter distinct from the controlled corporation’s scienter’” control person liability can be found for a defendant who otherwise had no scienter. [ii]
A similar fact pattern arose in Moradpour v. Velodyne Lidar, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241994 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2022) (“Velodyne”) where the Court incorrectly dismissed a control person liability claim. In Velodyne, the plaintiffs asserted fraud claims brought under §10(b) and advanced four categories of false or misleading statements by the defendants related to their efforts to drum up support for the SPAC merger and inflate the price of Velodyne securities. [iii] The court sustained the §10(b) claims against defendants Velodyne, Anand Gopalan (“Gopalan”), and Michael Dee (“Dee”) based on untrue or misleading statements relating to the ouster of the founder David Hall (“Hall”). [iv] The court likewise sustained the §20(a) control person claims for defendants Gopalan and Dee based on Velodyne’s statements about Hall’s ouster. [v] However, the plaintiffs moved for clarification of the court’s dismissal, in full, of claims asserted against another defendant, Andrew Hamer (“Hamer”), Velodyne’s CFO and Treasurer who signed several Velodyne SEC filings which contained the same actionable material misstatements about Hall’s ouster. [vi]
To demonstrate “a prima facie case under § 20(a), plaintiff must prove: (1) a primary violation of federal securities laws[;] and (2) that the defendant exercised actual power or control over the primary violator[.]” [vii] In Velodyne, the court found a primary violation of the securities laws against defendants Velodyne, Gopalan, and Dee for statements about the ouster. Thus, the plaintiffs needed only to prove that Hamer exercised control over the violator, and courts routinely sustain §20(a) control claims against corporate officers who, as with defendant Hamer, sign written documents containing actionable misstatements. [viii]
In the order granting plaintiff’s motion to clarify, the court acknowledged that “[d]ismissing claims against Hamer was an oversight[]” and corrected its prior order to deny the motion to dismiss as it pertains to the §20(a) claim against Hamer based on Hall’s ouster. [ix]
This example serves to demonstrate that close attention pays off, even for the often overshadowed §20(a) claims.
[i] 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a)), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
[ii] Howard v. Everex Sys. Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).
[iii] Id. at *5.
[iv] Id. at *5-6.
[v] Id.
[vi] Moradpour v. Velodyne Lidar, Inc., No. 21-cv-01486-SI, ECF No. 124 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2022).
[vii] Howard 228 F.3d at 1065.
[viii] See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1065-66 (“review and signature of the financial statements[]” sufficient to “presume control[.]”).
[ix] Moradpour v. Velodyne Lidar, Inc 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241994, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2022).
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(Estimated time to read: 9 – 11 minutes)
On March 26, 2025, Delaware Governor Matt Meyer signed Senate Bill 21 (SB 21), significantly amending (among other things) Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), the statute that governs shareholders’ rights to inspect corporate books and records.[1] While other attorneys at Levi & Korsinsky have commented on the consequences of other provisions of SB 21,[2] this article specifically focuses on the amendments to Section 220 of the DGCL and the challenges that stockholders now face in obtaining books and records from a company.
Although the bill’s supporters claimed the amendments merely codify existing practices, promote efficiency, and ensure clarity,[3] these changes present a substantial rollback of transparency and oversight mechanisms that investors have long relied upon to monitor corporate management and investigate wrongdoing.
Section 220, codified in the 1967 DGCL amendments, formalized the long-standing common law principle in Delaware that stockholders are entitled to inspect corporate books and records, a tool that has been central to corporate governance and shareholder oversight.[4] While the underlying principle of inspection rights remains intact, the newly adopted amendments introduced substantial procedural and substantive changes that affect both the scope of permissible inspections and the way demands must be made:

What Has Really Changed—And Why It Matters
One of the most impactful changes is the restriction of what counts as “books and records.” Historically, Section 220 allowed shareholders to request access to a corporation’s “books and records” so long as they could demonstrate a proper purpose.[5] However, the statute did not define what qualified as "books and records," leaving the interpretation to the courts. SB 21 alters that framework by expressly defining the types of documents that would fall within the scope of inspection and by codifying several judicial doctrines that have developed over decades of litigation.[6] Previously, courts could, and often did, order production of informal materials such as emails or text messages when formal documents were lacking or appeared to have been sanitized.[7] These communications frequently contained key insights into directors’ and officers’ actual decision-making and intent. Under SB 21, such materials are off-limits,[8] unless a shareholder can prove that no formal records exist and can meet a significantly higher evidentiary threshold.[9]
These changes not only limit the types of documents shareholders can access, but also shield behind-the-scenes communications that may reveal misconduct, conflicts of interest, or failures in oversight—precisely the kinds of issues that investors often seek to investigate through a books and records demand.
The new law also imposes more stringent procedural requirements. Accordingly, beyond just narrowing the range of discoverable materials, SB 21 also raises the bar for initiating a Section 220 demand. Shareholders must now:
Corporations are further empowered to impose confidentiality restrictions and to condition document production on the shareholder’s agreement that any materials obtained may be incorporated by reference in any related litigation.[11] While shareholders have always needed to show a “proper purpose,” SB 21 demands “reasonable particularity” in describing both the purpose and the specific documents sought.[12] This added specificity creates a serious conundrum: how can a shareholder describe the exact documents needed without knowing what exists?
This added hurdle risks deterring shareholders from pursuing valid inquiries, especially when weighed against the cost of litigation.
As noted above, another shift is the explicit authorization for corporations to impose confidentiality agreements and conditions on use of produced materials.[13] Although confidentiality has long been a feature of books and records actions, it was previously subject to equitable review by the Court of Chancery. Under SB 21, confidentiality terms are now more clearly within the company’s control, potentially limiting shareholders’ ability to share findings with other investors, regulators, or the press.
Perhaps one of the most significant changes is the mandatory incorporation by reference of all documents obtained through a Section 220 demand into any future complaint.[14] While this might appear to promote fairness by preventing selective use of materials, it can also increase litigation risk for shareholders—forcing them to include potentially unhelpful or ambiguous documents and giving defendants additional ammunition at the motion to dismiss stage.
Effective Date, Application, and What Comes Next?
The amendments apply to all books and records demands made after February 17, 2025. They do not retroactively affect litigation initiated or concluded prior to that date.
Previously, Delaware courts had operated a balanced framework for Section 220 that required credible evidence before permitting intrusive demands, while still giving shareholders access to the tools needed to investigate fraud or fiduciary breaches. SB 21 represents a substantial shift in how Delaware corporations and their shareholders engage over corporate transparency and governance oversight. While supporters of SB 21 argued that these changes would reduce frivolous litigation and preserve judicial resources, SB 21’s newly imposed procedural and evidentiary roadblocks represent a narrowing of shareholder rights that historically empowered investors to hold corporate management accountable. As a result, shareholders, and their attorneys, may find their ability to monitor companies significantly curtailed under SB 21. Shareholders considering a Section 220 demand should expect to do more upfront legal work and be prepared for companies to push back using the enhanced tools now available to them.
[1]See Office of the Governor, “Governor Meyer Signs SB21 Strengthening Delaware Corporate Law”, Delaware News (March 26, 2025) https://news.delaware.gov/2025/03/26/governor-meyer-signs-sb21-strengthening-delaware-corporate-law/.
[2] Brian Stewart, “Stockholder Considerations Following SB 21”, Levi & Korsinsky, available at https://zlk.com/Blog/stockholder-considerations-following-sb-21#_ftn2 (last accessed Jun. 17, 2025).
[3] In announcing the signing of SB21, Governor Meyer argued that the bill would protect Delaware’s status as “the best place in the world to incorporate your business” by “ensuring clarity and predictability, balancing the interests of stockholders and corporate boards.” See Office of the Governor, “Governor Meyer Signs SB21 Strengthening Delaware Corporate Law”, Delaware News (March 26, 2025) https://news.delaware.gov/2025/03/26/governor-meyer-signs-sb21-strengthening-delaware-corporate-law/; Mike Phillips, “Corporate law bill moves out of House committee”, WDEL News (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.wdel.com/business/corporate-law-bill-moves-out-of-house-committee/article_22ab8ffe-f631-40d3-b6b9-68483cd0ea58.html;
[4] State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 77 A. 16, 22 (Del. 1910).
[5] 8 Del. C. § 220(a)(2) (2025) (as amended by Del. S.B. 21, 153rd Gen. Assemb., (2025)), available at https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/ (last accessed Jun. 17, 2025) (“Proper purpose means a purpose reasonably related to a stockholder’s interest as a stockholder.”).
[6] 8 Del. C. § 220(a)(1).
[7] KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 752 (Del. 2019).
[8] 8 Del. C. § 220(7)(e).
[9] 8 Del. C. § 220(7)(f).
[10] 8 Del. C. § 220(b)(2).
[11] 8 Del. C. § 220(b)(3).
[12] 8 Del. C. § 220(b)(2).
[13] 8 Del. C. § 220(b)(3).
[14] 8 Del. C. § 220(b)(3).
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(Estimated time to read: 14 – 16 minutes)
Overview
In class action securities cases premised on misstatements and omissions made in connection with a company’s initial public offering, a complaint often alleges both claims arising under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Claims arising under Section 11 do not require showing a fraudulent state of mind (i.e., scienter) and therefore are governed by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Conversely, claims arising under Section 10(b) are held to the heightened pleading standard for fraud-based claims articulated in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, where a complaint alleges both Section 11 and Section 10(b) claims, plaintiffs are often confronted with an argument that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard should be applied to both claims.
This article explores a recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Pappas v. Qutoutiao Inc., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250 (2d Cir. 2024), which overturned a district court’s holding that the Section 11 claims were grounded in fraud and subject to Rule 9(b), and suggests that courts should ask—“would [such allegations] be evaluated under Rule 8 if contained in a stand-alone complaint alleging violations only of the Securities Act”—in lieu of applying other tests when assessing which pleading standard applies.
A Brief Review of Section 10(b), Section 11 and the Pleading Standards
Section 10(b) provides a cause of action for any person who purchases or acquires securities against any person or entity that employed manipulative or deceptive practices to secure the sale or acquisition of said security. Section 10(b) encompasses any materially misleading statement or omission that a person made to secure the security’s sale or acquisition. To prove a Section 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”[1] Section 10(b) is inherently grounded in fraud and as such, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” and generally allege “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind” to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.[2],[3]
By contrast, Section 11 provides those who purchased securities in a company’s offering a cause of action against certain persons (i.e., an issuer, director, underwriter, etc.) for any misrepresentation contained in the company’s registration statement that effected that offering.[4] To prove a Section 11 claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the “registration statement . . . contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading[;]” (2) that the purchased security was directly traceable to misleading registration statement; and (3) that the defendant was a person against whom such actions may be brought.[5] Section 11 claims are narrower than Section 10(b) claims because the statute only applies to misstatements and omissions made in a registration statement. Defendants are also strictly liable for such statements under Section 11 and the claims are typically premised on strict liability or negligence-based allegations. As such, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”[6] However, where a Section 11 claim sounds in fraud, then the complaint must meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud claims laid out in Rule 9(b).
Tests Frequently Applied in Evaluating Whether Section 11 Claims Sound in Fraud
Courts take varying approaches to assessing whether a Section 11 claim is grounded in negligence or fraud—and consequently, which standard of review applies.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit permits a plaintiff to choose “to allege some fraudulent and some non-fraudulent conduct” or rely entirely on “a unified course of fraudulent conduct[.]”[7] If the plaintiff chooses the former, then “only the allegations of fraud are subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements” rather than the whole claim.[8] However, if the plaintiff chooses to allege “a unified course of fraudulent conduct[,]” then both the Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims will be considered “‘grounded in fraud’” and both must satisfy Rule 9(b).[9]
In order to assess “‘whether the complaint ‘allege[s] a unified course of fraudulent conduct’ and ‘rel[ies] entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim[,]’’” courts in the Ninth Circuit “‘close[ly] examin[e]…the language and structure of the complaint[.]’”[10] This inquiry often involves determining whether the complaint relies on “the same alleged misrepresentations”[11] or “the exact same factual allegations[,]”[12] the latter of which raises an “assum[ption] that [the section 11 claim] sounds in fraud.”[13] Courts in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits take a similar approach.[14],[15]
Prior to the Second Circuit’s Pappas decision, courts in the Southern District of New York (“Southern District” or “SDNY”) often assessed an operative complaint’s structure to determine whether there was “‘a clear distinction between [the] negligence and fraud claims[,]’” including evaluating whether: (1) the complaint contains a blanket fraud disclaimer; (2) the claims employ classic fraud language; (3) the claims have been segregated into separate sections of the complaint; and (4) there are different theories and/or defendants underlying each claim.[16] Notably, Southern District courts have recognized that plaintiffs are permitted to “‘plead claims in the alternative’”—meaning that misstatement claims can be asserted as either fraud or negligence within the same complaint—and subject to correspondingly different pleading standards.[17] “The fact that the alleged misstatements supporting the Section 11 … claims are the same as those in the Section 10(b) claims is not dispositive” of whether Rule 9(b) applies.[18] Courts in the Third Circuit take a similar approach.[19]
Accordingly, although courts recognize that a plaintiff may plead in the alternative that a misstatement was fraudulent or negligent, the approaches used to assess whether a Section 11 claim sounds in fraud can inadvertently infringe on a plaintiff’s right to do so. For instance, as evidenced by the discussion below, an inquiry that focuses on whether the Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims allege the same misstatements or similar facts has the potential to improperly focus the analysis on the statements themselves or the underlying conduct, respectively, rather than allegations that carefully couch the conduct as negligence.
The Second Circuit’s Inquiry in Pappas v. Qutoutiao Inc.
On October 28, 2024, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Pappas v. Qutoutiao Inc., addressing whether the district court erred in applying the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) to negligence-based Securities Act claims.[20]
The underlying complaint sued Qutoutiao Inc. (“QTT”), a Chinese mobile content aggregator that makes money by selling advertisements on its app, and certain other defendants related to allegedly false and misleading statements concerning QTT’s non-compliance with Chinese laws and regulations, which prohibit entities from disseminating untrue or inaccurate advertising and entertainment content.[21] Specifically, the lead plaintiff alleged: (i) Section 10(b) claims against QTT, the Insider Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants; and (ii) Section 11 claims against QTT, the Director Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants, among other claims.[22] Both the Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims concerned: (i) misstatements regarding QTT’s “‘strategy of targeting users in lower tier cities in China[;]’” (ii) omissions of material facts that made the statements in in the IPO and SPO documents misleading; (iii) failure to disclose certain related party transaction information; and (iv) misstatements and omissions related to net revenue data and reasons for replacing the Company's third-party advertising.[23] Given the complaint alleged both Section 11 and Section 10(b) claims premised on some but not all the same facts and contained overlapping alleged false statements and omissions, the Qutoutiao district court assessed whether the Section 11 claims were grounded in fraud or negligence.[24]
At the outset of its analysis, the Qutoutiao district court noted that the Second Circuit and SDNY courts offer varying guidance with respect to a plaintiff’s burden to differentiate Section 11 claims from Section 10(b).[25] Expounding on this guidance, the Qutoutiao district court explained that, under Second (and Ninth Circuit) precedent, a complaint needs to do more than merely state that the Section 11 claim does not sound in fraud to preserve Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard.[26] Relying on SDNY authorities, the Qutoutiao district court then explained that a complaint’s articulation of the basis for the negligence claim or efforts to compartmentalize the fraud and non-fraud claims are factors to consider when assessing Section 11 claims from fraud-based ones.[27] Turning to its analysis of the complaint at issue, the Qutoutiao district court explained that it “attempt[ed] to differentiate the” claims from one another and “disclaim[ed] a theory of fraud” for the Section 11 claims. Nevertheless, the Qutoutiao district court held that the Section 11 claims “manifestly sound in fraud and thereby trigger the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard.”[28]
The Qutoutiao district court’s rationale was that the complaint’s Section 11 section employed language that exactly mirrored the language in the Section 10(b) section, including: (1) a fact section labeled “[d]efendant’s Illegal Acts” that came before both sections and alleged fraud in the offering documents and intentional placement of illegal advertisements; (2) IPO and SPO statements premised on material misstatements about “the [c]ompany’s strategy of targeting users” and omissions that the company was seeking to avoid the oversight of a superior content moderator; and (3) challenges to risk disclosures under both Section 11 and Section 10(b) that asserted the same basis. [29]
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s holding, finding that it had erred in determining the Section 11 claim sounded in fraud. [30] In doing so, the Second Circuit explained that the complaint’s Section 11 claims were classically framed in strict liability and negligence language, such as “[d]efendants failed to satisfy their ‘duty to make [a] reasonable and diligent investigation’ to ensure that the offering documents did not contain misstatements or omissions.”[31] The Second Circuit further noted that plaintiff made more than nominal efforts to distinguish the claims, including by: (1) expressly disclaiming fraud, scienter, and intent; (2) “painstakingly segregat[ing] the fraud and negligence claims” with each claim set forth under its own heading; and (3) “incorporat[ing] only certain factual allegations” for the securities act claims and expressly excluding allegations related to scienter and reliance.[32]
The Second Circuit elaborated, stating that even though the complaint premised its Section 10(b) claims on QTT’s intentional conduct with respect to the company’s design and implementation strategies, the Section 11 claims “charge[d] [d]efendants with negligently failing to disclose those strategies and their results[.]”[33] This was a critical distinction because, as the Court explained, “that a fact was known and not disclosed does not mean, as a matter of law, that the circumstances of the resulting omission sound in fraud” and distinguished such allegations from those claiming defendants intentionally concealed information.[34] Thus, the Second Circuit found that the Section 11 “allegations would be evaluated under Rule 8 if contained in a stand-alone complaint alleging violations only of the Securities Act” and held that those allegations would “not be held to a higher standard because [p]laintiff also exercised his right to sue [d]efendants for securities fraud under the Exchange Act.”[35]
A Case for Asking the “Stand-Alone” Question to Assess Section 11 Claims
When posed as a question, the Second Circuit’s finding has the potential to greatly simplify a court’s analysis of which pleading standard to apply to Section 11 claims. Indeed, asking whether a complaint’s allegations would be evaluated under Rule 8(a) if contained in a stand-alone complaint alleging violations only of the Securities Act focuses the inquiry solely on the Section 11 allegations and preserves a plaintiff’s right to plead the theories as alternatives.[36]
By contrast, an assessment of whether there are overlapping false statements or similar underlying facts, which focuses the inquiry on both the Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims, creates the potential that the fraudulently alleged conduct will be attributed to and overshadow carefully pled negligence allegations (as discussed above). If courts adopt an approach that considers the Section 11 claims on a stand-alone basis, then it may obviate the risk that the mere existence of a concurrently pled Section 10(b) claim will improperly result in applying the heightened pleading standard to Section 11.
[1] In re Grab Holdings Ltd., Sec. Litig., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43193, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024).
[2] Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
[3] A complaint that alleges a Section 10(b) claim must also meet the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) in addition to those set forth in Rule 9(b). See In re Grab Holdings Ltd., Sec. Litig., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43193, at *33-34.
[4] 15 U.S.C. §77k.
[5] Id.; In re Grab Holdings Ltd., Sec. Litig., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43193, at *34.
[6] Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
[7] Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003).
[8] Id. at 1104.
[9] Id. at 1103-04.
[10] In re Rigel Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir. 2012)
[11] Id. at 886.
[12] Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009).
[13] Id.
[14] Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 777 Fed. Appx. 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Claims under the Securities Act are evaluated under the normal pleading standards. If the claim is based on the same underlying facts and allegations as a securities fraud claim under the Exchange Act, then the pleading standard is the standard contained in Rule 9(b).”).
[15] See Kolominsky v. Root, Inc., 100 F. 4th 675, 683-86 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen a 1933 Act plaintiff brings a Section 11 … claim that does not rely on one unified course of fraudulent conduct but, rather, carefully distinguishes the fraud claims from other claims, then we apply the Rule 8(a) pleading standard to those non-fraud claims.”).
[16] Fresno Cnty. Emples. Ret. Ass’n. v. comScore, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 526, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Grab Holdings Ltd., Sec. Litig., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 43193, at *38-40; Wallace v. Intralinks, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65958, at *33-34 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013); In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 632-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
[17] Fresno Cnty. Emples. Ret. Ass’n., 268 F. Supp. 3d at 558.
[18] Wallace, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65958, at *32-33.
[19] See e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F. 3d 256, 272 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“We now hold that where, as here, individual defendants are accused in separate claims of the same complaint of having violated Section 11 … and Section 10(b), the Securities Act claims do not sound in fraud if ordinary negligence is expressly pled in connection with those claims.”); Garfield v. Shutterfly, Inc., 857 Fed. Appx. 71, 79 (3rd Cir. 2021) (explaining that negligence-based claims do not sound in fraud even where the underlying activity is the same if plaintiff “expressly disavowed fraud in their negligence claims and carefully separated the two types of claims.”)
[20] Pappas v. Qutoutiao Inc., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2024)
[21] Id. at *2.
[22] In re Qutoutiao, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136019, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3 2023). The Insider Defendants included Eric Tan, Lei Li, Jingbo Wang, and Xiaolu Zhu. The Director Defendants included Shaoqing Jiang, Jianfei Dong, Oliver Yucheng Chen, Yongbo Dai, James Jun Peng, and Feng Li. The Underwriter Defendants included Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., China Merchants Securities (HK) Co., Ltd., UBS Securities LLC, Keybanc Capital Markets, Inc., CLSA Limited, Haitong International Securities Company Limited, Jefferies Group LLC, and Lighthouse Capital International Inc. (a.k.a. Guangyuan Capital or Guangyuan Ziben). Id.
[23] Id. at *7-9, 37-38.
[24] Id. at *38-41.
[25] Id. at *38 quoting Rombach v. Chang, 355 F. 3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) citing In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F. 3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996).
[26] Id. at *38-39 citing In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. at 633; In re Ultrafem Inc. Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); and In re Jumei Int'l Holding Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3206, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2017).
[27] Id. at *39-40
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at *40-41
[30] Pappas, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250, at *1.
[31] Id. at *5-6.
[32] Id. at *7.
[33] Id. at *7.
[34] Id. at *7-8.
[35] Id. at *6-7.
[36] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)
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(Estimated time to read: 6 – 8 minutes)
By Amanda Foley
On August 8, 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling in Max Royal LLC v. Atieva, Inc. (In re CCIV / LUCID Motors Sec. Litig.), 110 F.4th 1181 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Atieva”), which affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of securities fraud claims brought under §§10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.[i] The Ninth Circuit rooted its decision on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
The action stems from claims brought by a class of plaintiffs who made investments prior to a merger between Atieva, Inc. and Churchill Capital Corporation IV (“CCIV”). In re Cciv/Lucid Motors Sec. Litig., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11415 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2023) (“Lucid Motors”). Before the merger, Atieva Inc. was a privately held electric car manufacturer doing business as Lucid Motors (“Lucid”), and CCIV was a separate special purpose acquisition company, or “SPAC.” [ii] SPACs, also known as blank check companies, are publicly traded companies created for the sole purpose of acquiring another company within a limited window of time to transform the acquired company into a publicly traded company. [iii] Thus, SPACs are seen as an alternative to traditional IPOs for companies to become publicly traded.
As the merger approached, although CCIV and Lucid generally kept public disclosure of the companies’ negotiations quiet, there were still sufficient rumors and leaks that “it was widely speculated that CCIV would acquire Lucid[.]” [iv] During an interview on CNBC at a time when the market believed a merger between CCIV and Lucid was imminent, Lucid’s CEO “made misrepresentations about Lucid’s ability to meet certain production targets,” grossly overstating Lucid’s ability to produce electric cars.[v] CCIV’s stock price increased 12% after the CEO’s interview on the expectation that CCIV would soon acquire Lucid. [vi]
Plaintiffs purchased CCIV shares after the misrepresentations were made but before the merger was formally announced.[vii] Concurrent with the merger’s closing, it was disclosed that Lucid was expected to produce far fewer cars than the CEO had represented in the CNBC interview. Over the next two days, CCIV’s stock price fell 37%, spawning the lawsuit.[viii] At issue was whether plaintiffs, purchasers of CCIV stock, had standing to sue Lucid for the misrepresentations made by the Lucid CEO.
In the District Court, the defendants challenged whether the plaintiffs – as purchasers of CCIV stock – had standing to bring claims against persons who made alleged misstatements concerning the then-separate Lucid. The defendants argued that such claims violated the “purchaser-seller requirement” of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (“Blue Chip”) that requires a transaction during the alleged class period.[ix] Rejecting this argument, Judge Gonzalez Rogers found that the concern in Blue Chip—whether the plaintiff, who was only offered to buy stock but did not actually purchase stock, could maintain a 10b-5 action—was not present in Lucid Motors.[x] Rather, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip held that “[m]erely abstaining from transacting in a security is inadequate to confer standing for a Section 10(b) claim.”[xi] The Supreme Court explained the plaintiff could only base their claim on oral testimony and, thus, the claim would lack a “time-stamped transaction in a ‘demonstrable number of shares traded.’”[xii] In finding plaintiffs had standing, Judge Gonzalez Rogers parted ways with two Second Circuit cases, finding both misinterpreted Blue Chip: Ontario Pub. Serv. Emps. Union Pension Tr. Fund v. Nortel Networks Corp. 369 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Nortel”) and Menora Mivtachim Insurance Ltd. v. Frutarom Industries Ltd., 54 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Menora”).
Nortel involved two publicly traded companies, JDS and Nortel, where the class consisted of purchasers of JDS securities and Nortel was JDS’s largest customer.[xiii] During the Class Period, Nortel announced that it saw strong demand for its fiber optic products and expected growth in earnings for the year.[xiv] As a result, JDS also made optimistic projections and its stock price went up.[xv] When Nortel disclosed that it was cutting revenue estimates and halved its growth projections, both Nortel’s and JDS’s share prices fell.[xvi] The Nortel court dismissed, finding that if it conferred standing on the JDS investors who challenged statements made by Nortel, “their standing would lead to the same risk of abusive litigation seen in Blue Chip.”[xvii] Judge Gonzalez Rogers found Nortel unpersuasive because the plaintiff in Blue Chip purchased no shares whereas in Nortel, plaintiffs purchased actual shares in JDS would prove the time, number, and value of securities sold.[xviii]
In Menora, International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”) was a company seeking to acquire the target company Frutarom Industries Ltd. (“Frutarom”).[xix] Plaintiffs purchased shares in IFF, but sued Frutarom for making material misstatements about itself leading up to the merger.[xx] The Second Circuit held that “purchasers of a security of an acquiring company do not have standing under Section 10(b) to sue the target company for alleged misstatements the target company made about itself prior to the merger between the two companies.”[xxi]
Ultimately, Judge Gonzalez Rogers dismissed the case on the grounds that plaintiffs had inadequately pleaded the alleged misstatements’ materiality, but found that plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit in the underlying case, Lucid Motors. The district court reasoned that Blue Chip, Nortel, and Menora do not hold that the plaintiffs must have purchased securities in the same company about which the misstatements were made.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal, but on the alternative ground that plaintiffs lacked standing under the purchaser-seller rule.[xxii] Specifically, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Blue Chip as requiring the “purchase or sale” of a security in “the security about which the alleged misrepresentations were made[,]” not the “the security about which Plaintiffs allege injury,” as plaintiffs argued.[xxiii] The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ argument would impermissibly broaden the scope of the purchaser-seller requirement beyond what Blue Chip allows, stating “hypothetical plaintiffs would need only to have purchased a security—any security[.]”[xxiv] The Ninth Circuit further stated that the fact CCIV ultimately acquired Lucid did not affect its analysis because at the time the misstatements were made, CCIV and Lucid were two separate companies and there is “no recognized exception [to the purchaser-seller requirement] for transactions involving SPACs[,]” adding that “if Congress wants to treat SPAC acquisitions differently than traditional mergers, it has the authority to do so.”[xxv], [xxvi]
Would Lucid Have Turned Out Differently if the New SPAC Rules Were in Place?
Due to the increasing number of recent de-SPAC transactions, investor advocates have called for heightened disclosures and protections in SPAC transactions. On January 24, 2024, the SEC adopted the final rules for SPACs by a 3-2 vote of the SEC Commissioners. The final rules became effective on July 1, 2024.[xxvii] Under the new rules, Lucid and its officers would have had to sign the registration statement filed by CCIV in connection with the de-SPAC transaction (i.e., the merger between CCIV and Lucid), thereby exposing Lucid and its officers to liability for false statements in the registration statement. However in Lucid Motors, the alleged false statements were made in a TV interview prior to the merger. With the new rules in place, plaintiffs may have been able to establish standing and liability as to CCIV as a signatory to the Registration Statement, if the alleged misstatements in the TV interview were incorporated into the Registration Statement.
[i] 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a)), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
[ii] Atieva, 110 F.4th at 1183.
[iii] Id.
[iv] Id.
[v] Id.
[vi] Lucid Motors, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11415, at *11.
[vii] Atieva, 110 F.4th at 1183.
[viii] Lucid Motors, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11415, at *13.
[ix] Id. at *16-17.
[x] Id. at *17.
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id. at *18.
[xiii] Id. at *22.
[xiv] Id. (citing Nortel 369 F.3d at 29).
[xv] Id.
[xvi] Id.
[xvii] Id. at *23 (citing Nortel, 369 F.3d at 32-33).
[xviii] Id.
[xix] Menora, 54 F.4th 84.
[xx] Id.
[xxi] Id. at 88.
[xxii] Atieva, 110 F.4th 1181, at 1182.
[xxiii] Id. at 1185-86 (citing Blue Chip, 421 U.S. 727, 742, 746).
[xxiv] Id.
[xxv] Id.
[xxvi] Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Appellants petitioned for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. On September 17, 2024, the panel unanimously voted to deny Appellants petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.
[xxvii] Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/33-11265.pdf
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(Estimated time to read: 8 – 10 minutes)
Delaware has long been the state of choice for companies seeking to attract investment because of its savvy judiciary and its stable, predictable, and fair corporate law. As a result of this status, more than 20% of the state’s tax revenue comes from corporate franchise fees. But if companies start to prefer incorporation in states like Nevada and Texas, then Delaware would face a substantial budget shortfall.
This concern reared its head especially after high-profile, investor-friendly decisions from the judiciary, even though the substantive law had not actually changed. After the Court of Chancery for the State of Delaware rescinded Elon Musk’s $56 billion pay package from Tesla, he reincorporated Tesla in Nevada. Musk also took advantage of his “X” platform to denigrate Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick and encourage other Delaware corporations with controlling stockholders to reincorporate elsewhere. Following the lead of other states, Texas formed a Business Court in order to provide specialized judges and courts for business disputes and attract corporations.[1] Shortly after the new year, rumors circulated that Meta and Walmart were also considering more controller-friendly pastures.
These stirrings echoed those of ten years before, when another billionaire controlling stockholder threatened to leave Delaware amidst lawsuits accusing him of unfairly buying out minority stockholders.[2] Ultimately, Delaware ignored those threats against its franchise to no harm.
But this time, the threats and fear were transformative. Newly elected Governor Matt Meyer “convened an online meeting with attorneys from law firms that have represented Meta, Musk, Tesla and others in shareholder disputes in the state.”[3] The next day, Meyer held a second meeting, this time with the corporate secretary of Meta, and an attorney that has represented Meta in Delaware. Less than two months later, Senate Bill 21 (“SB 21”) Delaware’s legislative response to these rumors, easily passed through both houses of the Delaware legislature and received Governor Matt Meyer’s signature despite vociferous opposition from institutional stockholders and the plaintiffs’ bar.
The resulting bill, SB 21, amends two sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law: Section 144, and Section 220, in order to provide a statutory safe harbor for transactions between companies and their controlling stockholders, and to limit the rights of stockholders to the books and records of the corporation. This short article will address the changes to controller transactions, while a future article will describe the new requirements and limitations for books and records investigations.
Previous Delaware Law
Under pre-SB 21 Delaware law, transactions between a company and its controlling stockholders challenged in court would be subject to “entire fairness” review unless the negotiation of the transaction satisfied six procedural protections provided under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide (“MFW”):
After the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in In re Match Group Derivative Litigation, these requirements applied to all controlling stockholder transactions where the controlling stockholder received a unique benefit.
The New Procedural Safeguard Requirements
Supporters of SB 21 delivered demonstrably false testimony to the Delaware Senate that SB 21 overturns Delaware Supreme Court precedent in only “one, maybe one and a half, significant ways.”[4] In fact, SB 21 overturns both In re Match Group and at least four of the six requirements for avoiding entire fairness review set out in MFW.
For so-called “going private” transactions where a controlling stockholder buys the shares of company stock that it does not already own, approval of both a special committee and the minority stockholders will still be required to avoid entire fairness. For all other transactions, however, where a controlling stockholder extracts a unique benefit from the Company, such controlling stockholder needs only to obtain either the approval of a special committee or the approval of the minority stockholders to bring the transaction under the lenient “business judgment” standard. If only a special committee approves the transaction, then only the special committee needs to be informed about the transaction. Minority stockholders will receive little notice of the transaction.
SB 21 also further guts existing caselaw that was favorable to minority stockholders.
Takeaways for Concerned Stockholders
Investors should keep this new controller-friendly regime in mind when investing in controlled public companies incorporated in Delaware. SEC filings regarding related party transactions and the independence of directors should be given additional skepticism. Investors can no longer trust that the purportedly independent members of a board will protect them from a controlling stockholder, or ensure their fair compensation in a going private transaction. And it is more important than ever that minority stockholders actually vote when given the chance, as withholding a vote is no longer an effective dissent in controller-driven transactions. As always, if investors have concerns about a specific company or transaction, they are invited to contact Levi & Korsinsky, LLP to learn more about their rights and options.
[1] This was hardly a novel threat. As noted by White & Case LLP, nearly half of all states have created a specialized court for business and commercial disputes. Andrew Zeve & Stephen Shuchart, Texas Business Courts: What You Need to Know, White & Case LLP Alert (Sep. 9, 2024) available at https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/texas-business-courts-what-you-need-know.
[2] See Joel Friedlander, Are Hamermesh, Chandler and Strine Making Delaware Corporate Law Great Again?, Delaware Online (Mar. 17, 2025) available at https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2025/03/17/are-hamermesh-chandler-and-strine-making-delaware-corporate-law-great-again-opinion/82490918007/.
[3] Lora Kolodny, Meta’s Potential Exit from Delaware Had Governor Worried Enough to Call Special Weekend Meetings, CNBC.com (Mar. 19, 2025) available at https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/19/meta-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-in-overhaul-delaware-corporate-law.html.
[4] Lauren Pringle, Transcript – SS 1 to SB 21 Delaware Senate Floor Vote, Mar. 13, 2025, available at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/transcript-ss-1-sb-21-delaware-senate-floor-vote-lauren-pringle-dj45c/?trackingId=3BfJlsgHREWuyoMI0qRTDA%3D%3D.
[5] See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
[6] See In re Dell Tech., Inc. Class V Stockholders Litig., 2020 WL 3096748, at *33 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020).
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(Estimated time to read: 8 – 10 minutes)
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals: “[A] projection is not a magic wand that immunizes all statements that relate to that projection”
Quick Summary:
I. Introduction
Pursuing claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act for allegedly fraudulent financial projections can be difficult as financial projections are forward-looking statements of opinion and often subject to the protections of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) safe harbor provisions.[i] E.g., In re Turquoise Hill Res. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 625 F. Supp. 3d 164, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“The PSLRA says that projections are protected unless they are both (a) actually known to be false and (b) not accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.”) (citing Slayton v. Am. Exp. Co., 604 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the “safe harbor is written in the disjunctive”)).
However, even if projections themselves are not actionable, defrauded investors may seek relief by pleading that a defendant’s statements and omissions misled investors about the bases of the projections. A recent decision in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In Re Shanda Games Limited Securities Litigation, illustrates several types of statements and omissions about financial projections that can be independently actionable. In Re Shanda Games Ltd. Sec. Litig., 128 F.4th 26, 47 (2d Cir. 2025).[ii] See also Baum v. Harman Int'l. Indus., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 3d 70, 86 (D. Conn. 2019) (statement about projections was not protected by the PSLRA safe harbor where the statement was an “assessment of the Management Projections, rather than an assumption on which the Management Projections were based”); In re AppHarvest Sec. Litig., 684 F. Supp. 3d 201, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (a statement, even when made in connection with forward-looking guidance, may be “a severable statement of past performance that is not subject to the PSLRA”).
II. Background
Shanda Games Limited (“Shanda”) was a video game company registered in the Cayman Islands whose American Depository Shares (“ADS”) began trading on NASDAQ in 2009. One of Shanda’s primary assets was the right to market a multiplayer online game, Mir II, in China. Mir II had been very successful, generating billions of dollars of revenue. To expand its business into the mobile gaming market, Shanda developed Mir II Mobile (“MIIM”) which was first announced during a July 28, 2013 conference call and would eventually launch in August 2015. Shanda spent several years developing MIIM and management expected MIIM to be highly successful. But before the launch of MIIM, Shanda’s board members authorized a merger, announcing on April 3, 2015 that Shanda had entered an agreement that would take the company private. While the group seeking to take Shanda private had enough control to guarantee the transaction would be consummated, minority shareholders could choose to exercise their appraisal rights and have an independent authority determine the value of their shares.
Under the relevant rules, Shanda was required to file initial and final proxy statements to inform shareholders of the details of the transaction to enable shareholders to make informed decisions. The Initial Proxy was filed on May 5, 2015 and contained financial projections that purportedly “summarize[d] the financial projections provided by management” to Merrill Lynch and the buyers in March 2014 and March 2015. But there were at least two issues with the financial projections published in the proxy statements: first, the projections omitted an entire year of data and thus did not “summarize” all of what had been provided by management to Merrill Lynch and the buyer; second, the projections were developed using a method of depreciation that was not generally accepted and, moreover, was contrary to the method Shanda had used in the past. The Final Proxy, filed in October 2015 after the August launch of MIIM, contained the same financial projection summaries and failed to disclose that the financial performance of the recently released MIIM dramatically improved the company’s financial prospects. Notably, however, the Final Proxy disclosed that the forecasts had not been updated since the original filing.
After the merger was completed, the massive success of MIIM became apparent and the former stockholders learned that their stake in the company had been worth much more than the $7.10 they had received for each ADS. In a separate appraisal suit, a judge concluded the fair value of Shanda’s stock was $16.68 per ADS at the time of the merger. Shanda’s own expert in the appraisal case recognized the depreciation method used in developing the forecasts was not an accepted accounting method. Subsequent to the appraisal suit, plaintiffs brought suit against Shanda and other defendants, alleging violations of the federal securities laws under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act for false and misleading statements and omissions relating to the forecasts, among other claims. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court dismissed some of the claims against some of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
III. The 2nd Circuit’s Analysis of Statements and Omissions About the Forecast
a. Statements That Projections Are a “Summary” of Data Can Be Misleading When the Projections Omit An Entire Year of Data
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded a claim arising from the defendants’ statement that the financial projections published in the proxy statement were a “summary” of the data that had been provided to Merrill Lynch and the buyers to evaluate the transaction. While Merrill Lynch and the buyers had been provided with five years of projections, the proxy statements only included four. The Court explained that “[w]ith one out of five years of data excluded, the March 2015 Projections do not constitute an accurate summary of the material provided to Merrill Lynch and to the Buyer Group.” In Re Shanda Games Ltd. Sec. Litig., 128 F.4th 26, 47 (2d Cir. 2025). “The question is thus not whether it is misleading to describe the reduction of some amount of information in a condensed presentation as a summary, but whether it is misleading to describe the exclusion of one-fifth of the relevant data underlying a projection as a summary. As to this latter question, we conclude that it is.” Id. The defendants argued that they were entitled to exercise their discretion and judgment in deciding whether the inclusion of all of the data in the proxy statement was important, but the Court explained that once Defendants provided all five years of data to Merrill Lynch and the buyers, defendants could not mislead plaintiffs about what data had been provided by publishing only four years of data in the proxy statement and describing it as a summary of the data that had been provided. Id.
b. Statements Describing the Process for Developing Projections as “Reasonable” Can Be Misleading When the Projections Are Prepared With Accounting Methods That Are Not Generally Accepted
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also agreed with the district court in concluding that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded a claim arising from the defendants’ statement that the process for developing the financial projections had been “reasonable” and based on the “best available estimates.” The Court of Appeals explained that “a reasonable investor assured by Shanda that the Projections were reasonably prepared would infer that basic accounting principles were followed.” In Re Shanda Games Ltd. Sec. Litig., 128 F.4th 26, 45 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, because the projections had been prepared using a deprecation method that was not generally accepted, the representation that the process for developing the projections was “reasonable” was misleading.
c. Statements of Opinion Describing a Transaction as Fair Can Be Misleading When the Speaker Has Information that Does Not Align with the Opinion
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s determination finding Shanda’s opinion that the transaction was fair was not actionable. The Court explained that a fairness statement is an opinion that must be analyzed like any other opinion. In Re Shanda Games Ltd. Sec. Litig., 128 F.4th 26, 49 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, if the defendants possessed information that did not align with their stated opinion that the transaction was fair, the opinion may be actionable. Defendants argued that because the projections were purportedly protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions, the plaintiff could not rely upon the alleged falsity of the projections to dispute the fairness opinion. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that forward-looking statements made in connection with a going-private transaction are outside of the scope of the PSLRA’s safe harbor, and added: “But more importantly, a projection is not a magic wand that immunizes all statements that relate to that projection.” In Re Shanda Games Ltd. Sec. Litig., 128 F.4th 26, 49 (2d Cir. 2025). In other words, even if financial projections are protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions, as they often will be, the safe harbor does not necessarily immunize other statements relating to those financial projections from liability. The Court further explained that the plaintiff adequately alleged that the fairness statement was misleading because, by the time the final proxy statement was published, “MIIM had launched and the game’s initial success was such that the Defendants “could not possibly have believed the Buyout was fair.”” Id. at 49. Thus, even though the defendants disclaimed the projections as not being up to date and had no duty to provide updated financial projections, the fairness statement was actionable because defendants possessed information at the time that did not align with the opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Financial projections are forward-looking statements of opinion and thus are often protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions, making it hard for defrauded investors to state a claim. However, even if projections themselves are not actionable, defrauded investors may seek relief by pleading that a defendant’s statements and omissions misled investors about the bases of the projections.
[i] The PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions do not protect all forward-looking statements. Excluded from the safe harbor are forward-looking statements made by an issuer in connection with a going-private transaction. 15 U.S. Code § 78u–5(b)(1)(E).
[ii] In In re Shanda Games, the plaintiffs also alleged the projections, themselves, were false. In finding plaintiffs adequately alleged falsity, the court found that while the projections were forward-looking, since they were made in connection with a going-private transaction, they were not protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions and were, thus, actionable. However, the purpose of this article is to illustrate how statements concerning financial projections—as opposed to the projections themselves—can be actionable.
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(Estimated time to read: 10 – 12 minutes)
Overview
It has been over three and a half years since the Supreme Court issued its seminal opinion in Goldman Sachs. Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 594 U.S. 113 (2021) (“Goldman”), which concerned securities class actions pursuing causation and damages theories under the price inflation-maintenance theory (i.e., a theory under which the “price impact is the amount of price inflation maintained by an alleged misrepresentation[.]”).[1],[2] During this time, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and several district courts have had an opportunity to weigh in on Goldman’s application to motions seeking class certification. This article examines how the Supreme Court’s Goldman decision is shaping the legal landscape.
A Recap of Goldman
In Goldman, the Supreme Court considered the question of “whether the generic nature of a misrepresentation is relevant to price impact” for putative class actions alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and proceeding under the price inflation-maintenance theory.[3] The Supreme Court held that: (i) “the generic nature of an alleged misrepresentation often will be important evidence of price impact because, as a rule of thumb, a more-general statement will affect a security’s price less than a more-specific statement on the same question[;]” (ii) “courts may consider expert testimony and use their common sense in assessing whether a generic misrepresentation had a price impact[;]” and (iii) “courts may assess the generic nature of a misrepresentation at class certification even though it also may be relevant to materiality[.]”[4]
The Supreme Court also provided guidance on how courts should consider and analyze the genericness of a statement in cases proceeding under the price inflation-maintenance theory, cautioning “that the back-end price drop equals front-end inflation … break[s] down when there is a mismatch between the contents of the misrepresentation and the corrective disclosure.”[5] This is because, the Court explained, it is less likely that a specific disclosure, such as “our fourth quarter earnings did not meet expectations[,]” would correct a generic statement, such as “we have faith in our business model[.]” In those circumstances, “there is less reason to infer front-end price inflation from the back-end price drop.”[6] The Court further instructed that, “[i]n assessing price impact at class certification, courts should be open to all probative evidence on that question—qualitative as well as quantitative—aided by a good dose of common sense[,]” regardless of whether such “evidence is also relevant to a merits question like materiality.” [7]
The Court then remanded the case with instructions that the Second Circuit apply the guidance from its opinion and consider “all record evidence relevant to price impact, regardless of whether that evidence overlaps with materiality or any other merits issue.” [8]
The Second Circuit’s Application of Goldman in Goldman II
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Second Circuit further remanded Goldman back to the district court, instructing it to “consider all record evidence relevant to price impact and apply the legal standard as supplemented by the Supreme Court.”[9] On December 8, 2021, the district court, again, certified the class and thereafter, defendants filed another request pursuant to Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23(f)”) seeking an appeal.[10] After taking the matter up for the third time, on August 10, 2023, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s class certification order and remanded with the instruction to decertify the class (“Goldman II”).[11]
In Goldman II, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in finding plaintiffs demonstrated price impact because there was an insufficient “match” between the two categories of alleged misleading statements—those about Goldman’s conflicts management procedures and certain related risk factors—and the corrective disclosures.[12] The Second Circuit explained that the district court incorrectly enhanced the specificity of the first category of misstatements by considering them in tandem with the second category,[13] because the two categories were “disseminated to shareholders in separate reports at separate times” and plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that an investor would have considered them together. [14] The Second Circuit further explained, if a corrective disclosure does “not expressly identify the alleged misrepresentation as false … the truthful substitute should align in genericness with the alleged misrepresentation” (e.g., there needs to be a “match”).[15] The Second Circuit then added, Goldman requires that any gap among the front- and back-end statements as written be limited.”[16] Thus, the Second Circuit held that, given the considerable gap in specificity between the statements and the corrective disclosures, the district court should have asked “what would have happened if [the company] had spoken truthfully[] … at an equally generic level.”[17]
Rather than applying such a test, the Second Circuit held that “the district court [improperly] allowed the details and severity[] . . . of the corrective disclosure to do the work of proving front-end price impact,” despite its finding that investors would not have “consciously relied on” the alleged misstatements “in the moment” in evaluating whether to invest in Goldman.[18] But, for the back-end price drop to serve as a proxy for the front-end misrepresentation, the misrepresentation must “hold its weight in propping up the price” (i.e., there must be “some indication that investors relied upon the misstatement as written”).[19] This is because, under Goldman, evidence that the stock dropped in response to a disclosure that touches on the same subject matter as the generic statement is insufficient to establish that investors would have relied on that statement in the first instance.[20] The Second Circuit elaborated that “the central focus” must be “ensuring that the front-end disclosure and back-end event stand on equal footing; a mismatch in specificity between the two undercuts a plaintiff’s theory that investors would have expected more from the front-end disclosure.”[21] The Second Circuit further cautioned “if a stock price decline follows a back-end, highly detailed corrective disclosure . . . courts must be skeptical whether the more generic, front-end statement propped up the price to the same extent.”[22]
After reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit provided the following road map for district courts to use when analyzing genericness for purposes of price impact at class certification. The Second Circuit explained that “a searching price impact analysis must be conducted where (1) there is a considerable gap in front-end-back-end genericness,” “(2) the corrective disclosure does not directly refer … to the alleged misstatement, and (3) the plaintiff claims … that a company's generic risk-disclosure was misleading by omission.”[23] In doing so, district courts should assess how generic the alleged misrepresentation is as a factual matter – an inquiry which the Second Circuit notes can be guided by “case law bearing on materiality[.]”[24] If there is a gap between a generic misstatement and more specific corrective disclosure, then “courts should ask … whether a truthful—but equally generic—substitute for the alleged misrepresentation would have impacted the stock price.”[25] The Court elaborated that, because the back-end price drop’s value as evidence in such cases is diminished, “courts should consider other indirect evidence of price impact,” including whether there was any “pre- or post-disclosure discussion in the market regarding a generic front-end misstatement” and whether “a truthful, equally generic substitute would not … go unnoticed by the market[.]”[26]
The Second Circuit then conducted such an analysis and held that, while plaintiff’s expert’s evidence supported analysts’ reliance on information involving the same subject matter as the alleged false statements, the expert failed to put forth evidence demonstrating investors relied on the actual conflict misstatements to assess Goldman’s conflicts management procedures.[27] Defendants’ expert, on the other hand, put forth evidence consisting “of 880 analyst reports published during the Class Period … none of which reference[d] the conflicts disclosure.”[28] Based on this, the Second Circuit found “that there [was] an insufficient link between the corrective disclosures and the alleged misrepresentations[,] and as such, defendants “demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the misrepresentations did not impact Goldman’s stock price, and, by doing so, rebutted Basic’s presumption of reliance.” [29]
District Courts’ Applications of Goldman
Since the Court’s Goldman decision, district courts applying its framework have used varying levels of evidence to assess mismatches, with some only relying on the language of the alleged statements and corrective disclosures and others considering such language in addition to analyst commentary (or lack thereof), expert testimony, and intraday stock prices.
For instance, the district court in IBEW Loc. 98 Pension Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205201, at *36-38 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2024), relying on only the alleged misstatements and corrective disclosures, themselves, rejected the auditor defendant’s argument that there was a mismatch between the alleged false statements in its auditor report that the Nuclear Project was “expected to be operational and to qualify for the nuclear production tax credits” and the corrective disclosure revealing the Nuclear Project would not be completed on time (or at all), finding a “mirror image” disclosure is not required under Goldman, which only requires that “the misstatement and corrective disclosure be related or relevant to one another.”[30] By contrast, in Shupe v. Rocket Cos., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178076, at *75-76 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2024), the district court determined that there was a mismatch by relying on the language of the misrepresentations and corrective disclosures, and the fact that, similar to Goldman II, there was evidence from “defendants’ expert “suggesting that no analyst referenced” the alleged misrepresentations during the Class Period.
Whether there is a mismatch between an alleged misstatement and corrective disclosure is not always a death knell for class certification. For instance, in Del. Cnty. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172506, at *29-32 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2023), the district court assessed whether there was a mismatch between three categories of misleading statements concerning environmental compliance and two corrective disclosures published on the same day – a Form 10-Q disclosure revealing pollution issues in the region at issue and a press release lowering annual guidance. While the district court found there was a mismatch with the guidance update, it nevertheless determined it was “immaterial” to resolving class certification because, inter alia, defendant Cabot’s proffered evidence, intraday stock prices, failed to show that the resulting stock drop was caused solely by the guidance.[31] Accordingly, because the alleged misstatements matched the Form 10-Q disclosure and said disclosure contributed to the stock decline, Cabot failed to meet its burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged misstatements had no price impact.[32] Thus, the district court held defendants failed to rebut the Basic presumption and granted class certification.[33]
On the Horizon: The Ninth Circuit’s Impending Decision in Jaeger v. Zillow Group, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit has recently been asked to weigh in on how to properly apply Goldman and Goldman II to assess the plaintiffs’-appellees’ price inflation-maintenance theory in Jaeger et al., v. Zillow Group, Inc., et al., No. 24-6605. In Zillow, plaintiffs-appellees alleged Zillow: (i) falsely attributed the increase in its homes inventory to purported improvements in the company’s automated pricing model when, in fact, Zillow had not improved its pricing model and had to apply price overlays to boost offer prices and be more competitive;[34] and (ii) concealed that its purported operational improvements were driven by reducing the scope and pay for renovation projects, causing contractors to deprioritize Zillow or decline jobs altogether.[35] The plaintiffs-appellees alleged these statements were corrected through four partially corrective disclosures revealing: (i) Zillow purchased too much inventory at too high of a price[36]; (ii) Zillow’s pausing of home acquisitions was due to, inter alia, a backlog in renovations; (iii) 66% of Zillow homes were for sale below their purchase price; and (iv) Zillow was writing down $500 million in home inventory and winding down its Zillow Offers operations because the housing market was too volatile for its pricing projections.[37]
On appeal, the Zillow defendants-appellants argued that the district court erred in certifying the class by improperly applying the more lenient “plausible connection” loss causation standard instead of the tests established in Goldman and Goldman II, and by failing to consider all record evidence demonstrating a lack of front end price impact.[38] In support of their arguments, the Zillow defendants-appellants urged the Ninth Circuit to follow the approach applied by the Second Circuit to first assess whether the corrective disclosure either “expressly and specifically negat[es] the alleged false statement” or “directly render[s] [] false” the company’s affirmative misrepresentations[.]”[39] This test was not met, the defendants-appellants argue, because none of the corrective disclosures expressly referenced the alleged misstatements or disclosed Zillow’s use of price overlays or the reduction in renovation scope and contractor pay, resulting in a “stark gap[,]” which, under Goldman and Goldman II, prohibits the use of back-end price drop as a proxy for front-end price impact.[40]
Thus, defendants-appellants contend, the court must “consider other indirect evidence of price impact to support the back-end front-end inference,” such as whether analysts reference the misstatements at issue rather than merely providing commentary that touches upon the same subject matter.[41] Here, they argued, the district court erred by failing to consider all record evidence demonstrating a lack of front end price impact, including analyst reports and expert testimony demonstrating the stock price declines were attributable to factors unrelated to the misstatements.[42]
Whether the Ninth Circuit will ultimately adopt the tests put forth by the Zillow defendant-appellants and reverse the lower court’s certification of the class remains to be seen as briefing does not conclude until the end of February and oral argument has been requested. In the meantime, as the post-Goldman legal landscape continues to develop, counsel relying on price inflation-maintenance theory should be prepared to put forth a fulsome argument and evidence to demonstrate the relationship between alleged misstatements and corrective disclosures in support of motions for class certification.
[1] All internal quotations and citations omitted.
[2] Goldman Sachs. Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 594 U.S. 113, 123 (2021).
[3] Id. at 121.
[4] Id. at 121-22.
[5] Id. at 123.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 122 (emphasis removed).
[8] Id. at 123-24 (emphasis removed).
[9] Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sach Grp., Inc., 77 F. 4th 74, 89 (2nd Cir. 2023) (“Goldman II”).
[10] In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 3d 520, 538-539 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2021); In Re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, 1:10cv3461, Dkt. Entry 265 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2022).
[11] Goldman II, 77 F. 4th at 105.
[12] Id. at 82.
[13] Id. at 94.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 98 (emphasis removed).
[16] Id. at 99.
[17] Id. (emphasis removed).
[18] Id. at 99-100.
[19] Id. at 100.
[20] See id. at 102-03.
[21] Id. at 102.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 102-03.
[27] Id. at 103-04.
[28] Id. at 104.
[29] Id. at 105.
[30] See also In re Nio, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138011, at *48 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2023) (rejecting argument that alleged false statements concerning construction at a manufacturing facility in Shaghai were mismatched to a disclosure reporting the plan for the facility was terminated, and further explained that while “the corrective disclosure [was] not a perfect match[,] the alleged misrepresentation here [was] quite specific[.]”); see also Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34976, at *56 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2024) (“[C]ourts do not necessarily require an economist or evidence to determine whether it is more likely than not that the alleged misrepresentation had a price impact.”).
[31] Del. Cnty. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172506, at *33-34 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2023) (emphasis added).
[32] Id. at 34.
[33] Id. at 36.
[34] Jaeger et al., v. Zillow Group, Inc., et al., No. 24-6605, Dkt Entry. 10.1 at 7 (Jan. 8, 2025).
[35] Jaeger, No. 24-6605, Dkt Entry. 10.1 at 8.
[36] The district court did not analyze this corrective disclosure in evaluating defendants’ mismatch arguments. See Jaeger v. Zillow Group, Inc., et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151879, at *18-23 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2024).
[37] Jaeger, No. 24-6605, Dkt Entry. 10.1 at 8-9.
[38] Id. at 2, 28-29, 45-57.
[39] Id. at 31.
[40] Id. at 12, 31-34.
[41] Goldman II, 77 F. 4th at 102; Jaeger, No. 24-6605, Dkt Entry. 10.1 at 21, 26-27.
[42] Id. at 52-57.
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(Estimated time to read: 10 – 12 minutes)
On November 22, 2024, after full merits briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal brought by defendants Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), Facebook CEO and Chairman Mark Zuckerberg, former Facebook Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg, and former Facebook CFO turned Chief Strategy Officer David Wehner (“Defendants”).[i] The Defendants’ appeal concerned whether Facebook’s risk disclosure statements in its 2016 annual report were false and misleading to investors. The per curium dismissal order consisted of just two sentences, leaving legal experts to speculate about why the Supreme Court chose not to issue an opinion.
Dismissals without an opinion such as this are relatively rare, and with the case slated to be remanded back to the federal district court, securities law practitioners are left speculating what the Justices granted certiorari, how the case might proceed from here, and what information (if any) can be gleaned for future securities class actions.
Readers may recall that in 2018, Facebook (now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”), faced widespread scrutiny when news media unveiled that Cambridge Analytica Ltd. (“Cambridge Analytica”), a U.K.-based political consulting firm, had improperly collected personal data from approximately 87 million Facebook users in order to create data profiles of American voters. Information from these profiles was then allegedly sold to and used to consult with political campaigns, including notably the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump. Amongst other things, the Cambridge Analytica scandal lead to a Federal Trade Commission investigation, ending with Facebook agreeing to pay a whopping $5 billion fine.
Though the news of Cambridge Analytica’s actions was first broken by The Guardian and The New York Times on March 17, 2018, Defendants had actually learned of Cambridge Analytica’s data harvesting over the course of 2015, but did not inform affected Facebook users. Rather, as detailed below, investors allege that Defendants mislead investors and committed securities fraud, such that when the truth came out in March 2018, Facebook’s stock price dropped 13% per share—equal to roughly $50 billion in Facebook’s market value at the time—thus causing investors, including retirement and pension funds, to lose money.
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (“District Court”), plaintiffs Amalgamated Bank (as a trustee for several funds) and Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi filed their Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) on October 16, 2020.[ii] The Complaint alleged, amongst other things, that Facebook had issued false and misleading statements to investors regarding its handling of its users’ data, including by issuing misleading risk statements in its 2016 annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on Form 10-K on February 3, 2017.[iii] Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Facebook misled investors by making the following risk statements:
The plaintiffs alleged that these risk statements were materially false and misleading because these risks were posed as mere hypothetical scenarios that had not occurred, when in reality Defendants knew that Cambridge Analytics had already improperly accessed and misused Facebook user data. Having chosen to speak on the issues implicated by these disclosures, the Defendants’ decisions to omit information of then-existing risks rendered the disclosures misleading. Thus, Defendants were alleged to have violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and SEC rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
On December 20, 2021, District Court Judge Edward J. Davila granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, finding (amongst other things) that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the falsity of the foregoing risk statements. In other words, the District Court found they were not actionably false or misleading statements because Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct was purportedly already known to the investing public when Facebook made the statements.[v] The District Court held that The Guardian and The Washington Post had already reported at the time Facebook issued the risk statements that Cambridge Analytica had improperly collected data from “a massive pool of unwitting US Facebook users.”[vi]
Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On February 8, 2023, a split Ninth Circuit panel reversed the District Court’s decision in part and remanded the case back to the District Court in part, finding amongst other things, that plaintiffs had adequately plead the risk disclosures as actionably false and misleading, given allegations that Defendants knew in 2015 that Cambridge Analytica had violated Facebook’s user data policies.[vii] Specifically, the Ninth Circuit majority found that while some details of Cambridge Analytica’s actions were public at the time of Facebook’s risk statements, the full extent of the damage—including to Facebook’s business and reputation—was not yet revealed. Therefore, the majority reasoned, the risk statements were adequately plead to be misleading in the Complaint.
The panel majority’s opinion referenced another recent Ninth Circuit case involving Google’s parent company, Alphabet Sec. Litig., R.I. v. Alphabet, Inc., 1 F.4th 687 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its pleading standard for risk statements, writing “falsity allegations [are] sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint plausibly allege[s] that a company's SEC filings warned that risks ‘could’ occur when, in fact, those risks had already materialized.”[viii]
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision below.[ix] In doing so, defendant appellees-turned-petitioners suggested a circuit split existed, and advocated that Supreme Court adopt the position of the Sixth Circuit which “does not require companies to disclose any past events in its risk factors, and six other circuits require disclosure only if the company knows the past events will harm the business.”[x] The Defendants hypothesized that allowing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to stand might require companies to “disclose past instances when a risk materialized even if those events pose no known threat of business harm.”[xi]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to the following question taken from the Defendants’ petition:
First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the “risk factors” section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm…
The questions presented are:
In other words, was the Ninth Circuit correct in stating that risk statements describing potential risks can be false and misleading under federal securities laws if the risks have already materialized?
Subsequent briefing involved numerous persons and entities filing briefs as amicus curiae for the parties, including the United States government, through attorneys with the SEC and the U.S. Office of the Solicitor General, who intervened on behalf of investors in the case.
On November 6, 2024, the Supreme Court heard oral argument.[xiii] Meta argued that the risk disclosures companies make in their SEC filings are inherently forward-looking, and that no reasonable investor would read such statements as asserting anything about whether the risks had transpired in the past, or whether such past events created a present harm to the company. Further, Meta argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision gave rise to a problem where companies going forward would have to have to issue far lengthier risk statements, in order to disclose all possible past events that could cause present harm to the company and thus that could be material information for investors.
The investors countered that Meta was mischaracterizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the problem identified by Meta was purely hypothetical in the case, because all courts recognize that events that do not pose a risk of harm to a company are not material to investors, and therefore do not need to be disclosed. Moreover, the investors argued, adopting Meta’s interpretation would give companies license to intentionally mislead investors about material events by describing such events as purely hypothetical.
Perhaps crucially, the investors argued that they actually agreed with Meta that a risk disclosure is not false or misleading if it doesn’t disclose the past occurrence of an immaterial risk. The investors reasoned that the scenario posed by Meta’s first question presented was inapposite to this case, because here Defendants did know that the risks had occurred and were occurring and presented “risk of ongoing or future business harm.”
During oral arguments, the Supreme Court justices spent a considerable portion of the two hour hearing posing theoretical scenarios to test Meta’s proposed rule, apparently trying to assess where to draw a line on whether or not past events—which could pose present risks to a company—need to be properly disclosed to investors. Some justices seemed to imply that limits on disclosure requirements were needed so that corporations do not need to disclose every past event that may harm a company presently, whereas other justices pointed to scenarios where investors would want to be told material information about the company they’ve invested in, implying that Meta investors had been misled by the company’s risk statements. Some legal observers noted that the justices in general appeared skeptical about whether the case was a good one upon which to base a universal rule.[xiv]
On November 22, 2024 the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, commonly referred to as a “DIG”[xv]—meaning that a majority of justices of the Supreme Court determined the Defendants’ petition to appeal was not worthy of a grant of certiorari. As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was not disturbed and the investors may proceed in their lawsuit against the Defendants.
While the Supreme Court often does not explain why it has “DIGed” a case, legal experts have opined several potential reasons. First, the Justices may have learned something after granting the petition (such as at oral argument) that lead them to determine the particular case was a poor vehicle for resolving the legal question posed. Second, the court may have perceived a “bait-and-switch” where the petitioner presented one issue or argument at the certiorari stage, and a different issue or argument in the merits briefing. Third, the Justices may simply have not been able to reach a consensus on how to dispose of the case.[xvi]
Here, the Supreme Court’s DIG lacked any explanation. However, it appears likely based on the justices’ questioning at oral arguments that the first scenario mentioned above applies: the Court possibly had difficulty in creating a clearly-defined, or “bright line”, rule for when a company has to disclose past events. Taking this assumption as true, the implication is that the question—whether or not a company has to disclose past events that may presently pose harm to the company—is highly fact-intensive and should be determined based on the facts of a specific case.
It is also possible that the second scenario above may have been implicated: that the Supreme Court may have felt that Meta and its co-Defendants switched the focus of their appeal from whether past events required disclosure (at the certiorari stage) to whether previously transpired risks created a present, ongoing harm for Facebook (at the merits stage).
Given that the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands, it is possible that investor-plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims in Ninth Circuit are better protected than Sixth Circuit claimants in cases alleging misleading risk disclosures that conceal current or future harms arising from the known past materializations of risks.Nevertheless, investors nationwide should keep an eye out for instances where publicly-traded companies issue false or misleading risk statements, especially where there is evidence that the companies and their leadership know that risks are presently causing harm but do not disclose this to investors. Likewise, securities law practitioners—like those here at Levi & Korsinsky, LLP—will keenly monitor developments in the law, including whether the Supreme Court takes up review of any similar questions presented in the future.
[i] Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 23-980, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2024) (Per Curiam), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-980_4f14.pdf
[ii] Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, In re Facebook, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 5:18-cv-01725-EJD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020), ECF No. 142.
[iii] Facebook’s 2016 Annual Report on Form 10-K was filed February 3, 2017. See Complaint at ¶ 525; Meta Platforms, Inc., Form 10-K, File No. 001-35551 (SEC Feb. 3, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000007/fb-12312016x10k.htm
[iv] Complaint at ¶ 527; Meta Platforms, Inc., Form 10-K, File No. 001-35551, at 12–13 (SEC Feb. 3, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000007/fb-12312016x10k.htm
[v] In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 5:18-cv-01725-EJD, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242619, 2021 WL 6000058 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021).
[vi] Sec. Litig. v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc.), 87 F.4th 934, 950 (9th Cir. 2023).
[vii] Sec. Litig. v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc.), 87 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2023).
[viii] Sec. Litig. v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, Inc.), 87 F.4th 934, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2023).
[ix] Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 23-980 (U.S. filed Mar. 4, 2024), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-980/302143/20240304124120337_Meta%20Petition%20for%20Certiorari.pdf
[x] Id. at 2.
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id. at i.
[xiii] Supreme Court of the United States, Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, et al., Docket No. 23-880 (last accessed Jan. 22, 2025 6:04 PM), https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-980.html; see also Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcripts, Oral Argument on risk disclosures: Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank (Nov. 16, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZHGJLeDxc4 (unofficial transcript based on audio recording of oral arguments from Oyez); Oyez, Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank (Nov. 6, 2024), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts13/oral_argument_audio/25664 (containing audio recording of oral arguments).
[xiv] Ronald Mann, Justices skeptical about Facebook’s data breach disclosure to investors, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 7, 2024 12:12 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/11/justices-skeptical-about-facebooks-data-breach-disclosure-to-investors/
[xv] The Supreme Court occasionally decides to “dismiss as improvidently granted,” or “DIG” cases that have been granted a petition of the writ of certiorari. See Michael E. Solimine and Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the Sophisticated Use of DIGs, 18 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 155, 155–157 (2010), available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/659985
[xvi] Kevin Russell, Practice Pointer: Digging into DIGs, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 25, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/practice-pointer-digging-into-digs/
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Summary:
In April 2024, in an eagerly anticipated decision, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an order in In re Match Group Deriv. Litig., C.A. No. 2020-0505 (April 4, 2024) (“Match”) that clarifies the application of the framework articulated in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (the "MFW Doctrine”). Under the MFW Doctrine, the standard of review of a conflicted controlling stockholder transaction, which is typically viewed under entire fairness scrutiny, can be shifted to the business judgment rule if certain conditions are met. These conditions include: (1) approval by an independent special committee of directors; and (2) fully informed approval by the majority of the company’s disinterested stockholders. Essentially, the doctrine aims to simulate a fair, arm’s-length deal by eliminating conflicts of interest and undue influence from the controlling stockholder. A failure to adhere to the MFW Doctrine in a controlling stockholder transaction will result in the court evaluating the transaction based on the more stringent entire fairness standard instead of the more lenient business judgment rule.
Match involved a legal challenge regarding the spinoff of Match.com by IAC/InterActiveCorp (“IAC”), its then-controlling stockholder. In the lower court, the Court of Chancery dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the spinoff merger under the business judgment rule, finding that the defendants had satisfied the requirements of the MFW Doctrine. During the appeal process, the Delaware Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on a novel question regarding MFW's applicability beyond controller freeze-out merger. The defendants argued that the MFW Doctrine should be restricted to freeze-out mergers. Conversely, Plaintiffs asserted that MFW should continue to apply universally to all transactions involving a conflicted controlling stockholder and that deviating from this would significantly limit stockholder protections.
In ruling for the Plaintiffs, the Court held that entire fairness is the presumptive standard of review in any suit where a controlling stockholder stood on both sides of a transaction with the controlled corporation or received a non-ratable benefit. Furthermore, in a win for stockholders everywhere, the Court clarified that to shift the standard of review under the MFW Doctrine, fiduciaries must demonstrate that the transaction was approved by both an entirely independent special committee and a fully informed vote of the unaffiliated stockholders.
The Conflicted Transaction:
Match Group was acquired by IAC in 1999. In 2009, IAC incorporated Match Group in Delaware as its subsidiary. The transaction in question involved the separation of Match Group, and some debt obligations, from the rest of IAC’s businesses. To complete the separation, IAC formed a subsidiary, “New IAC,” and spun off its other businesses into that new entity. This left “Old IAC” holding Match Group, as well as a considerable amount of debt. At the time of this reverse spinoff, Old IAC held 98.2% of Match Group’s voting power—a benefit conferred through its ownership of 24.9% of Match Group’s common stock and all of the Class B shares, which had disproportionately high voting rights. Old IAC reclassified three classes of stock into a single class of common stock and became known as “New Match.”
Negotiations for this transaction were led by a “Separation Committee” composed of three of the ten Match Group directors: Thomas McInerney, Pamela Seymon, and Ann McDaniel. Led by McInerney, the Separation Committee negotiated and ultimately reached an agreement with IAC CEO Joey Levin to spin IAC off from Match Group. Later, a majority of the unaffiliated stockholders of both IAC and Match Group voted to approve the transaction. McInerney was the former CFO of IAC and a director of several Diller-controlled companies. Both IAC and Match Group were controlled by IAC’s chairman and largest individual stockholder, Barry Diller.
The Chancery Court Litigation:
On September 1, 2022, Match Group stockholders brough a suit challenging the fairness of the reverse spinoff, through which IAC would separate from its controlled subsidiary, Match Group. The lawsuit named IAC and ten of its directors as defendants and alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the company by conferring non-ratable benefits on IAC to the detriment of Match Group’s minority stockholders. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Separation Committee was conflicted, and that the proxy disclosures regarding the spinoff misled the Match Group stockholders who had voted in favor of the transaction.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that IAC had complied with the MFW framework and therefore the Court of Chancery should review the transaction under the business judgment rule. In granting defendants’ motion, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to call into question whether any of the MFW Doctrine’s procedural requirements had been satisfied. Specifically, the Court of Chancery held that the special committee approval prong of MFW did not require complete independence of all members of a special committee in order for business judgment to apply.
The Delaware Supreme Court Decision:
In a welcome decision for stockholders, the Supreme Court clarified that the protections outlined in MFW applied to all controller transactions, not just controller cash-out mergers. Additionally, while the Court of Chancery had deemed a majority-independent special committee sufficient, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing the necessity of full independence of all members of a special committee to meet MFW standards. Notably, a special committee member who was also IAC’s former CFO's IAC was found to be plausibly conflicted, leading to the application of entire fairness review and a remand to the Court of Chancery for further assessment.
Why It Matters:
This ruling clarifies a key aspect of Delaware law, potentially preventing dismissals of well-founded lawsuits where certain members of a special committee may not have been independent, and reinforcing the Delaware Court’s inclination towards heightened scrutiny in controller transactions. The impact of this decision is a clear win for stockholders, who now have a firm rule in place that governs and controls the exact type of behaviors and procedures that a company must follow when engaging in transactions with controlling stockholders if they hope to enjoy the protections of the business judgment rule. Following the Match.com decision, in order to qualify for business judgment review, conflicted controlling stockholder transactions must satisfy both of MFW's requirements: (i) approval by a committee of an independent directors that is fully empowered and meets its duty of care, and (ii) approval from a majority of minority stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote. If a conflicted controlling stockholder transaction fails to satisfy both of those requirements, then entire fairness will remain the standard of review. Special committees must be comprised solely of independent directors. Entire fairness will remain the standard of review if plaintiffs can show significant connections between even one special committee member and the controlling stockholder.
This memorandum is provided by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws. Prior results may not be predictive of future outcomes.
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On December 5, 2023, a three-judge panel in In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 87 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2023) (“In re Facebook”) voted to deny the defendant appellee Facebook, Inc.’s (“Facebook”) petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc of the Ninth Circuit’s October 18, 2023 ruling reversing the dismissal of claims against Facebook. In rejecting Facebook’s request for rehearing and confirming its findings by way of its December 5, 2023 amended order, the Ninth Circuit reiterated, inter alia, two important findings with respect to Facebook’s widely-publicized Cambridge Analytica scandal: 1) companies cannot make reference to data privacy risks as merely hypothetical where those risks have already materialized and 2) loss causation is adequately alleged where disclosures reveal the significance of a company’s fraud to the market, even where the fraud was initially revealed to shareholders four months earlier.
Shareholders commenced this securities fraud action on March 20, 2018 against Facebook and several of its executives, including Mark Zuckerberg, in the wake of the company’s Cambridge Analytica scandal that came to light in 2018. In March 2018, news broke that Cambridge Analytica improperly harvested and retained personal data from millions of Facebook users. Id. at 941. In the months following this news, the public learned that Facebook failed to inform its users of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct despite being aware of it for over two years. Id. Following this shocking revelation, Facebook’s stock price suffered two drops totaling over $200 billion. Id. Shareholders filed suit, alleging in their operative complaint that Defendants violated Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making materially misleading statements and omissions regarding, inter alia, the risk of improper access to Facebook users’ data, Facebook’s internal investigation into Cambridge Analytica, and the control Facebook users have over their data. Id. Ultimately, shareholders filed three amended complaints that the District Court dismissed, the third dismissal being with prejudice. Id. at 946.
False Statements of “Hypothetical” Privacy Risks
In reversing the District Court’s dismissal of certain claims, the Ninth Circuit described the “essence” of the challenged risk statements as Facebook representing that only hypothetical risks of improper third-party misuse of its users’ data could harm its business, while in reality, Facebook already knew Cambridge Analytica accessed and used its users’ data. Id. at 948.[1] In dismissing claims predicated on these statements, the District Court incorrectly found the statements inactionable because Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct was public knowledge when the statements were made, and because the complaint did not allege that Cambridge Analytica’s scandal was already causing such harm when the statements were made. Id.
The District Court’s dismissal, however, did not have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s recent ruling in another data privacy securities case: In re Alphabet Sec. Litig., 1 F.4th 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2021), which the majority in In re Facebook analogized to. There, Alphabet reiterated risk warnings that its privacy and security practices “could” harm its operations despite learning earlier that year that a privacy bug had threatened thousands of users’ personal data for three years. Id. at 694-696. Like in In re Alphabet, shareholders in In re Facebook alleged more than enough to support Facebook’s knowledge that its purportedly “hypothetical” data privacy concerns had already materialized. In re Facebook, 87 F.4th at 949.
Writing for the majority in In re Facebook, Circuit Judge McKeown addressed several assertions made in the dissent, including the assertion that Facebook need not have represented that it was free from significant breaches at the time of the filing because Facebook represented that “the risk of improper access […] of Facebook user data” was purely hypothetical. Id (emphasis added). Judge McKeown also found that “[b]ecause Facebook presented the prospect of a breach as purely hypothetical when it had already occurred, such a statement could be misleading even if the harm did not yet materialize or if the magnitude of the ensuring harm was still unknown.” Id. at 950 (emphasis added). And although articles released at the time of Facebook’s false risk warnings may have raised concerns about Cambridge Analytica’s conduct, this was not sufficient to “counterbalance any misleading impression” because the full extent of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct was not yet public. Id.
Loss Causation
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the dismissal of several statements regarding Facebook’s assurances to users that they had full control over their information and privacy settings related to two stock drops. First, with respect to the March 2018 stock drop of over $100 billion, the majority found that the March 2018 revelation about Cambridge Analytica was the first time shareholders were alerted that Facebook users did not have complete control over their own data. Id. at 955. Notably, the majority found loss causation despite the dissent noting that “much of the Cambridge Analytica scandal was already public by the time of the user control statements.” Id. at 963. The majority distinguished the total mix of information available to shareholders prior to March 2018 from the information revealed in the corrective disclosure by noting that prior news reports did not reveal that Cambridge Analytica misused the data. Id. at 955. For example, Facebook’s public response prior to the corrective disclosure was that it was still “carefully investigating” Cambridge Analytica’s use of the data. Id.
Additionally, the majority reversed on loss causation with respect to the July 2018 stock drop, which also represented a loss of approximately $100 billion and was, at the time, the largest single-day stock price drop in U.S. history. Id. This reversal was noteworthy to the extent it was based on the same Cambridge Analytica news that gave rise to the March 2018 drop. As Defendants argued in their petition for rehearing, by reversing on loss causation with respect to the Cambridge Analytica reports, the Ninth Circuit “embraced the unprecedented theory that the same corrective disclosure—here, the March 2018 Cambridge Analytica reports—caused two separate stock drops four months apart” without identifying “a single case in any jurisdiction endorsing a similar theory of loss causation.” In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 22-15077, ECF 501, at 13 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023). The majority stood by its reversal order, explaining that although the July 2018 drop was predicated by a disappointing second quarter earnings report detailing “dramatically lowered user engagement, substantially decreased advertising revenue and earnings, and reduced growth expectations going forward”, the July 2018 stock drop revealed new information to the market. In re Facebook, 87 F.4th at 956.[2] Here, the majority clarified that the poor earnings results were “on account of the Cambridge Analytica and whitelisting scandals” and that the poor earnings results constituted new information in that they allowed the public to appreciate for the first time the significance of the scandals. Id.
Practice Points
[1] For example, Facebook's 2016 10-K warned that the “failure to prevent or mitigate security breaches and improper access to or disclosure of our data or user data could result in the loss or misuse of such data” and that if “third parties or developers fail to adopt or adhere to adequate data security practices ... our data or our users' data may be improperly accessed, used, or disclosed.” Id.
[2] The Ninth Circuit found two separate groups of corrective disclosures each caused the July 2018 stock drop: the Cambridge Analytica reports giving rise to the March 2018 stock drop and a “whitelisting” revelation that surfaced on June 3, 2018, disclosing to shareholders that Facebook allowed certain applications to override user privacy settings. Id. at 946, 956.
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By Eduard Korsinsky & Alexander Krot
On Jan. 15, the American Arbitration Association amended its mass arbitration supplementary rules and implemented a new consumer mass arbitration and mediation fee schedule.
In its press release announcing the updated rules and fees, the AAA stated that it "listened to the needs of the individuals and business involved in mass arbitrations" and articulated that the updates would benefit the parties by bringing more order into the mass arbitration process, empowering a process arbitrator to make more substantive decisions, and changing the consumer case fee structure and timing.[1]
The impact of these changes is unclear. However, at first glance, it appears these amendments may reduce consumers' ability to counteract the mandatory arbitration agreements that businesses have been forcing upon them for years to deter claims.[2]
While the shift from filing fees to an initiation fee and per-case fees may result in fewer companies refusing to honor their fee obligations and delaying mass arbitration proceedings, these rule and fee changes appear to focus on reducing costs for businesses while also increasing the demands on consumers.[3]
The combined effect of these updates may diminish the very provisions of the AAA's rules and fee structures that have served as a check against businesses' efforts to keep consumers out of court on allegations of mass harm.
If this proves accurate, it will give credence to allegations that big business finally got to the AAA by refusing to honor their arbitration fee obligations and causing the AAA to administratively close mass arbitration cases.
Ultimately, how the AAA and its arbitrators apply these rules in the field will determine whether consumers will realize the claimed benefits and if the AAA remains a true neutral in these cases. This article summarizes the relevant changes and sheds light on their possible implications.
Mass Arbitration Supplementary Rules
Per the AAA, the updates to the mass arbitration supplementary rules[4] will increase process efficiency through an expanded role for the process arbitrator, reduce friction through attestation requirements for pleadings and filings, and streamline the arbitration process.[5]
Specifically, the updated rules require "an affirmation that the information provided for each individual case is true and correct to the best of the representative's knowledge" for demands for arbitration, amended claims, answers and counter-claims.
The rules also expand and clarify the process arbitrator role by allowing the AAA-International Centre for Dispute Resolution in its sole discretion to appoint a process arbitrator who has the authority under Section MA-6(c) to determine, in part:
Furthermore, under Section MA-6, the updated rules clarify that the process arbitrator shall resolve disputes, including whether the disputes are nonfact specific or are fact-specific and, therefore, must be determined on an individual basis; and allow merit arbitrators to review rulings by process arbitrators under an abuse of discretion standard.
Under Section MA-9, the rules permit the AAA-International Centre for Dispute Resolution to "in its sole discretion, appoint a mediator to facilitate discussions between the parties on processes that may make resolution of the cases more efficient." Under Section MA-5, the rules provide that "[v]irtual hearings are the preferred method of evidentiary hearings" instead of in-person hearings.
Consumer Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule
The new mass arbitration supplementary rules accompany amendments to the fees charged by the AAA to consumers and businesses in mass arbitrations.
The consumer mass arbitration and mediation fee schedule[6] replaces the previous filing fees due at the time of filing of a demand for arbitration with new initiation fees and stages the additional costs of the arbitration to the parties based on the case's procedural posture. The AAA states that the staged fees will provide cost predictability in cases through transparency and manageability.[7]
Under the new fee structure, individual consumers must now pay a $3,125 initiation fee upon filing a mass arbitration.[8] Once the individual consumers have met the filing requirements for the case, the business will be required to pay its $8,125 initiation fee.[9]
The new initiation fees are nonrefundable and will cover the administrative review of the filing, an administrative conference call with the AAA, and the appointment of a global mediator or process arbitrator.[10] The initiation fees replace the previous sliding scale for filing fees due at or near the time of case filing.[11]
If the cases proceed past the initiation stage, per-case fees are then assessed based on a sliding scale similar to before. For the first 500 cases, individual consumers and businesses are responsible for per-case fees of $125 and $325, respectively.[12]
For consumers, the per-case fees decrease to $75 per case after 500 cases and decrease for businesses to $250, $175 or $100 per case, depending on the applicable tier.[13] The new fee schedule credits the initiation fees towards any per-case fees.[14] Thus, the new per-case fees effectively shift the timing of the previous fee structure's filing fees to later in the case excepting the initiation fee amounts.[15]
The new fee schedule has generally decreased the per-case fees for businesses. The previous fee structure charged businesses case management fees of $1,400 per case for one arbitrator and $1,775 for a panel of three arbitrators.[16]
The new fee schedule replaces these fees with a per-case arbitrator appointment fee with shared assessments of $450 to a business and $50 to an individual consumer if the merit arbitrator is selected by direct appointment or $600 to a business and $75 to the consumer if the selection is by the list and rank process.[17] A final fee of $600 per case assessable to the business replaces the former $500 per-case hearing fee.[18]
Whether AAA Updates Truly Benefit Businesses and Consumers
In its press release announcing the changes, the AAA's senior vice president of dispute resolution services stated that the revised rules and fees are "crafted to save time, reduce costs, and foster constructive dialogue from the start."[19] Whether this is true will ultimately depend on their application, but a few observations can be made now.
The AAA's new fee schedule increases per-case fees for consumers while decreasing them for businesses. Importantly, these increased fees do not include the additional costs consumers may incur when complying with the new attestation rules or delays defending against any expanded and material procedural challenges businesses will undoubtedly bring before the process arbitrators.
This new regime will incentivize respondents to introduce delays with procedural hurdles that, when combined with the postponement of fees, will likely discourage respondents from engaging in constructive dialogue and result in fewer early resolutions.
As per-case fees are only assessable after the initiation phase is complete, cases may be vetted and excluded from the mass arbitration by the Process Arbitrator before the per-case fees are due.
Although not assessing fees for cases that the AAA will not arbitrate is reasonable, delaying the assessment of the per-case fees on businesses, as opposed to implementing a refund policy for later excluded claims, may trigger protracted and expensive vetting litigation before the legitimate consumers can get to the merits of their case.
This shift to per-case fees may reduce businesses' willingness to engage in meaningful discussions with consumers before they file a mass arbitration. All this may increase costs and delay resolutions.
The updates also appear to focus on assuaging businesses' concerns about the substantial filing fees the AAA levies upon them when claimants file mass arbitration cases.
Before the fee changes, businesses were responsible for paying filing fees to the AAA after the individual's filing was confirmed to meet the AAA's filing requirements.[20]
When 25 or more claimants brought similar arbitration demands against a business, the AAA's previous fee structure for multiple case filings placed much of the responsibility to pay on the businesses who chose the AAA forum and its procedures for dispute resolution over the class action litigation mechanisms that could be adjudicated in court for a fraction of the cost of arbitration.
This cost of adjudication, compared to the cheaper class action alternative for mass wrongs, served as an important check on businesses and incentivized them to explore resolutions before the filing of mass arbitration demands and the assessment of nonrefundable fees.[21]
The recent updates appear to have been influenced by the businesses that select the AAA as their arbitration forum but then balk at paying the necessary arbitration fees when more than a handful of consumers are affected.
Over the past few years, companies have refused to pay the costs of adjudicating arbitrations before the AAA,[22] even though such refusals may result in the AAA declining to administer future consumer arbitrations for that business.[23]
In a setback to businesses, claimants have successfully compelled companies, such as DoorDash Inc. and Samsung Electronics America Inc., to arbitrate thousands of arbitration demands and to pay millions of dollars in AAA's administrative fees — when these companies failed to honor the very same arbitration clauses they mandated upon claimants and refused to pay their AAA fees — so the mass arbitrations could not proceed.[24]
Claimants have also successfully fought arbitration clauses that sought to curb the collective power of consumers filing multiple arbitration demands and impose unfair associated fees.[25]
Some companies, such as Amazon.com Inc., have recognized that arbitration might not be an appropriate forum to resolve mass wrongs and elected to drop mandatory arbitration clauses from their contracts in favor of litigating the claims in federal or state court.[26]
Other companies chose not to compel arbitration when faced with lawsuits in court. These continued conflicts between businesses and individuals over mass arbitration fees have resulted in likely unwanted attention for the AAA from the media and the nonprofit organizations who have joined the foray on the side of consumers.[27]
By enacting the updates, it appears, at least for now, the AAA is looking to appease businesses' concerns about the AAA's rules and fees that have taken center stage in court proceedings.
How the AAA and its arbitrators apply these updates will determine whether they are truly neutral when adjudicating mass arbitration disputes.
Eduard Korsinsky is a founding partner at Levi & Korsinsky LLP. He heads the consumer mass arbitration and mass filings practice at the firm. Alexander Krot is an associate at the firm. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of their employer, its clients, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.
[1] Press Release, American Arbitration Association, AAA Announces Updated Mass Arbitration Supplementary Rules (Jan. 16, 2024, 9:17 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aaa-announces-updated-mass-arbitration-supplementary-rules-302035818.html ("AAA Press Release").
[2] See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone and Alexander J.S. Colvin, The arbitration epidemic: Mandatory arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their rights, Econ. Policy Inst. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.
[3] See Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (company refusing to pay AAA's fees resulting in the AAA administratively closing the arbitration cases); Wallrich v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 22 C 5506, 2023 WL 5935024, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2023) (same).
[4] Mass Arbitration Supplementary Rules (Jan. 15, 2024), Am. Arb. Ass'n, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Mass_Arbitration_Supplementary_Rules.pdf ("Supplementary Rules").
[5] AAA Press Release.
[6] Consumer Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule (Jan. 15, 2024), Am. Arb. Ass'n, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer_Mass_Arbitration_and_Mediation_Fee_Schedule.pdf ("Consumer Fee Schedule").
[7] AAA Press Release.
[8] Consumer Fee Schedule at 1.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Compare Consumer Fee Schedule at 2 with Consumer Arbitration Rules Costs of Arbitration, Am. Arb. Ass'n, 3 (Aug. 1, 2023), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Fee_Schedule.pdf ("Consumer Costs of Arbitration").
[12] Consumer Fee Schedule at 2.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Compare id. with Consumer Costs of Arbitration at 3.
[16] Consumer Costs of Arbitration at 1.
[17] Consumer Fee Schedule at 2.
[18] Compare Consumer Fee Schedule at 2 with Consumer Costs of Arbitration at 1.
[19] AAA Press Release.
[20] Consumer Costs of Arbitration at 1.
[21] See Alison Frankel, Verizon's $100 million fee settlement is setback for mass arbitration critics, Reuters (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/column-verizons-100-million-fee-settlement-is-setback-mass-arbitration-critics-2024-01-16/.
[22] See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3; Plaintiff's Complaint, Family Dollar, Inc. v. American Arbitration Association, Inc., 2:20-cv-00248-RBS-RJK (E.D. Va. May 15, 2020), ECF No. 1(Family Dollar, Inc. suing for a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to pay the AAA any portion of the $2.57 million in administrative fees when the claimants withdrew their demands before conducting any arbitration proceedings before the AAA).
[23] See Consumer Costs of Arbitration at 1 ("Where the AAA determines that a business's failure to pay their portion of arbitration costs is a violation of the Consumer Arbitration Rules, the AAA may decline to administer future consumer arbitrations with that business."); Consumer Fee Schedule at 1 (same).
[24] Abernathy, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1067–68 (granting DoorDash's couriers' motion to compel AAA arbitration after DoorDash refused to pay $12 million in fees to the AAA, including filing fees); Wallrich, 2023 WL 5935024, at *13 (granting motion to compel arbitration and to pay its filing fees noting that "Samsung was surely thinking about money when it wrote its Terms & Conditions. The company may not have expected so many would seek arbitration against it, but neither should it be allowed to 'blanch[ ] at the cost of the filing fees it agreed to pay in the arbitration clause.'" (citing Abernathy, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1068)).
[25] See MacClelland v. Cellco P'ship, 609 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1040–44 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (finding arbitration clause substantively unconscionable that sought a bellwether proceeding by arbitrating claims in "batches" and setting a cap on the number of arbitration demands that can proceed against Verizon at any one time before additional arbitration demands could proceed).
[26] Sara Randazzo, Amazon Faced 75,000 Arbitration Demands. Now It Says: Fine, Sue Us, Wall St. J. (June 1, 2021, 7:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-faced-75-000-arbitration-demands-now-it-says-fine-sue-us-11622547000.
[27] See e.g., Alison Frankel, Uber loses appeal to block $92 million in mass arbitration fees, Reuters (April 18, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/uber-loses-appeal-block-92-million-mass-arbitration-fees-2022-04-18/; Michael Hiltzik, Column: DoorDash thought it was smart to force workers to arbitrate but now faces millions in fees, L.A. Times (Feb. 11, 2020, 2:48 PM PT), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-02-11/doordash-arbitration-blunder; Alison Frankel, Samsung ordered to pay arbitration fees for 36,000 biometric privacy plaintiffs, Reuters (Sept. 14, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/column-samsung-ordered-pay-arbitration-fees-36000-biometric-privacy-plaintiffs-2023-09-14/; Brief for Amici Curiae Public Justice, American Association for Justice, National Consumer Law Center, Woodstock Institute, and Public Investors Advocate Bar Association in Support of Appellees, Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., No. 23-2842 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023).
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By Amanda Foley
In a class action suit pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison recommended the denial of class certification, finding the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the defendants’ alleged false statements in the proxy statement that plaintiffs argued prevented shareholders from casting an informed vote and caused them losses when the truth became known and the subject company’s stock price declined. Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159957 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2023). While Magistrate Judge Edison found the plaintiffs’ disclosure claims were direct, he also found their damages theory was derivative in nature because the plaintiffs were unable to “demonstrate that . . . [they] can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.’” Id. at *21-23. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs’ damages theory was derivative and plaintiffs failed to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, Magistrate Judge Edison found the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert Section 14(a) claims.
On September 29, 2023, Judge Hanks rejected the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation and ordered that Lead Plaintiffs file a new Motion for Class Certification that focuses solely on the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3).[1] However, this intra-Court dispute highlights the confusion surrounding the issue of whether a claim is direct or derivative.
As courts recognize, the question of whether a claim is derivative or direct is not always clear. In determining whether the plaintiffs’ claims were direct or derivative, Magistrate Judge Edison relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2005), which held that “[s]tate law determines whether a shareholder may maintain a nonderivative action”—here, Delaware law. Under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 845 A.2d 1035 (Del. 2004), whether a claim is direct or derivative turns on “[w]ho suffered the alleged harm—the corporation or the suing stockholder individually—and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy?” (the “Tooley Test”).
Applying Tooley to McDermott, it is clear that the plaintiffs had standing to assert Section 14(a) claims. In McDermott, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant McDermott International issued false and misleading proxy materials to solicit shareholder votes in favor of a proposed merger between McDermott and CB&I, where McDermott acquired CB&I for .82407 shares of McDermott stock for each share of CB&I. After the merger closed, McDermott reported consecutive quarterly operating losses, causing the new company’s stock price to decline, culminating in a restructuring bankruptcy, SEC investigation, and a securities fraud lawsuit.
In the defendants’ motion to dismiss, they argued that the plaintiffs pled a derivative claim which should be dismissed for lack of standing. District Judge Hanks dispensed of that argument, holding that “shareholders have long been able to bring direct Section 14(a) claims when those shareholders have been deprived of the right to cast an informed vote.” Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71758, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2021) (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381, 397 (1970)). At the class certification stage, Magistrate Judge Edison revisited the direct versus derivative issue and found that, while plaintiffs’ inability to cast an informed vote on the merger was a direct claim, plaintiffs’ “theory of class wide damages confirms the derivative nature of its claim:”
Plaintiff’s theory of liability may be direct, but its damages claim is derivative. Delaware law does not permit Plaintiff to paint its derivative damages claim with a disclosure coating. There is no dispute that Plaintiff has not satisfied Rule 23.1’s procedural requirements for bringing a derivative claim against McDermott. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing under Rule 23.1 and its proposed class should not be certified.
Id. at *26. In finding the plaintiffs’ damages theory was derivative, Magistrate Judge Edison reasoned that “a drop in Plaintiff’s shares’ price is ‘an injury suffered by all [McDermott] shareholders in proportion to their pro rata share ownership.’” Id. at *21-22 (quoting Smith v. Waste Mgmt., 407 F.3d381, 385 (5th Cir. 2005)). “As such, Plaintiff cannot prove its injury without also proving an injury to the corporation.” Id. at *22.
The confusion, thus, appears to lie in the fact that a stock price decline arguably harms both the shareholder through the loss in value of his or her shares of stock, and the corporation through a decline in market cap value. As the plaintiffs correctly argued, their damages theory is not derivative under the Tooley Test because the plaintiffs “are seeking damages to be paid to stockholders for the decline in the value of their own shares.” However, Magistrate Judge Edison failed to consider this and other important distinctions that demonstrate the plaintiffs’ standing under Tooley. First, (as the plaintiffs correctly pointed out), the damages plaintiffs sought—to be paid a higher price for their shares in the merger—flowed directly from their disclosure claim. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Edison did not fully consider the second prong of the Tooley Test—“who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy.” Because McDermott no longer existed as a standalone company, there was no McDermott that could benefit from a financial recovery. Further, any financial recovery received would go directly to, and for the benefit of, the pre-merger McDermott shareholders. Also, as the plaintiffs pointed out, “[u]nder the MR’s incorrect theory of the law, every stock decline would also injure the company,” leading to the “absurd result” that all “indisputably direct claims, such as those under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 11 of the Securities Act, [are] somehow derivative.”
While Judge Hanks did not provide any further clarification in his decision rejecting Magistrate Judge Edison’s recommendation, Judge Hanks appears to have put the issue to rest for now. This showdown, however, indicates that Counsel should be aware of the critical distinctions between direct and derivative claims and that even courts are confused, leading to inconsistent rulings, including between Judges in the same court.
[1] Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176267 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023).
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In the wake of the special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”) fad that recently gripped the financial world, the passage of time has shown that many, or even most, of these companies were ultimately value destructive for public investors.[1] In response, stockholders have pursued class actions alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by SPAC insiders, and the Delaware Court of Chancery handed down several decisions in 2022 and 2023 denying motions to dismiss filed by the SPAC controllers. Specifically, in a series of decisions starting with the Multiplan[2] case, the Delaware Court of Chancery has sided with stockholder plaintiffs and found that their claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the alleged controllers were legally sound.
A key issue in these decisions was whether the “plaintiff-friendly” entire fairness standard of review applied to the Court’s pleading-stage review of the alleged controllers’ actions.[3] The applicability of the entire fairness standard of review is of major consequence for these and future SPAC cases. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized that “the invocation of the entire fairness standard has a powerful pro-plaintiff effect against interested parties.”[4] This standard of review “intentionally puts strong pressure on the interested party and its affiliates to deal fairly before-the-fact when negotiating an interested transaction.”[5]
The Multiplan decision assessed claims arising from the SPAC merger of Churchill Capital Corp. III (“Churchill”).[6] Churchill was formed in October 2019 to serve as a SPAC.[7] It was a publicly traded company that raised capital through its initial public offering (“IPO”) to realize the goal of merging with a private company and taking it public.[8] Before the merger, Churchill had no operations and its assets were effectively limited to its IPO proceeds.[9] Michael Klein (“Klein”) incorporated Churchill as a Delaware corporation through Churchill Sponsor III, LLC (“Sponsor”).[10] Sponsor’s managing member was M. Klein Associates, Inc., and its sole stockholder was Klein.[11]
After its IPO, Churchill had two classes of common stock and warrants.[12] Specifically, Churchill sold 110,000,000 units at $10 per unit in its IPO, and each unit consisted of one share of Churchill Class A common stock and a quarter of a warrant with an exercise price of $11.50.[13] Class A shares composed 80% of Churchill's outstanding stock.[14] The Sponsor purchased millions of Class B founder shares an upfront capital contribution of $25,000 (the “Founder Shares”), which made up the remaining 20% of Churchill’s common stock.[15] The Founder Shares stood to convert into Class A shares at a one-to-one ratio (subject to adjustments) if Churchill consummated an initial business combination.[16] The Sponsor was also compensated through an option to purchase warrants in Churchill.[17] That is, Churchill made a private placement of 23 million warrants to the Sponsor at $1 each (the "Private Placement Warrants").[18] Like the warrants associated with the public IPO units, the Private Placement Warrants’ exercise price was $11.50.[19]
Churchill had 24 months after its IPO to find a private company target and complete a merger.[20] If no transaction was completed by then, Churchill would return the IPO proceeds plus interest to its stockholders, cease operations, and wind up.[21] In this scenario, both the Class B shares and Private Placement Warrants would expire worthless.[22]
Each of the Churchill’s Class A stock had a redemption right pursuant to Churchill’s certificate of incorporation.[23] This redemption right is a unique feature of a SPAC.[24] After the merger was disclosed but before the stockholder vote, Class A stockholders had an option to redeem their stock for the $10 IPO price plus any interest that accumulated in the trust that consisted of the IPO proceeds.[25] Such stockholders could redeem their shares regardless of whether they voted for or against the merger while retaining the warrants that were included in the IPO units at no cost.[26]
Churchill selected Polaris Parent Corp. ("MultiPlan"), the parent company of MultiPlan, Inc. as the target company to take public through its SPAC merger.[27] On October 7, 2020, Churchill stockholders voted to approve the merger with Multiplan.[28] Churchill completed the merger with MultiPlan on October 8, 2020.[29]
Shortly after Churchill’s merger closed, on November 11, 2020, an equity research firm published a report about MultiPlan discussing that, inter alia, Multiplan’s then largest client formed a company that was a likely MultiPlan competitor.[30] Public MultiPlan's stock fell to a then-closing low of $6.27 the following day, which was significantly below the redemption price.[31]
A key issue in the Multiplan decision was whether the entire fairness standard of review applied to the Court’s review of Klein’s actions as Churchill’s controller.[32] The Court of Chancery reasoned that the entire fairness standard of review applied because the merger was a conflicted controller transaction.[33] The parties agreed that Michael Klein, through his control of the Churchill’s Sponsor, was Churchill’s controller, so Klein’s controller status was not in dispute.[34] With respect to the issue of the Klein’s conflict, the Court of Chancery observed that a controller’s conflict triggers the entire fairness standard of review if the controller receives greater monetary consideration for its shares than the minority stockholders, takes a different form of consideration than the minority stockholders, or receives a unique benefit by extracting something uniquely valuable to the controller, even if the controller nominally receives the same consideration as all other stockholders to the detriment of the minority.[35] The Court of Chancery reasoned that Klein extracted a unique benefit because the SPAC merger was valuable to him regardless of whether the post-merger entity’s shares traded above the $10.04 redemption value.[36]
In pertinent part, the Court of Chancery observed that Klein’s purchase of Founder Shares for de minimis consideration contributed to how his risk-reward profile was mismatched from those of the minority stockholders[37]:
The well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint highlight a benefit unique to Klein at the point when Class A stockholders held redemption rights backed by a trust that Class B stockholders could not access, and Klein (who controlled the Sponsor) had an economic interest in 70% of the Class B shares. Both the Class B shares and the Private Placement Warrants held by the Sponsor would be worthless if Churchill did not complete a deal. As of the record date, the Private Placement Warrants were worth roughly $51 million and the founder shares were worth approximately $305 million, representing a 1,219,900% gain on the Sponsor's $25,000 investment. These figures would have dropped to zero absent a deal.
Churchill's public stockholders, on the other hand, would have received $10.04 per share if Churchill had failed to consummate a merger and liquidated. Instead, those that did not redeem received Public Multiplan Shares that were allegedly worth less.
In brief, the merger had a value—sufficient to eschew redemption—to common stockholders if shares of the post-merger entity were worth $10.04. For Klein, given the (non-)value of his stock and warrants if no business combination resulted, the merger was valuable well below $10.04. This is a special benefit to Klein.
It can also be reasonably inferred that Klein gained a unique benefit from the redemption offer itself—it brought him one step closer to consummating a transaction that allegedly benefitted him to the detriment of Class A stockholders. Further, in a value-decreasing deal where the post-merger entity is expected to be worth less than $10.04 per share, issuing a share at $10.04—the effective result of a stockholder choosing not to redeem a Churchill share—is value enhancing to the existing stockholders. It is also patently harmful to the ones giving up $10.04 for something less valuable. Because of his founder shares, Klein effectively competed with the public stockholders for the funds held in trust and would be incentivized to discourage redemptions if the deal was expected to be value decreasing, as the plaintiffs allege.
After deciding that the entire fairness standard of review applied, the Court of Chancery ultimately found that the minority-stockholder plaintiffs successfully pled a claim against Klein as a controlling stockholder.[38] In November 2022, the Multiplan action settled for $33.75 million to a certain class of Churchill’s unaffiliated stockholders.[39]
Mostly due to its decision to apply the “plaintiff-friendly” standard of review, the Multiplan decision has been described by commentators as having “made big headlines”[40] and as a “must-read for anyone focused on SPACs.”[41] Following the Multiplan decision, several similar cases have survived motions to dismiss, including Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC,[42] Laidlaw v. GigAcquisitions2, LLC,[43] In re XL Fleet (Pivotal) Stockholder Litigation,[44] Malork v. Anderson,[45] and Newbold v. McCaw[46]. SPAC investors who have suffered losses should consider these developments in the law and consult qualified counsel to explore their legal options.
This memorandum is provided by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws. Prior results may not be predictive of future outcomes
[1] Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 Yale J. On Reg. 228, 292 (2022) (“By the second quarter of 2021, SPAC share prices came back roughly to where they were before the bubble, with mean pre-merger share prices approximately at $10.00. Furthermore, those SPACs that merged in Q4 2020 and Q1 2021 and appeared to be great deals for investors have now soured. As of December 2021, the mean and median prices for those SPACs have fallen to $9.01 and $7.09, respectively. If investors had redeemed their shares and invested the proceeds in a market index, they would now have roughly $12.35 in value.”).
[2] In re Multiplan Corp. Stockholders Litig., 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. 2022).
[3] Multiplan, 268 A.3d. at 799.
[4] Leal v. Meeks, 115 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Del. 2015).
[5] Id.
[6] Multiplan, 268 A.3d, at 791-92.
[7] Id. at 793.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 794.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 795.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id. at 796.
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at 798
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 810.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id. at 811.
[37] Id (internal citations omitted).
[38] Id. at 817.
[39] See, e.g., Multiplan Corporation Announces Settlement of Delaware Litigation, Businesswire (Nov. 17, 2022) (https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20221117006191/en/MultiPlan-Corporation-Announces-Settlement-of-Delaware-Litigation).
[40] Alison Frankel, Multiplan SPAC's bid to kill shareholder suit? Blame Muddy Waters, Reuters (Feb. 23, 2022) (last accessed October 25, 2023) (https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/multiplan-spacs-bid-kill-shareholder-suit-blame-muddy-waters-2022-02-23/).
[41] Howard L. Ellin, et al., Court of Chancery Issues SPAC-Related Decision of First Impression, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates (Jan. 6, 2022) (last accessed October 25, 2023) (https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2022/01/court-of-chancery-issues-spac-related-decision).
[42] 288 A.3d 692, 713-20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2023).
[43] 2023 WL 2292488, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2023).
[44] Consol. C.A. No. 2021-0808-KSJM, at 5, 23-28 (Del. Ch. June 9, 2023) (TRANSCRIPT).
[45] C.A. No. 2022-0260-PAF, at 30 (Del. Ch. July 7, 2023) (TRANSCRIPT).
[46] C.A. No. 2022-0439-LWW, at 17 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2023) (TRANSCRIPT).
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Ninth Circuit Holds Former Employee Statements Can Be Probative of Scienter in 10b-5 Actions at the Pleading Stage Even Where the Former Employee Departed the Company Before the Class Period Began or Had No Direct Contact With a Defendant
Whether allegations in a complaint raise a strong inference of scienter is one of the most hotly contested questions in nearly every securities fraud action brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its corollary, Rule 10b-5. In the recent Ninth Circuit decision, E. Ohman J v. Nvidia Corp., the majority opinion puts a finer texture on what type of allegations from former employees can be probative of scienter at the pleading stage. E. Ohman J v. NVIDIA Corp., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22473 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023). Additionally, comparing the majority opinion with the dissent can provide practitioners and courts with a better understanding of what type of allegations are not required to raise a strong inference of scienter under Ninth Circuit law. The following briefly summarizes the facts of NVIDIA and offers a few observations that can be useful in practice.
In NVIDIA, the plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Huang, NVIDIA’s CEO, materially understated the Company’s exposure to the volatility of the cryptocurrency market by understating the number of Gaming GPUs—NVIDIA’s primary product—the Company knew were being sold to end-users in the crypto industry. When asked by analysts what amount of NVIDIA’s GPU sales were related to the highly volatile crypto industry, Defendant Huang repeatedly minimized that amount, often misstating it by hundreds of millions of dollars, and assured investors that substantially none of the sales reported in NVIDIA’s “Gaming” segment were subject to crypto volatility. But when the crypto market pendulum returned to its nadir, NVIDIA Gaming GPU sales were substantially lower than expected. Investors were shocked when NVIDIA’s executives revealed that “Gaming was short of expectations as post crypto channel inventory took longer than expected to sell through,” leaving a “crypto hangover” from excess inventory buildup.
The District Court dismissed the amended complaint for failing to “plausibly show that the Defendant who made each specified statement knowingly or recklessly spoke falsely.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, holding that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded Defendant Huang made false and misleading statements with scienter.
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on statements from two former NVIDIA employees. Former Employee 1 (“FE 1”) was a Senior Account Manager in China employed at NVIDIA for nearly 10 years whose knowledge of the relevant facts was largely derived from FE 1’s discussions with superiors and not from direct contact with the defendants, themselves. Id. at *43-44. FE 1 reported that Nvidia kept meticulous records and collected sales data from all regions in a centralized global database, accessible by Defendant Huang. Former Employee 2 (“FE 2”) had more direct knowledge of Defendant Huang’s knowledge and behavior from personal interactions and regular meetings with Huang. But FE 2 departed from NVIDIA before the Class Period, limiting FE 2’s information about Defendant Huang’s knowledge, habits, and behaviors to a period before the alleged fraud. Id. at *45-47. FE 2 described Defendant Huang as a meticulous manager who closely monitored sales data.
Applying a “holistic” analysis, the Ninth Circuit held FE 1 and FE 2’s accounts were probative of scienter and Plaintiffs’ allegations raised a strong inference that Defendant Huang acted with scienter, stating:
A holistic review gives rise to such an inference in this case. To summarize Plaintiffs’ allegations, they allege that (1) Huang had detailed sale reports prepared for him; (2) Huang had access to detailed data on both crypto demand and usage of NVIDIA’s products; (3) Huang was a meticulous manager who closely monitored sales data; and (4) sales data at the time would have shown that a large portion of GPU sales were being used for crypto mining. Huang’s access and review of contemporaneous reports are the most direct way to prove scienter. See Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1230. Huang himself admitted to closely monitoring sales data. Taken together, these allegations support a strong inference that Huang reviewed sales data showing that a large share of NVIDIA’s GeForce GPUs sold during the Class Period were being used for crypto mining.
* * *
In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs provide a number of reasons supporting a conclusion that Huang, the CEO of NVIDIA, knew that more than a billion dollars in company revenues came from selling GeForce GPUs to crypto miners. We state the obvious. A CEO who does not know the source of $1.126 billion in company revenues during fifteen-month period, or $1.35 billion during an eighteen-month period, is unlikely to exist. Or if such a CEO does exist, he or she is not likely to remain CEO for very long. It is “reasonable to infer” that Huang’s “detail-oriented management style” would have led him “to become aware of” the source of more than a billion dollars in company revenue during a fifteen- or eighteen-month period. See Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1234 (“It is reasonable to infer that Oracle executives’ detail-oriented management style led them to become aware of the allegedly improper revenue recognition of such significant magnitude that the company would have missed its quarterly earnings projections but for the adjustments.”)
Id. at *50, *65-66.
In holding the plaintiffs adequately alleged a strong inference of scienter, the majority made two important points:
Former Employee Statements Can Be Relevant and Probative of Scienter Even when the Former Employee Was Not Employed by the Defendants During the Class Period
The majority opinion found that FE 2’s statements of Defendant Huang’s knowledge and behavior immediately before the class period allowed the court to infer what Defendant Huang “would have known” and how Defendant Huang “would have behaved” during the immediately following Class Period. Specifically, the majority observed:
FE 2 quit working at NVIDIA at the beginning of the Class Period. However, FE 2’s statements about Defendant Huang’s practices in the period immediately preceding the Class Period—in particular, his micromanaging and attention to detail—are relevant and probative, showing how Huang would have behaved and what he would have known during the immediately following Class Period. Critically, FE 2’s statements were not only about Huang’s general practices and knowledge. Instead, FE 2’s statements specifically concerned what Huang knew about the issue at the heart of this case—the large volume of sales of GeForce GPUs to crypto miners.
Id. at *47 (emphasis added).
Thus, while the dissent complained that FE 2’s knowledge was limited to a time period outside of the alleged fraud and refused to draw any inferences from FE 2’s statements alleged in the amended complaint, id. at *100, the majority credited FE 2’s knowledge of Defendant Huang prior to the Class Period, holding that it is appropriate for courts to draw reasonable inferences from the facts alleged by former employees, even if not employed during the Class Period.
Former Employee Statements Can Be Relevant and Probative of Scienter Even when the Former Employee Had No Direct Contact With A Defendant
The majority also credited statements from FE 1 that “NVIDIA kept meticulous track of who was buying its GPUs” and that “NVIDIA managers from all regions collected sales data and inputted it into NVIDIA’s centralized global database,” finding them probative of scienter. Id. at *43. Whereas the dissent complained that FE 1 “lacks personal knowledge of what the global database showed” and “was five levels removed from Huang and never interacted with him,” id. at *96, the majority held that such information from a junior-level employee is relevant and probative of scienter when considered together with the other allegations in the complaint, as part of a holistic analysis: “Taken together, these allegations support a strong inference that Huang reviewed sales data showing that a large share of NVIDIA’s GeForce GPUs sold during the Class Period were being used for crypto mining.” Id. at *50 (emphasis added). In other words, FE 1’s statements that the Company carefully tracked who was buying its GPUs combined with FE 2’s statements that Defendant Huang carefully reviewed the Company’s data, to raise a strong inference of scienter.
Putting NVIDIA into Practice
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In a meaningful victory for shareholders, Levi & Korsinsky attorneys recently defeated two motions to dismiss a securities fraud class action brought on behalf of investors who purchased common stock issued in Stronghold Digital Mining, Inc.’s IPO.[1] Stronghold is pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York before United States District Judge Ronnie Abrams. Judge Abrams’ decision on the motions to dismiss offered important clarity on the requirements for successfully pleading a claim brought pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, and may offer substantial protections for all IPO investors going forward.[2] Specifically, the Stronghold decision clarified that under the Securities Act, a plaintiff only needs to allege that the facts and circumstances making a defendant’s statement false or misleading were knowable to the defendant—such facts do not need to have been actually known by the defendant. Judge Abrams also rejected the Stronghold defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs failed to allege “loss causation” because such an argument is almost always inappropriate to make prior to fact and expert discovery.[3]
The plaintiffs in the Stronghold action alleged that offering documents published in connection with Stronghold’s October 2021 IPO included a number of disclosures regarding anticipated delivery of certain cryptocurrency mining equipment that were materially false and misleading.[4] When defendants issue a communication in connection with an IPO that ‘include[s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,” Section 11 of the Securities Act is violated.[5] The Stronghold Court looked to previously “settled” case law, and held that individuals or entities that make misleading statements in connection with an IPO are liable under Section 11 even if those statements are made “innocent[ly].”[6] Therefore—unlike allegations pursuant to antifraud provisions of federal securities law (such as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)—Section 11 allegations are not required to include that the defendants spoke with a culpable state of mind.[7]
As is common in Section 11 litigation, the Stronghold defendants nevertheless argued that the alleged misstatements could only be actionable if the defendants either “knew or should have known” the facts and circumstances that made the statements misleading.[8] In her August 10th opinion in Stronghold, Judge Abrams explained that the only requirements under Section 11 are that, at the time of the IPO: (1) the statements at issue are false or misleading and (2) the facts and circumstances that make the statements misleading are “knowable.”[9] Critically, Judge Abrams emphasized that “whether a fact [is] “knowable” at the time of a securities offering is not the same as whether a defendant “knew,” or “should have known” of that fact.”[10]
In addition, the Stronghold opinion reiterated that a plaintiff asserting a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act does not need to allege “loss causation”—i.e. a causal connection between the alleged misstatements and the losses suffered by the class.[11] In moving to dismiss a complaint, defendants can raise “negative causation”—ie., the absence of loss causation—as an affirmative defense.[12] But defendants’ burden in arguing negative causation is “a heavy one,” and, except in an “unusual” case, defendants can generally meet this burden only later in the litigation process—generally, at the summary judgment or trial phase after the parties have been able to obtain pertinent business records, take depositions, and confer with expert witnesses in the discovery process.[13] In Stronghold, the defendants proffered two arguments in support of a negative causation defense: that the truth had emerged prior to the date plaintiffs suggested and that the stock price decline was wholly attributable to factors other than the allegedly false representations.[14] The court rejected both arguments and concluded that “[i]n sum, given the burden on Defendants to establish an affirmative defense such as negative causation, dismissal on that basis is more properly considered on a motion for summary judgment.”[15]
[1] See Winter v. Stronghold Digital Mining, Inc., No. 22-CV-3088 (RA), 2023 WL 5152177 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023) (“Stronghold”).
[2] Id.
[3] Id., at 7-10.
[4] Id., at *2-3.
[5] 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k.
[6] See e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S. Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1983).
[7] See e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 169 n. 4 (2d Cir.2004).
[8] Stronghold, 2023 WL 5152177, at *7.
[9] Id., at *7-8.
[10] Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
[11] Id., at *10; see also, In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Levine v. AtriCure, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
[12] Stronghold, 2023 WL 5152177, at *10.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. (cleaned up and citation omitted).
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Digital-asset investors have long faced uncertainty regarding the protections afforded to their investments by United States law. On August 18, 2023, citing split between two judges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the SEC filed a motion that requests permission to file an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seeking clarity on whether sales by crypto issuers on trading platforms qualify as securities transactions.[1] The motion additionally also seeks appeal on the related issue of whether an exchange of services for crypto payments can constitute a securities transaction.[2]
In late July, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in SEC v. Terraform Labs Pte. Ltd, et al., 23-cv-1346 (JSR), 2023 WL 4858299 (S.D.N.Y. July 31. 2023) (“Terraform”), providing a victory for regulators and U.S. investors and supporting that investors do have recourse for losses from investments in digital tokens or currencies that were fraudulently promoted or not properly registered with the SEC. In May of 2022, Terraform’s digital asset ecosystem collapsed, wiping out an estimated half a trillion dollars from crypto markets.[3] In Terraform, Judge Rakoff upheld claims against Terraform Labs and its cofounder Do Kwon under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, the opinion found that the SEC set forth plausible allegations that Defendants violated Section 5 of the Securities Act by distributing unregistered tokens to accredited, institutional investors, knowing that the tokens would be resold, and by selling other assets (mAssets) directly to the public, including to investors who were not “eligible contract participants,” as the law defines them.[4] The Court separately refused to dismiss fraud claims asserting violations of both Acts alleging that Terraform and Kwon: (a) falsely stated that certain transactions were processed on the Terraform blockchain when they were actually processed in Korean Won; and (b) misleadingly omitted that the stablecoin UST was repegged in May 2021 via third party intervention, not by “self-healing” as their prior statements suggested.[5]
The Terraform decision expressly declined to follow an opinion issued in the same District just weeks earlier, SEC v. Ripple Labs Inc., 2023 WL 4507900 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2023) (“Ripple”), which had excluded a narrow segment of crypto transactions from the definition of “security.” Because federal law typically only regulates “securities,” the Ripple decision, authored by Judge Analisa Torres, left certain investments unprotected. Like Terraform, Ripple recognized that sales of digital assets can constitute investment contracts and form the basis for securities fraud liability.[6] However, Ripple distinguished between direct sales by issuers to institutional buyers and public sales by issuers on digital exchanges, finding liability only for the former.[7] Applying the Supreme Court’s seminal Howey test,[8] Ripple reasoned that the “Programmatic Buyers” did not purchase Ripple’s digital assets (“XRP”) with the “expectation of profit” to be derived “from Ripple’s efforts,” because (a) the sales were not made pursuant to detailed contracts; (b) Ripple’s promotional materials and brochures may not have been as widely distributed to these buyers as to the institutional buyers; and (c) in the Court’s view, these buyers were “generally less sophisticated as [] investor[s]” and may not have been able to “parse through the multiple documents and statements…across multiple social media platforms and news sites.”[9] Ripple’s reasoning is limited to blind bid/ask transactions, and the opinion expressly declined to rule on secondary market sales.[10] The direct holding in Ripple, therefore, only expressly limited liability for sales by crypto issuers on digital asset exchanges via trading algorithms. Separately, Ripple held that distribution of XRP to employees or third parties as compensation did not involve an “investment of money” and therefore were also not securities transactions under Howey.[11]
In Terraform, Judge Rakoff roundly rejected Ripple’s institutional/retail investor split and its reasoning, observing that the Supreme Court’s seminal Howey opinion “made no such distinction” and “it makes good sense that it did not.”[12] Further, Judge Rakoff found that the SEC had sufficiently alleged that the defendants “embarked on a public campaign to encourage both retail and institutional investors to buy their crypto-assets” and that the misleading “representations would presumably have reached individuals who purchased their crypto-assets on secondary markets –- and, indeed, motivated those purchases -- as much as it did institutional investors.”[13]
By rejecting the Ripple precedent, Terraform created a clear split within the same federal judicial district on the issue of whether “programmatic” offers and sales by issuers on digital asset trading platforms can be actionable as offers and sales of securities. Generally, appeals courts only hear appeals of “final decisions.” Interlocutory review, however, is warranted where (1) “[an] order involves a controlling question of law,” (2) “as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” SEC v. Rio Tinto PLC, 2021 WL 1893165, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021). Citing Terraform, which reached the opposite result, the SEC is seeking permission to appeal the Ripple decision.[14]
In addition to prompting likely review of the Ripple decision by the Second Circuit, the Terraform decision is separately noteworthy because it identifies several classes of digital assets that can give rise to securities fraud liability, including certain stablecoins and derivative assets. Applying the longstanding Howey test, Terraform found that the SEC had sufficiently alleged fraud liability for assets in the below categories:[15]
Moreover, Terraform confirms that federal courts can have personal jurisdiction over foreign cryptocurrency issuers and related parties.[21] This holding is significant because cryptocurrency companies are often incorporated in foreign jurisdictions and may not have physical headquarters, which complicates personal jurisdiction analysis. To establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “purposefully directed” activities within the forum state and that the allegations “arise out of” that directed activity. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985). In Terraform, these factors are held to be sufficiently established because of (1) direct sales of the relevant coins or products to United States companies carried out through the United States banking system and (2) that Defendants marketed their products in meetings in the United States.[22] This decision builds on a similar holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and aligns with notable cases in the Southern District of New York. See U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm. v. Terraform Labs Pte Ltd., 2022 WL 2066414, at *4 (2d Cir. June 8, 2022); Owens v. Elastos Found., 2021 WL 5868171, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2021).
Accordingly, Terraform is a positive result for digital-asset investors which could become the law for the entire Second Circuit if the SEC receives permission to appeal Ripple.
[1] SEC v. Ripple Labs Inc., Case 1:20-cv-10832-AT-SN, ECF No. 893 (Filed August 18, 2023).
[2] Id.
[3] CFI Team, What Happened to Terra? (October 13, 2022, updated: February 1, 2023).
[4] See 7 U.S.C, § 1a(18). “Eligible contract participants” include, for example, financial institutions, regulated insurance companies, and employee benefit plans with assets exceeding $5 million. Id.
[5] Terraform, at *15-17.
[6] Id., at *14-15; Ripple, at *6-8.
[7] Ripple, at *13.
[8] Howey defines an investment contract subject to securities laws as a “contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person (1) invests his money (2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promotor or a third party,” SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
[9] Ripple, at *12.
[10] Id., at *11 n. 16 (“The Court does not address whether secondary market sales of XRP constitute offers and sales of investment contracts because that question is not properly before the Court. Whether a secondary market sale constitutes an offer or sale of an investment contract would depend on the totality of circumstances and the economic reality of that specific contract, transaction, or scheme.”).
[11] Id., at *13.
[12] Terraform, at *15; SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
[13] Terraform, at *15.
[14] SEC v. Ripple Labs Inc., Case 1:20-cv-10832-AT-SN, ECF No. 893 (Filed August 18, 2023).
[15] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
[16] Terraform, at *15-16. These holdings mirror the results in a considerable number of cases that found similar coins to be “securities.” See e.g., Owen v. Elastos Found., No. 1:19-CV-5462-GHW, 2021 WL 5868171 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2021); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
[17] Terraform, at *12.
[18] Id.
[19] Id., at *16.
[20] Id.
[21] Id., at *5-6.
[22] Id.
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