Introduction to Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Apollo Global Management, Inc. and certain executives in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The lawsuit covers the period from May 10, 2021 through February 21, 2026. Investors allege that Apollo Global Management, Inc. (NYSE: APO) and its leadership repeatedly assured the market that the firm never conducted business with Jeffrey Epstein, the convicted sex offender who died in 2019, an alleged misrepresentation under federal securities law. According to the complaint, media reports in February 2026 by the Financial Times and CNN about U.S. Department of Justice files revealed that Apollo executives, including CEO Marc Rowan, communicated with Jeffrey Epstein on sensitive Apollo business matters in the mid-2010s, and that Epstein obtained internal Apollo financial records and communicated with senior decision makers. As these revelations emerged through media reports, Apollo's stock price declined sharply, causing significant losses for investors, including over $12 billion in market value.

Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Solomon Feldman v. Apollo Global Management, et al.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-01692

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York

Filed on: March 2, 2026

Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Company Profile

Apollo Global describes itself as a high-growth, global alternative asset manager and a retirement services provider, with segments spanning Asset Management, Retirement Services, and Principal Investing, and an alternative investments focus in credit, private equity, infrastructure, and real estate. The company's common stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol APO (NYSE: APO).

Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

May 10, 2021 – February 21, 2026, inclusive.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Apollo Global securities on the NYSE during the Class Period and suffered damages may be eligible to join the Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Apollo Global Management, Inc., CEO Marc Rowan, and former CEO and co-founder Leon Black for allegedly misleading investors about the firm's relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, including by making material misstatements and omissions under federal securities laws. During an October 30, 2020 earnings call, Gary Stein, Apollo's Head of Investor Relations, stated flatly that Apollo never did any business with Jeffrey Epstein, a representation investors allege was materially false and misleading.

These assurances continued into 2021 and formed part of Apollo's disclosure obligations to shareholders. On January 25, 2021, Apollo released findings from an investigation conducted by the law firm Dechert, which stated that Apollo never retained Epstein for any services and Epstein never invested in any Apollo-managed funds. When Apollo filed its first quarter 2021 Form 10-Q on May 11, 2021, the company declared that the Dechert report's findings were consistent with statements made by Black and Apollo regarding the prior relationship, reinforcing the company's no-business narrative.

According to the complaint, these statements were false because Rowan and Black, among other Apollo leadership figures, had frequent contact with Jeffrey Epstein in the 2010s regarding Apollo Global's business, including undisclosed business communications about sensitive corporate matters. Investors allege that Epstein received internal Apollo financial documents and regularly emailed, met with, and called some of the firm's most senior decision makers on sensitive matters, such as corporate structure issues, namely Apollo's tax affairs. The complaint alleges that because of this entanglement between Apollo's leaders and Epstein, the harm to Apollo's reputation was more than a mere possibility, and the company's statements about its business, operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading, artificially inflating the price of APO securities during the Class Period.

The Truth Emerges

The alleged deception began to unravel in February 2026 when files released by the U.S. Department of Justice, drawn from DOJ document productions referenced by media outlets, revealed the extent of Apollo executives' communications with Epstein. On February 1, 2026, the Financial Times published an article titled "Apollo chief Marc Rowan consulted Epstein on firm's tax affairs," reporting that Epstein had requested and received internal Apollo financial documents and had ongoing contact with senior decision makers, contradicting Apollo's prior no-business assertions. The article revealed that Rowan repeatedly corresponded with Epstein over Apollo's tax receivable agreement, a sensitive tax arrangement affecting Apollo's tax liabilities and was involved in discussions about a possible tax inversion deal with Rowan telling Epstein in one email, "I am getting the calculation detail."

The scrutiny intensified when the Financial Times reported on February 17, 2026 that the American Federation of Teachers and American Association of University Professors had urged the SEC to investigate Apollo, arguing that the firm's communications to investors gave an inaccurate and incomplete picture of the alleged disclosure violations and material omissions of its connections to Epstein. On February 21, 2026, CNN published an article titled "How Wall Street's Apollo got tangled up again in the Epstein files," which repeated the Financial Times revelations and included criticism questioning why Rowan's meetings and correspondence with Epstein had not been previously disclosed, amplifying the reputational risk to the alternative asset manager.

Market Reaction

Apollo's stock price suffered a series of declines as the revelations emerged. On February 2, 2026, following the initial Financial Times article about Rowan's consultations with Epstein, Apollo shares fell $1.35 to close at $133.19. The decline continued the next day, with shares dropping an additional $6.34 to close at $126.85 on February 3, 2026 (approximately 5.7% over two trading days). After the February 17, 2026 Financial Times article about the SEC investigation request, Apollo's stock fell $6.81 over two trading days, dropping from a close of $125.15 on February 17 to $118.34 on February 19, 2026 (about 5.4% over two days). Following the February 21, 2026 CNN article, shares declined another $5.99, approximately 5%, closing at $113.73 on February 23, 2026, bringing the cumulative decline to approximately 16%.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (NYSE: FBRT) and certain executives on behalf of investors who purchased FBRT securities between November 5, 2024 and February 11, 2026, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Investors allege that defendants repeatedly overstated the company's $0.355 quarterly dividend sustainability and misrepresented the earnings power of its commercial real estate portfolio. On February 11, 2026, in its fourth quarter and full year 2025 earnings announcement, the company slashed its dividend by 44% to $0.20 per share and admitted it had been "over-distributing capital to investors" while REO liquidations took far longer than anticipated. Shareholders suffered significant losses as the stock price declined over 14% following the corrective disclosure, including a 14.2% drop the next trading day.

Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Robert Moses v. Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-01107

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York

Filed on: February 26, 2026

Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) Company Profile

Franklin BSP Realty Trust is a real estate investment trust that originates, acquires and manages a diversified portfolio of commercial real estate debt, an asset-backed business model focused on commercial real estate secured by properties located in the United States. The company trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol FBRT, and its publicly traded common stock is part of the Real Estate/REITs industry sector.

Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

November 5, 2024 – February 11, 2026, inclusive.

This lawsuit includes persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded FBRT securities, including common stock during the Class Period and may be eligible to join the Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Franklin BSP Realty Trust, Inc. (FBRT) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Franklin BSP Realty Trust and three of its senior executives: Richard J. Byrne, who served as Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board until February 10, 2026; Jerome S. Baglien, the company's Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and Treasurer; and Michael Comparato, who served as President before replacing Byrne as CEO. Investors allege these defendants made materially false and misleading statements about the company's earnings power and its $0.355 quarterly dividend throughout the class period, misleading investors about dividend sustainability and book value preservation.

The alleged pattern of misstatements began on November 5, 2024, when CFO Baglien acknowledged on the Q3 2024 earnings call that GAAP and distributable earnings were insufficient, leaving coverage below the payout level but assured investors that "we remain confident that our dividend level accurately reflects our portfolio's long-term stabilized earnings potential and we're comfortable with the current level.” On the same earnings call, CEO Byrne reinforced this confidence, stating that the company set its dividend policy based on earnings power over the long term rather than quarter-by-quarter performance. Defendant Byrne further emphasized that with $350 million of cash, "[w]e have a lot more earnings power than we're demonstrating now, and we feel confident in the level of our dividend." On the February 14, 2025 Q4 2024 earnings call, Byrne again stated that despite not reaching dividend coverage that quarter, "we believe that our current dividend level is appropriate given the future earnings potential embedded in our REO and non-performing loans", reiterating long-term earnings over near-term GAAP results. CFO Baglien added that as the company continued to resolve REO and put that equity back to work, "we believe we could generate an additional $0.25 to $0.30 to our distributable earnings on an annual basis," bringing earnings power closer to dividend coverage. By July 31, 2025, on the Q2 2025 earnings call, CEO Byrne declared "[w]e believe there is a clear path to growing this to a level that supports our dividend," while CFO Baglien outlined three key drivers to reach dividend coverage, including plans to call several CLOs expected to generate approximately $0.04 to $0.06 per share quarterly by creating liquidity and freeing up equity for reinvestment. On October 30, 2025, President Comparato stated during the Q3 2025 earnings call that "we are excited to continue the path to dividend coverage," assurances investors claim were materially misleading under Rule 10b-5.

According to the complaint, defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that the company lacked the earnings power to sustain the $0.355 dividend, that REO liquidations were taking longer than represented, and that the company was over-distributing capital while sacrificing book value to maintain the dividend, rendering their public statements materially false and misleading in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.

The Truth Emerges

The truth began to surface after the market closed on February 10, 2026, when Franklin BSP Realty Trust announced that CEO Richard Byrne was stepping down and would be replaced by Michael Comparato. After market close the following day, February 11, 2026, the company announced its results for the fourth quarter and full year 2025 along with a dramatic dividend cut from $0.355 to $0.20 per share. In the earnings release, new CEO Comparato admitted that "2025 was a year of transition for FBRT" and that while the company had managed through the credit cycle with minimal losses, "it has taken longer to resolve and sell the real estate than we originally planned." He acknowledged directly: "This has led to over-distributing capital to investors. In order to stabilize our book value and match the earnings power of our company to distributions, our Board reset the quarterly dividend to $0.20", reporting GAAP net income of $18.4 million for Q4 2025 compared to $30.2 million in the prior-year quarter.

On February 12, 2026, during the Q4 2025 earnings call, Comparato stated that “[a]fter a thoughtful analysis, we decided it was no longer prudent to sacrifice book value to pay that dividend.” He explained the reset was driven by declines in SOFR, the timing of originations and repayments, tight spreads reducing returns on new loans, and REO liquidations taking longer than anticipated, locking equity in underperforming investments. According to the complaint, these disclosures revealed information that was inconsistent with defendants’ prior assurances about dividend sustainability and coverage.

Market Reaction

On February 11, 2026, following the leadership transition announcement, FBRT stock fell 0.97%, trading on the NYSE. The following day, February 12, 2026, after the company disclosed the dividend cut and admitted to over-distributing capital to investors, the stock price fell another $1.44 per share, a 14.2% single-day decline, closing at $8.71 on the New York Stock Exchange.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Snowflake Inc. (NYSE: SNOW) and two of its former executives for alleged misstatements made between June 27, 2023 and February 28, 2024, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Investors allege that the company and its leadership repeatedly made positive statements about consumption trends, product developments, and revenue growth while concealing that product efficiency gains, Iceberg Tables, and tiered storage pricing were expected to materially harm consumption and revenues, which are driven by a consumption-based revenue model. On February 28, 2024, after market close, the company disclosed significant revenue headwinds from these very factors, withdrew its $10 billion revenue target for 2029, and lowered fiscal year 2025 guidance to 22% growth. The release, a corrective disclosure, sent the stock plummeting 18.14% in a single day, erasing over $41 per share in value.

Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Harsh Patel v. Snowflake Inc., et al.

Case No.: 3:26-cv-1613

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

Filed on: February 24, 2026

Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) Company Profile

Snowflake is a software company that provides cloud data storage, a cloud-based data platform used by enterprise customers enabling customers to consolidate data onto data-driven applications, across a multi-cloud environment and share data for analytics and other processes, including data warehousing and analytics services. The company operates on a consumption model, a usage-based billing system, selling services in units called "credits" that customers must consume over contractually defined periods, reflecting a consumption-based revenue model, recognizing revenue as credits are used, consistent with storage and compute separation architecture.

Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

June 27, 2023 – February 28, 2024 at 4pm EST, inclusive.

This lawsuit seeks to represent all persons and entities who purchased Snowflake Class A common stock on the NYSE (ticker SNOW) during the Class Period and may be eligible to join the Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Snowflake Inc., former CEO and Chairman Frank Slootman, and former CFO Michael P. Scarpelli for allegedly misleading investors about the company's consumption trends and growth prospects, through false statements and material omissions, in violation of the federal securities laws. According to investors, the alleged deception began on June 27, 2023, when Scarpelli told investors at an Investor Day presentation that consumption had returned to expected levels after a brief April slowdown, stating that "coming into May and into June, consumption is back where we'd expect it to be", a key driver of the company's consumption-based revenue. That same day, he allegedly promoted the company's expansion as critical to the business strategy, i.e., support for open table formats such as Iceberg Tables, claiming it would "open up the data lake opportunity" across multiple workload categories. Scarpelli also reaffirmed the company's confidence in reaching $10 billion in product revenue by fiscal year 2029, a long-term revenue target that investors allege lacked a reasonable basis.

During this same June 27, 2023 presentation, Slootman allegedly addressed retirement rumors directly, denying he was stepping down and emphasizing "I'm still here" to reassure investors. Two months later on August 23, 2023, Scarpelli continued the positive narrative, while failing to disclose revenue headwinds from product efficiency gains and tiered storage pricing, telling analysts that consumption was "really good" and that the company was seeing stabilization rather than reduction in customer consumption. He pointed to upcoming product releases including Streamlit, Unistore, and Containerized Services as factors that would "have a very positive impact on our revenue growth rate next year", which investors allege lacked a reasonable basis. By November 29, 2023, Scarpelli reported "strong consumption from a broad base of customers" and highlighted that migrations were driving growth, with the company adding multiple customers generating over $5 million in trailing twelve-month revenue, including large enterprise customers.

Investors allege that throughout this period, defendants knew or should have known that product efficiency gains, Iceberg Tables, and tiered storage pricing were expected to materially harm consumption and revenues, rendering their positive statements about consumption patterns and growth prospects misleading, and that the company's Class A common stock traded at artificially inflated prices.

The Truth Emerges

The alleged scheme unraveled on February 28, 2024, when Snowflake released financial results and guidance after market close, a corrective disclosure. On the earnings call that same day, management disclosed that "consumption trends have improved since the ending of last year, but have not returned to pre-FY '24 patterns" and announced they were "forecasting increased revenue headwinds associated with product efficiency gains, tiered storage pricing and the expectation that some of our customers will leverage Iceberg Tables for their storage", linking these factors to headwinds in a consumption-based revenue model. The company withdrew its $10 billion 2029 product revenue target and lowered fiscal year 2025 guidance to just 22% year-over-year growth. In the same announcement, Snowflake revealed that Slootman had retired as CEO effective February 27, 2024, contradicting his June 2023 denials of impending departure, a leadership transition that investors allege was concealed until this disclosure.

Days later on March 5, 2024, management admitted that tiered storage pricing had begun rolling out in the third and fourth quarters of fiscal 2024 and that large customers had already informed the company of plans to adopt Iceberg Tables, which would reduce storage revenues and impact consumption patterns. Senior Vice President Christian Kleinerman acknowledged that "for many of our large customers, we have been in touch on their plans for adoption on Iceberg. So some of what you see in our guidance has factored in those intentions." These admissions directly contradicted the positive statements about product developments and consumption trends made throughout the class period, and supported allegations under Rule 10b-5.

Market Reaction

The February 28, 2024 after-hours disclosures devastated Snowflake's NYSE: SNOW stock price. On February 29, 2024, shares declined $41.72, or 18.14%, closing at $188.28 compared to the prior day's $230.00, triggering shareholder losses and class-period damages.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Navan, Inc. (NAVN) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action under the Securities Act of 1933 has been filed against Navan, Inc. (NASDAQ: NAVN) in connection with its October 31, 2025 initial public offering, of its common stock on the NASDAQ, which offered shares at $25 per share. The lawsuit alleges that Navan's Registration Statement and Prospectus, collectively referred to as the “Offering Documents,” contained materially false and misleading statements and omissions by failing to disclose that the company would need to increase its sales and marketing expenses by 39% just months after the IPO to sustain its revenue growth, Gross Booking Volume, and usage yield. The Offering Documents allegedly portrayed Navan as experiencing rapid, sustainable growth, despite internal expense trends while omitting material information showing that revenue was decelerating and that massive expense increases would be necessary to maintain growth rates. Following revelations about the dramatic expense increase, Navan's stock declined substantially, trading as low as $9.20 per share, nearly 63% below the $25 IPO offering price.

Navan, Inc. (NAVN) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: David McCown v. Navan, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 5:26-cv-01550

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

Filed on: February 23, 2026

Navan, Inc. (NAVN) Company Profile

Navan, Inc. is a business travel technology company, headquartered in Palo Alto, California, that provides booking and expense reporting software for business travelers. The company operates a platform for the travel and expense management industry combining travel booking, corporate-issued payment cards, expense reporting, and analytics solutions to businesses. At the time of its IPO, Navan reported $537 million in revenue for fiscal 2025, with revenue growing 33% year-over-year from 2024 to 2025 and Gross Booking Volume, a key performance indicator, growing 32% year-over-year during the same period.

Navan, Inc. (NAVN) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

On or around October 30, 2025, inclusive.

Investors who purchased Navan, Inc. securities, including common stock, in connection with Navan, Inc.'s IPO, pursuant to or traceable to the Registration Statement and Prospectus, may be eligible to join the Navan, Inc. (NAVN) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Navan, Inc. (NAVN) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Navan's individual officers and directors who signed the Registration Statement, including CEO Ariel Cohen, CFO Amy Butte, and Chief Accounting Officer Anne Giviskos, along with eight board members, and charges violations of the federal securities laws. The lawsuit also names fourteen underwriter defendants who brought the offering to market, including Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Jefferies LLC, Mizuho Securities USA LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, BNP Paribas Securities Corp., Citizens JMP Securities, LLC, Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., MUFG Securities Americas Inc., Needham & Company, LLC, BTIG, LLC, Loop Capital Markets LLC, Academy Securities, Inc., and Rosenblatt Securities Inc.

According to the complaint, Navan's October 30, 2025 Prospectus and Registration Statement portrayed the company as experiencing rapid growth, but investors allege the Offering Documents were materially misleading under the Securities Act of 1933. The Offering Documents stated that Navan was focused on continuing to expand wallet share across existing customer relationships by driving cross-sell and increasing platform adoption, yet those statements lacked a reasonable basis. The documents touted that Navan's revenue grew 33% year-over-year from 2024 to 2025, its Gross Booking Volume grew 32% year-over-year during the same period, and that the company had increased demand for its platform. The documents further represented that the company's solutions catered to customers of all sizes across any industry vertical, with a usage yield of approximately 7% in each of those years, a performance metric management highlighted to investors.

Investors allege that the Registration Statement and Prospectus failed to disclose that the company had already increased its sales and marketing expenses by 39%, to approximately $95 million from $68.5 million quarter-over-quarter, in the quarter ending October 31, 2025 (the same day as the IPO), compared to the quarter ending July 31, 2025, to sustain its revenue, Gross Booking Volume, and usage yield growth. The Offering Documents allegedly omitted information, a material adverse fact, showing that revenue was decelerating for the quarter ending October 31, 2025. The Risk Factor section allegedly did not adequately warn potential investors about the negative results and trends the company was already observing in Navan's revenue growth, including rising sales and marketing expenses.

The Truth Emerges

On December 15, 2025, Navan filed its 10-Q and 8-K with the SEC, for the fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2025, revealing that the company had increased its sales and marketing expenses to nearly $95 million, a 39% increase quarter-over-quarter from its $68.5 million in sales and marketing expenses in the quarter ending July 31, 2025. This disclosure, according to the complaint, undercut the Offering Documents' portrayal of rapid growth by indicating that Navan needed to increase sales and marketing spending to sustain growth, including its Gross Booking Volume and usage yield. The same filing reported that CFO Amy Butte would depart the company, announcing her resignation roughly six weeks after the IPO, with CEO Ariel Cohen stating that Amy would leave as Navan's CFO on January 9.

Market Reaction

Following the December 15, 2025 earnings announcement, Navan's stock, trading on the NASDAQ under ticker symbol NAVN, dropped almost 12% to close at $12.90 per share on December 16, 2025, approximately 48.4% below the $25 IPO offering price. The stock continued to decline, remaining below the IPO price, trading as low as $10.45 per share, a decline of nearly 60% from the offering price. By the time this case was filed, the company's stock had continued to fall, trading as low as $9.20 per share, nearly 63% below the $25 IPO offering price, reflecting a sharp post-IPO decline for investors.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Lakeland Industries, Inc. (LAKE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Lakeland Industries, Inc. (NASDAQ: LAKE) and three of its senior executives, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, on behalf of investors who purchased Lakeland securities, including NASDAQ: LAKE common stock between December 1, 2023 and December 9, 2025. Investors allege that defendants made materially false and misleading statements about the success of two strategic acquisitions-Pacific Helmets and Jolly-overstating their financial impact while concealing significant operational problems including shipping delays, production issues, and slower-than-expected product rollouts, certification delays, and tariff-related headwinds. According to the complaint, defendants also misrepresented the strength of their tariff mitigation measures and the reliability of their financial guidance, including EBITDA guidance, even as the business deteriorated. When the truth emerged through a series of corrective disclosures over fifteen months, Lakeland's stock price that investors claim was artificially inflated collapsed from over $23 per share to $9.16, causing significant investor losses.

Lakeland Industries, Inc. (LAKE) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Robert Purrington v. Lakeland Industries, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-01501

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York

Filed on: February 23, 2026

Lakeland Industries, Inc. (LAKE) Company Profile

Lakeland Industries, together with its subsidiaries, manufactures and sells industrial protective clothing and accessories, including fire and rescue helmets and fire boots for the industrial and public protective clothing market worldwide, operating in the protective apparel manufacturing industry. The Company employs a "small, strategic, and quick" mergers and acquisitions strategy, often referred to as its SSQ M&A strategy, to drive its growth in revenue and profitability, including acquisitions such as Pacific Helmets and Jolly Boots, and serves industrial, medical, and safety markets.

Lakeland Industries, Inc. (LAKE) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

December 1, 2023 – December 9, 2025, inclusive.

All persons and entities other than defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Lakeland securities, including LAKE common stock, during the Class Period are eligible to participate.

Allegations in the Lakeland Industries, Inc. (LAKE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Lakeland Industries, Inc., along with James M. Jenkins (President, CEO, and Executive Chairman), Charles D. Roberson (CEO until January 31, 2024), and Roger D. Shannon (Chief Financial Officer), alleging they made materially false statements about the company's fire services expansion strategy and acquired businesses, in violation of the federal securities laws.

On November 30, 2023, Jenkins announced the Pacific Helmets acquisition in a press release, calling it "a significant milestone in our global fire services expansion efforts" in fire and rescue helmets and projecting that Pacific would "add seven to eight million dollars of sales revenue to Lakeland in our next fiscal year and to be immediately accretive." Two months later, in a press release on February 5, 2024, Jenkins made nearly identical statements about the Jolly acquisition of fire and rescue footwear, projecting it would "add $14 to $16 million of sales revenue to Lakeland this fiscal year and to be immediately accretive." On July 1, 2024, the company issued guidance expecting adjusted EBITDA of $18 million to $21.5 million for fiscal year 2025. On September 4, 2024, despite missing revenue targets, Jenkins stated the company remained "confident in our full-year projections" and expected "the growth of our industrial safety products will accelerate in the second half of our fiscal year." On April 9, 2025, the company projected fiscal 2026 revenue of $210 to $220 million and adjusted EBITDA of $24 to $29 million, statements investors relied on when purchasing LAKE securities during the class period.

According to the complaint, these statements were materially false and misleading because Lakeland was experiencing significant, sustained issues with its Pacific Helmets and Jolly businesses throughout the class period. The complaint alleges defendants concealed shipping-related delays, production issues, and slower-than-expected rollout of new products at both acquired companies, as well as certification delays and material flow issues. Investors further allege that defendants overstated the positive impact of these businesses on Lakeland's financial results while the company's business was significantly deteriorating due to tariff-related headwinds and elevated freight costs, certification delays, and material flow issues in the acquired businesses, causing the stock to trade at artificially inflated prices. The complaint alleges defendants overstated the strength of their tariff mitigation measures and SSQ M&A strategy, rendering their financial guidance unreliable.

The Truth Emerges

The truth began to surface on September 4, 2024, when Lakeland disclosed that its second quarter fiscal 2025 revenue had missed analyst expectations by $1.39 million, with management admitting "the shortfall was due to shipment timing" and that "Jolly had substantial fire orders delayed to the late third and early fourth quarter." The problems deepened on April 9, 2025, when the company reported fourth quarter GAAP EPS that missed estimates by $2.80 and full fiscal year 2025 adjusted EBITDA of only $17.4 million-below the guidance range of at least $18 million. CFO Shannon admitted "The shortfall in our annual Adjusted EBITDA guidance was a direct result of the slippage of a large boot order at Jolly into FY26," while also revealing "weakness at Pacific Helmets resulting from production issues and product offering updates, and slower than expected rollout of new products from Pacific Helmets and Jolly Boots." On June 9, 2025, Lakeland disclosed first quarter fiscal 2026 GAAP EPS that missed by $0.60 and revenue that missed by $2.1 million, citing problems at "Pacific Helmets business resulting from production issues and updates to product offerings, as well as shipment timing and tariff-related delays" and tariff headwinds. The final blow came on December 9, 2025, when the company reported third quarter fiscal 2026 GAAP EPS that missed by $1.93 and revenue that missed by $9.05 million, while withdrawing all financial guidance for FY2026 and terminating its CFO employment, Roger D. Shannon, Jenkins admitted "these challenges have affected our forecasting ability and, as a result, we are withdrawing our previously issued financial guidance for FY2026 and will not be providing financial guidance going forward." These disclosures revealed that the acquisitions Jenkins had touted as immediately accretive and significant milestones were plagued by operational failures, that the company's tariff mitigation measures were ineffective, and that management's forecasting ability had broken down completely, with guidance proving unreliable contradicting the confident projections and assurances defendants had provided throughout the class period.

Market Reaction

Lakeland's common stock price declined sharply following each corrective disclosure. On September 5, 2024, the stock fell $1.86 per share, or 7.82%, to close at $21.92. On April 10, 2025, after the company revealed the extent of problems at its acquired businesses, the stock fell $2.63 per share, or 14.33%, to close at $15.72. On June 10, 2025, following disclosure of continued production issues and tariff-related delays, the stock fell $4.29 per share, or 22.16%, to close at $15.07. On September 10, 2025, the stock fell another $0.64 per share, or 4.43%, to close at $13.80. The most severe decline occurred on December 10, 2025, when Lakeland withdrew its financial guidance and announced its CFO employment termination, the stock plummeted $5.85 per share, or 38.97%, to close at $9.16.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Zynex, Inc. (ZYXI) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A federal securities fraud class action has been filed against certain Zynex, Inc. (NASDAQ: ZYXI) officers and directors for violations occurring between February 25, 2021 and December 15, 2025. Investors allege that defendants misrepresented the legitimacy of the company's order growth and sales force productivity, concealing that revenue was inflated through a fraudulent overbilling scheme targeting insurers involving excessive shipment of medical supplies to patients. In reality, the company was systematically billing insurers for thousands of dollars more than justified by patient needs, drawing scrutiny from government and private insurers, including Tricare and Travelers Insurance, that ultimately resulted in payment suspensions, federal criminal indictments, and bankruptcy, and a Nasdaq delisting. As a result of these revelations, Zynex shareholders suffered significant losses as the stock collapsed from over $10 per share to 34 cents and now trades on the OTC as ZYXIQ.

Zynex, Inc. (ZYXI) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Kent Beidel v. Thomas Sandgaard, et al.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-00714-DDD-KAS

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, District of Colorado

Filed on: February 20, 2026

Zynex, Inc. (ZYXI) Company Profile

Zynex is a Colorado-based medical device manufacturer in the medical device manufacturing industry that produces and markets electrotherapy devices for use in pain management, physical rehabilitation, neurological diagnosis, and cardiac monitoring. The company's products are small, battery-powered electronic devices which deliver electric pulses via wires and electrode pads, often billed as electrode pairs, generating $184.3 million in revenue for the year ended December 31, 2023, with payors including private insurers and government programs such as Tricare.

Zynex, Inc. (ZYXI) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

February 25, 2021 - December 15, 2025, inclusive.

The class includes all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Zynex securities, including common stock on Nasdaq under the ticker ZYXI and later OTCMKTS: ZYXIQ, during the Class Period and were damaged thereby. Excluded are the defendants, officers and directors of the company, members of their immediate families, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest.

Allegations in the Zynex, Inc. (ZYXI) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The lawsuit targets CEO and founder Thomas Sandgaard, COO Anna Lucsok, CFO Daniel Moorhead, and three members of the company's Audit Committee: Chairman Barry D. Michaels, Michael Cress, and Joshua R. Disbrow, asserting violations of the Securities Exchange Act. According to the complaint, these defendants repeatedly touted the company's strong order growth and sales force productivity as evidence of legitimate business success while concealing a systematic fraud that prioritized sales over compliance.

On February 25, 2021, Sandgaard spoke of "good order flow" that "speak volumes to the relationships that our salesforce has with many prescribers and the need for them to prescribe non-opioid, non-addictive prescription strength solutions for the patients in pain." On July 28, 2022, Lucsok attributed "a consistent increase in order growth and revenue over the past several quarters in large part due to productivity of our sales force." By March 13, 2023, Sandgaard was celebrating "increased sales rep productivity" and "the highest number of prescriptions in the company's history in the fourth quarter." On April 30, 2024, Lucsok praised sales reps who were able meet strict targets and the strong pipeline to prescribers to see patients in pain and in need of rehab. As recently as October 24, 2024, Sandgaard promoted the company's mission to provide "better pain management and monitoring solutions for patients and doctors as well as hospitals."

Investors allege that behind these optimistic statements, Zynex was engaged in a fraudulent overbilling scheme aimed at inflating revenue. The complaint alleges that the company shipped products, including electrodes, in excess of patient need, including volumes as high as 128 electrode pairs per month, inflating revenue by filing false claims with insurers, including government payor Tricare and private insurers. Management allegedly prioritized aggressive sales strategies to drive orders over compliance with industry laws and regulations, while the company failed to maintain proper oversight (i.e., weak internal controls). As a result, investors allege it was reasonably likely that Zynex would face adverse consequences, including removal from insurer networks and penalties from the federal government, a Tricare payment suspension, and insurer litigation by Travelers.

The Truth Emerges

The truth began to surface on June 4, 2024, when the medical journal STAT published an investigative report entitled "How a device maker inundated pain patients with unwanted batteries and surprise bills," detailing a systematic overbilling pattern. The report revealed that Zynex engaged in an "oversupplying scheme" by sending inordinate amounts of supplies like electrode pads and batteries, often through automatic monthly shipments in order to "bill insurers for thousands of dollars more than it otherwise could." The complaint also notes that on August 23, 2023, Travelers Insurance had commenced an action against Zynex, Sandgaard, Lucsok, and another executive in California Superior Court seeking $23 million in damages alleging a fraudulent overbilling scheme.

The situation deteriorated sharply on March 11, 2025, when Zynex reported a significant revenue "shortfall" for the quarter "due to slower than normal payments from certain payers." The company revealed that "Tricare has temporarily suspended payments as they review prior claims," with Tricare a government payor representing roughly 20-25% of revenue. On July 31, 2025, Lucsok admitted that "we revamped our sales compensation model to drive a performance-focused culture that meets the company's objectives for good patient care and experience and regulatory compliance." By November 18, 2025, new CEO Steven Dyson acknowledged that the company had been "tirelessly focused on addressing the business and compliance challenges at Zynex" and was "proactively engaging with government agencies and investigators in a collaborative way to deliver a new future for Zynex that is focused on compliance and integrity."

On December 15, 2025, Zynex filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and its Nasdaq listing was subsequently suspended, with the stock moving to OTC markets under the symbol ZYXIQ. On January 21, 2026, a federal grand jury indictment was unsealed charging Sandgaard and Lucsok with conspiracy to commit health care fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud.

Market Reaction

The stock price collapsed in stages as the truth emerged, producing substantial investor losses. On June 4, 2024, following the STAT investigation, Zynex's stock fell $0.50 per share, or 5%, to close at $9.35 per share on unusually heavy trading volume. On March 12, 2025, after the company disclosed the government payor Tricare payment suspension, the stock plummeted $3.59 per share, or 51.3%, to close at $3.41 per share on unusually heavy trading volume. On August 1, 2025, following management's admission of compliance problems and sales force realignment, the stock fell from $2.23 per share to $1.26 per share, a 45% decline in heavy trading volume. On December 16, 2025, after the bankruptcy filing, the stock declined by roughly 50% to close at 34 cents, a near-total loss for common equity holders.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.
• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.
• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (NASDAQ: CORT) and several executives in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 10b-5. The lawsuit covers investors who purchased Corcept Therapeutics common stock on the NASDAQ, ticker CORT, between October 31, 2024, and December 30, 2025. Investors allege that the company and its executives misrepresented the strength of clinical trial evidence supporting its new drug application for relacorilant and hid repeated FDA warnings about inadequate clinical data and concealed material risks related to an unfavorable benefit-risk assessment. On December 31, 2025, the FDA rejected the application through a Complete Response Letter, or CRL, revealing that the agency had warned Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated on several occasions during pre-submission meetings about significant review issues. The stock price collapsed, a 50.4% single-day decline that wiped out approximately $3.6 billion in market capitalization.

Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Allegheny County Employees' Retirement System v. Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated, et al.

Case No.: 3:26-cv-1525

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

Filed on: February 20, 2026

Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) Company Profile

Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated is a commercial-stage pharmaceutical company, publicly traded on the NASDAQ as CORT, focused on developing medications to treat severe endocrinologic, oncologic, metabolic, and neurologic disorders by modulating the effects of cortisol. Since 2012, the company has marketed Korlym for the treatment of patients suffering from hypercortisolism, also known as Cushing's syndrome.

Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

October 31, 2024 - December 30, 2025, inclusive

All persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated common stock on the NASDAQ under ticker CORT during the Class Period may be eligible to join the Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated (CORT) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

According to the complaint, Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated, along with Chief Executive Officer Joseph K. Belanoff, Chief Development Officer William Guyer, Chief Business Officer Gary Charles Robb, and President of Endocrinology Sean Maduck, allegedly misled investors about the strength of clinical evidence and the adequacy of clinical trials to demonstrate efficacy supporting the company's new drug application for relacorilant as a treatment for hypercortisolism. On October 30, 2024, Belanoff announced that results from the GRACE and GRADIENT Phase 3 studies would clear the path for relacorilant's new drug application in Cushing's syndrome, which the company planned to submit by year-end, representing to investors that approval was approaching. He stated that the outcomes of the GRACE study would provide powerful evidence of efficacy for the NDA, though they did not stand alone. During the same earnings call, Guyer expressed confidence in submitting an NDA based on the GRADIENT data, stating that the totality of evidence from all studies demonstrated a successful path to a positive NDA that would happen in the coming weeks. Robb added that the FDA had made clear that a single well-controlled study like GRACE, along with confirmatory evidence, was sufficient to demonstrate drug safety and efficacy. Belanoff further assured investors that the company had talked to the FDA plenty about the program and foresaw absolutely no impediments to getting the NDA submitted, stating there were no significant review issues.

The confidence continued through 2025, with repeated statements that approval was approaching. On February 26, 2025, Belanoff again characterized the positive results from GRACE, GRADIENT, and Phase 2 studies as powerful support for a successful relacorilant NDA. By May 5, 2025, he told investors the application was under review with an FDA action date of December 30, 2025, and was progressing towards approval by year-end. Maduck projected that within three to five years, relacorilant would generate $3 billion to $5 billion in annual revenue in hypercortisolism alone, reinforcing market expectations and artificially inflating the stock price. On July 31, 2025, Belanoff stated that relacorilant was approaching approval and that the company expected approval by the end of the year, again signaling imminent approval. On November 4, 2025, just weeks before the FDA decision, Belanoff told investors the company expected FDA approval of relacorilant the following month. The complaint alleges that throughout this period, the FDA had repeatedly raised concerns about the adequacy of the clinical evidence supporting the NDA in pre-submission meetings. Investors allege that the FDA had warned Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated about concerns regarding the adequacy of the program assessing relacorilant's effectiveness in treating hypertension in patients with hypercortisolism, including the design of the GRACE study itself, and raised the prospect of significant review issues.

The complaint contends there was a known material risk that Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated's relacorilant NDA would not be approved, which the company and its executives concealed from investors, causing Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated securities to trade at artificially inflated prices, and violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through material misstatements and omissions under Rule 10b-5.

The Truth Emerges

On December 31, 2025, Corcept disclosed that the FDA, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, had issued a Complete Response Letter, or CRL, regarding the NDA for relacorilant as a treatment for patients with hypertension secondary to hypercortisolism. The FDA concluded it could not arrive at a favorable benefit-risk assessment for relacorilant without Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated Incorporated providing additional evidence of effectiveness, finding the clinical evidence insufficient to demonstrate efficacy. Belanoff stated the company was surprised and disappointed by the outcome. According to the complaint, this disclosure, which stated the FDA could not reach a favorable benefit-risk assessment without additional evidence, called into question earlier statements that the data provided "powerful support" and that the company foresaw no impediments to approval, and undermined prior assurances about approval likelihood.

On January 30, 2026, the FDA published a redacted copy of the Complete Response Letter, or CRL. The FDA had determined it could not approve the application in its present form and detailed reasons why the evidence from the GRACE and GRADIENT studies was not sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of relacorilant for the proposed indication, including concerns about trial design and endpoints in the GRACE trial. The letter revealed that during pre-submission meetings, the FDA had informed Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated on several occasions of concerns about the adequacy of the clinical development program to assess the effect of relacorilant on hypertension in the intended population, including the design of the GRACE study, and warned the company to expect significant review issues if it submitted the application, and that additional effectiveness data would be required.

Market Reaction

The December 31, 2025 disclosure caused the price of Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated common stock on the NASDAQ (CORT) to decline by $35.40 per share, or 50.4%, from a closing price of $70.20 on December 30, 2025, to a closing price of $34.80 on December 31, 2025. The single-day collapse erased more than half of the company's market value, approximately $3.6 billion in market capitalization, as investors reacted to the Complete Response Letter and the revelation that the agency had repeatedly warned Corcept Therapeutics Incorporated about concerns regarding the adequacy of the clinical development program.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A federal securities fraud class action has been filed against PayPal Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: PYPL) under the federal securities laws for investors who bought common stock between February 25, 2025 and February 2, 2026. Investors allege the company touted aggressive financial targets and a strong growth trajectory for its core Branded Checkout business and 2027 guidance while concealing that its salesforce and operations were not equipped to deliver. 

The complaint says PayPal's leaders repeatedly projected strength and execution during 2025. The truth surfaced on February 3, 2026, when PayPal reported disappointing results in its Q4 2025 earnings report, withdrew its 2027 targets, announced a sudden CEO transition, and admitted execution and deployment failures. The stock fell hard-down 20.31% in one day-from $52.33 on February 2, 2026 to $41.70 on February 3, 2026.

“Most PYPL shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Goodman v. PayPal Holdings, Inc. et al.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01381
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
Filed on: February 17, 2026

PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) Company Profile

PayPal enables digital payments as a publicly traded technology platform through a two-sided network that connects merchants and consumers, facilitating shopping and money transfers online and in person. Its offerings include Branded Checkout solutions like PayPal and Venmo (including Pay with Venmo and Pay Later), alongside unbranded alternatives (payment service provider, or PSP).

PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

February 25, 2025-February 2, 2026, inclusive.

All investors who purchased or otherwise acquired PayPal common stock (NASDAQ: PYPL securities) between February 25, 2025, to February 2, 2026, inclusive, during the class period may be eligible to join the PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

According to the complaint, PayPal Holdings, Inc., along with executives James Alexander Chriss, Jamie S. Miller, Frank Keller, and Diego Scotti, told investors they were executing a strategy that would deliver ambitious 2027 financial targets and renewed momentum in Branded Checkout. Investors allege defendants made materially false and misleading statements in these financial disclosures. They spoke in confident terms about transformation, growth, and strength. Investors allege those assurances lacked a critical truth: PayPal's salesforce and operations were not positioned to achieve what management was selling and failed to disclose material risks to branded checkout execution and 2027 guidance.

The story begins on February 25, 2025, when CEO James Alexander Chriss told investors at Analyst/Investor Day that, looking to 2027, PayPal saw high single-digit growth for transaction margin (transaction margin dollars) and had the ambition to deliver double-digit transaction margin growth "into the future" alongside "20% plus non-GAAP EPS growth." That same day, Executive Vice President Frank Keller outlined a plan to accelerate total payment volume growth to 8%-10% by 2027, measuring success by expanding the company's "new experience" share to over 80%, growing Pay Later usage by more than 20%, and increasing "Pay with Venmo" by more than 40% as key metrics for branded checkout growth.

As 2025 progressed, the optimism continued. On April 29, 2025, during the Q1 2025 earnings call, Chriss pointed to "strength" in execution, market "excitement" around new innovations, and engagement from consumers and merchants-adding, "we're just getting started." Months later, on October 28, 2025, during the Q3 2025 earnings call, he declared, "We are operating from a position of strength," and said the results were proof the strategy was working, claiming PayPal had built a "more balanced, profitable growth engine across branded experiences, PSP and Venmo."

Meanwhile, investors allege a different reality. The complaint states the 2027 targets were not achievable under Chriss's tenure and depended on an unrealistically stable consumer backdrop and flawless execution. Behind the scenes, PayPal was not equipped to deliver the growth management described and was "too optimistic" about how quickly staff could drive change and customer adoption across a massive user base, and execution was not in line with expectations set by management.

The Truth Emerges

The reckoning arrived on February 3, 2026, when PayPal released its Q4 2025 results and held an earnings call. The company reported disappointing earnings that missed consensus estimates by approximately $120 million in revenue and by 5.4% to 7.5% on adjusted earnings per share with worsening performance in Branded Checkout, announced a sudden CEO transition, and, regarding its previously touted 2027 financial targets (a withdrawal of forward-looking guidance), attributed the shortfall to "operational and deployment issues" across all regions. Interim CEO Jamie S. Miller acknowledged, "our execution has not been where it needs to be, particularly in branded checkout," and admitted, "we were too optimistic about how quickly we could drive change and customer adoption." She added that product deployment in the second half of the year was slower than planned.

These admissions cut directly against earlier assurances that PayPal was operating from a position of strength, executing its strategy, and on course for 2027 goals. The withdrawal of the 2027 outlook and the acknowledgement of execution failures contradicted prior guidance and related financial disclosures and undermined the sustained narrative of momentum and readiness presented throughout 2025.

Market Reaction

Investors and analysts reacted immediately. From a closing price of $52.33 per share on February 2, 2026, PayPal's stock (NASDAQ: PYPL) fell to $41.70 per share on February 3, 2026-a single-day decline of $10.63, or 20.31%, establishing a new 52-week low of approximately $42 and closing at $41.03 per share on February 4, 2026.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

Frequently Asked Questions

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Introduction to Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Enphase Energy, Inc. (NASDAQ: ENPH) and two executives under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 covering the period from April 22, 2025 through October 28, 2025.

Investors allege the company misrepresented its ability to manage channel inventory levels and mitigate the impact of expiring tax credits, including the Internal Revenue Code Section 25D Residential Clean Energy Credit, painting an overly optimistic picture of its operational control and financial prospects. According to the complaint, channel inventory was actually severely elevated and the company was unprepared for the demand collapse following tax credit expiration, which had provided a 30% deduction until its termination on December 31, 2025, forcing destocking and dramatic revenue guidance cuts. As a result of these allegedly false statements and subsequent corrective disclosures, investors suffered significant losses when the truth emerged, after ENPH securities had traded at artificially inflated prices.

“Most ENPH shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Tripathi v. Enphase Energy, Inc. et al.

Case No.: 4:26-cv-01380-JST

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

Filed on: February 17, 2026

Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) Company Profile

Enphase Energy is a global energy technology company headquartered in Fremont, California founded in March 2006, focusing on solutions for solar generation, storage, and communication through its microinverter technology and integrated home energy solutions. The company partners with solar and battery financing companies that offer third-party ownership arrangements to homeowners, including lease and power purchase agreements in the residential clean energy market and is publicly traded on the NASDAQ (NASDAQ: ENPH) with a product portfolio that includes battery storage systems.

Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

April 22, 2025 - October 28, 2025, inclusive.

All persons and entities other than defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Enphase Energy securities (ENPH shares traded on the NASDAQ) during the Class Period are eligible class members and may be eligible to join the Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Enphase Energy, Inc. (ENPH) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Enphase Energy, Inc., President and Chief Executive Officer Badrinarayanan Kothandaraman, and Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Mandy Yang for allegedly making materially false statements about the company's channel inventory management and ability to weather policy changes affecting the solar industry, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.

On April 22, 2025, during the first quarter earnings call, Kothandaraman acknowledged that channel inventory had risen above target levels due to declining sell-through, but assured investors the recovery path was simple, reduce shipments and allow seasonal demand in the second quarter to naturally draw down excess inventory. He stated that when sell-through declined more than anticipated, inventory could go slightly up, but with discipline it would come back quickly. The company portrayed elevated inventory as a temporary, manageable situation within normal business cycles and minimized the risk that elevated channel inventory would result in lower shipments.

Throughout the second quarter, management continued to project confidence in its inventory control and market positioning.

On July 22, 2025, Kothandaraman reported that battery channel inventory had returned to normal levels while microinverter inventory remained only slightly elevated despite weakening demand signals in the solar photovoltaic industry. He emphasized the company's deep relationships with third-party financing customers and long-tail installers, claiming these partnerships would prevent overall market erosion as the industry adjusted to changing tax incentives linked to Internal Revenue Code Section 25D, also known as the Residential Clean Energy Credit. When pressed by analysts about channel levels, Kothandaraman was emphatic, stating the company was in very good shape in channel management and that lessons learned from previous years meant they would never again reach problematic inventory levels. He assured investors that any reference to slightly elevated inventory meant only slightly above the eight to ten week target range, and that increased demand from the expiring 25D tax credit would draw down channel inventory to reasonable levels by year end even as microinverter inventory and battery storage shipments required careful management.

According to the complaint, these assurances concealed the reality that Enphase had lost control of its channel inventory and dramatically underestimated the negative impact of the 25D tax credit expiration which provided a 30% deduction until its termination on December 31, 2025. The company allegedly overstated its operational capabilities and financial prospects while inventory problems worsened and demand signals deteriorated throughout the class period and failed to disclose material facts necessary to make its statements about inventory and revenue projections not misleading.

The Truth Emerges

The alleged deception unraveled on October 28, 2025, when Enphase reported third quarter results in a corrective disclosure and provided fourth quarter 2025 guidance that shocked investors. Management revealed the company expected 2025 to close on a weak note, with elevated channel inventory forcing reduced battery storage shipments in the fourth quarter as channel inventory levels affected battery storage systems and microinverter supply to partners.

Kothandaraman admitted the company was reducing product shipments to the channel in order to destock heading into 2026, directly contradicting his earlier denials that Enphase would engage in destocking or undershipment practices. He also acknowledged the company anticipated a larger-than-normal seasonal decline following the expiration of the tax credit, the Residential Clean Energy Credit under Section 25D terminating on December 31, 2025, undermining previous claims about the company's ability to mitigate tax credit impacts through installer relationships and market positioning and signaling pressure on first quarter 2026 revenue.

The guidance provided for the fourth quarter ranged from $310.0 million to $350.0 million, falling well below analyst estimates of $374.4 million to $383 million. The third quarter results themselves included $70.9 million classified as safe harbor revenue not contemplated in prior guidance, meaning the company effectively missed its own projections without this one-time boost. These revelations exposed that the inventory situation was far more severe than management had portrayed and that the company lacked the market control it had claimed during earnings calls throughout the class period as channel inventory resulted in lower shipments and revenue shortfalls.

Market Reaction

On October 29, 2025, following the earnings announcement and conference call and the corrective disclosure, Enphase's stock price fell $5.56 per share, or 15.15%, closing at $31.14 per share on the NASDAQ. The sharp sell-off reflected investor reaction to the significant guidance miss, the revelation of severe channel inventory problems requiring destocking, and management's admission that tax credit expiration would cause larger-than-normal revenue declines, contradicting months of assurances about operational control and market resilience and marking a substantial stock price decline tied to the securities class action allegations.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

Never Miss Another Deadline

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Introduction to NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against NuScale Power Corporation (NYSE: SMR) and certain executives for alleged violations of federal securities laws, including the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a). The lawsuit covers investors who purchased NuScale Class A common stock on the NYSE under ticker SMR between May 13, 2025 and November 6, 2025. Investors allege that the company and its executives made materially false and misleading statements about the experience and capabilities of ENTRA1 Energy LLC, NuScale's exclusive commercialization partner for deploying small modular nuclear reactors and commercializing the NuScale Power Module technology globally. The complaint alleges that ENTRA1 was actually a three-year-old entity with no significant experience building, financing, or operating power facilities or other nuclear energy generation facilities, despite company representations suggesting otherwise. Following revelations about ENTRA1's lack of experience and a $495 million payment to the entity, with potential milestone payments exceeding $3 billion tied to a Tennessee Valley Authority agreement, NuScale's stock price collapsed more than 70% from its class period high of more than $57 per share.

“Most SMR shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Truedson v. NuScale Power Corporation et al.

Case No.: 3:26-cv-00328-JR

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division

Filed on: February 18, 2026

NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) Company Profile

NuScale Power Corporation is a nuclear technology company focused on scalable, modular reactors headquartered in Corvallis, Oregon, a publicly traded company on the NYSE (SMR) with Class A common stock. The company's core technology, the NuScale Power Module, part of its NPM technology platform, is a small modular nuclear reactor designed to generate 77 megawatt electrical for nuclear power generation within a broader power plant, occupying a footprint of approximately 76 feet in height by 15 feet in diameter in the highly technical and complicated nuclear energy sector.

NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

May 13, 2025-November 6, 2025, inclusive.

All purchasers of NuScale Class A common stock during the Class Period are potentially eligible class members and may be eligible to join the NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the NuScale Power Corporation (SMR) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets NuScale Power Corporation, Chief Executive Officer John L. Hopkins, Chief Financial Officer Robert Ramsey Hamady, and Fluor Corporation for alleged securities fraud related to statements about ENTRA1 Energy in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a).

Throughout the class period, defendants allegedly emphasized ENTRA1's qualifications and experience as NuScale's commercialization partner through an exclusive global partnership responsible for distributing and deploying the company's nuclear reactor technology worldwide to nuclear power generation facilities. On May 12, 2025, Hopkins stated during a conference call that potential customers were attracted to ENTRA1's commercial model designed to provide financial flexibility while mitigating deployment risks for power plant development.

On May 29, 2025, the company issued a press release describing ENTRA1 as holding global exclusive rights to commercialize NuScale's small modular reactors and providing carbon-free energy to a wider range of consumers as part of a global commercialization strategy. During the second quarter 2025 earnings call on August 7, 2025, Hopkins highlighted the partnership with ENTRA1 as key to deploying NuScale's technology, while Hamady emphasized that ENTRA1's ability to provide customized plant development and operating structures helped de-risk projects and meet customer needs for nuclear power generation projects.

On September 3, 2025, Hopkins praised ENTRA1's team of energy and finance veterans, stating they brought exceptional value through energy sales knowledge, investment capabilities, deep project finance expertise, and experience delivering large-scale power infrastructure and positioned ENTRA1 as an independent power plant development platform. Hopkins characterized this experience as exactly what was required for commercializing and deploying NuScale's technology at scale.

According to the complaint, these statements were materially false and misleading because ENTRA1 had never built, financed, or operated any significant projects, let alone projects in the highly technical field of nuclear power generation and lacked prior operating history in nuclear energy. Investors allege that NuScale placed its commercialization strategy and hundreds of millions of dollars with an entity lacking any significant prior experience in nuclear energy facilities, entrusting commercialization to ENTRA1 despite undisclosed risks.

The complaint alleges that the purported experience attributed to ENTRA1 actually referred to the Habboush Group, a distinct entity without significant nuclear power experience, and that NuScale's commercialization strategy faced material undisclosed risks of failure, delays, and regulatory challenges in nuclear facility development and licensing.

The Truth Emerges

The truth began emerging on November 6, 2025, when NuScale released its third quarter earnings after market close. The company revealed that general and administrative expenses had ballooned more than 3,000 percent to $519 million during the third fiscal quarter, up from $17 million in the prior year period, due largely to a $495 million payment to ENTRA1 for its Tennessee Valley Authority agreement, and reported a quarterly net loss of $532 million.

The agreement contemplated as many as 72 NuScale Power Modules and up to six gigawatts of nuclear generation capacity, meaning milestone payments to ENTRA1 could potentially exceed $3 billion. During the earnings conference call, analysts pressed management about ENTRA1's actual experience and track record and questioned ENTRA1's qualifications and lack of prior nuclear power generation experience. CFO Hamady essentially confirmed that ENTRA1 itself did not have the relevant experience, but rather that the company was referring to the experience of the principals of ENTRA1 instead of ENTRA1's own prior operating history. Hamady further clarified that ENTRA1 would not actually be building the power plants, but rather serving to coordinate projects, bring in partners, and secure deals with those who could execute, not operating facilities or constructing plants.

CEO Hopkins, when questioned, referred to over 45 years of experience at the Habboush Group rather than ENTRA1's own experience, reinforcing investors' allegation that experience was misattributed to the Habboush Group. Following the call, independent analyst reports from Guggenheim Securities and Barclays described ENTRA1 as a three-year-old company that had never built, financed, or operated anything and as an entity supporting the activities of a single individual. Guggenheim published a critical report highlighting these deficiencies. These revelations directly contradicted prior representations that ENTRA1 was an experienced independent power plant development platform with extensive capabilities for global commercialization of the NuScale Power Module.

Market Reaction

Following NuScale's (NYSE: SMR) November 6, 2025 after-hours earnings announcement, the company's stock price declined (12.4%) over a two-day trading period on abnormally high volume, falling from approximately $32 per share on November 6, 2025 to approximately $28 per share on November 10, 2025. Trading volume spiked dramatically, with more than 42 million NuScale shares traded on November 7, 2025 and more than 31 million shares traded on November 10, 2025, reflecting substantial investor losses. The stock continued falling in subsequent days, dropping to a low of just $17 per share by November 21, 2025, representing a decline of more than 70 percent below the class period high of more than $57 per share for Class A common stockholders.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. and several individual defendants on behalf of investors who purchased OST ordinary shares (NASDAQ: OST) between May 11, 2025, and June 26, 2025, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Investors allege that defendants orchestrated a pump-and-dump scheme that artificially inflated OST's stock price by 1,175% over 73 days, driving market capitalization from approximately $22 million to more than $1 billion, through a registered direct offering executed fraudulently and a coordinated social media campaign.

According to the complaint, while the company claimed the offering would provide legitimate capital for growth, defendants were actually placing shares into the hands of co-conspirators who planned to dump them at inflated prices. When the coordinated selloff occurred on June 26, 2025, the stock crashed 94% in a single day, obliterating over $950 million in market capitalization and leaving retail investors with catastrophic losses.

“Most OST shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Gordon v. Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. et al.

Case No.: 1:26-cv-01288

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York

Filed on: February 16, 2026

Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) Company Profile

Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. is a Cayman Islands corporation operating through subsidiaries with principal executive offices in Nanjing, China that purports to design, develop, and manufacture TFT-LCD (thin-film transistor liquid crystal display) modules and polarizers used in consumer electronics, commercial LCD displays, and automotive displays, with ordinary shares trading on NASDAQ.

Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

May 11, 2025-June 26, 2025, inclusive.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired OST ordinary shares (ticker: OST) on the Nasdaq Stock Market during the Class Period may be eligible to join the Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd. (OST) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint targets Ostin Technology Group Co., Ltd., along with co-CEOs Tao Ling and Lai Kui Sen, CFO Qiaoyun Xie, and six other individual defendants, alleging they orchestrated a sophisticated securities fraud scheme, a classic market manipulation pump-and-dump. On April 15, 2025, when OST stock traded at a 52-week low of $0.78, the company announced a registered direct offering that it claimed would provide capital for the company's growth and operations, a representation investors allege was materially false and misleading.

Behind the scenes, however, co-CEO Lai Kui Sen was coordinating with select investors to execute a pump-and-dump scheme, placing OST ordinary shares in brokerage accounts they controlled. On April 25, 2025, Lai emailed a broker stating that two co-conspirators were participating in the registered direct offering and that their shares would be non-restricted, to facilitate brokerage account openings. On May 12, 2025, Lai provided the broker with updated share count information, and on June 2, 2025, he falsely represented in writing to brokers that certain co-conspirators had no ties to OST, vouching they were unaffiliated to avoid trading restrictions.

According to the complaint, the offering was non-bona fide and designed to place the majority of OST shares (approximately 80 million shares, with over 70 million transferred for zero cash consideration) in the hands of co-conspirators who would artificially inflate the stock price through fraudulent social media promotion, including WhatsApp groups that impersonated investment advisors and issued daily buying instructions, and AI-generated deepfake videos before systematically dumping their shares at inflated prices.

The complaint alleges that defendants and co-conspirators coordinated a promotional campaign that launched the same day the offering closed, showing the offering and promotions were synchronized, indicating premeditation. The offering structure allegedly diluted existing shareholders massively while providing insiders , with at least 15 co-conspirators, with shares at pennies apiece at an average cost of about $0.06 per share that could be immediately sold for enormous profits, generating over $110 million in illicit proceeds, which conspirators laundered through Treasury ETFs.

The Truth Emerges

On June 26, 2025, the truth surfaced when OST's stock price crashed from an intraday high of $9.40 to a closing price of $0.55-a 94% decline in a single day that wiped out over $950 million in market capitalization. The following day, on June 27, 2025, the company issued a press release claiming it had no undisclosed material matters and was not aware of specific reasons for the abnormal stock price fluctuations-a statement the complaint alleges was materially false because OST's co-CEO was directly involved in orchestrating the scheme.

On July 18, 2025, OST disclosed it had received a grand jury subpoena from the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting documents related to the securities offerings and promotional activities. On September 12, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a criminal indictment in the Eastern District of Virginia charging co-CEO Lai Kui Sen and financial advisor Yan Zhao with conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, and with substantive counts of securities and wire fraud. That same day, NASDAQ imposed a trading halt on OST shares, and trading was halted indefinitely. These revelations confirmed that the company's prior representations about legitimate business operations and the purpose of the stock offering were false.

The criminal charges and federal investigation directly contradicted management's June 27 claim that there were no undisclosed material matters, exposing the coordinated nature of the social media fraud and stock manipulation.

Market Reaction

On June 26, 2025, OST's stock price suffered a catastrophic collapse, plummeting 94.1% from an intraday peak of $9.40 to close at $0.55, destroying over $950 million in market capitalization in a single trading session. Trading volume that day reached 34.55 million shares-more than five times the average daily volume of 6.07 million shares, reflecting artificially inflated trading volume.

The decline continued over the following days, with the stock opening at $0.45 and closing at $0.35 on June 27, 2025, then falling to $0.16 by July 3, 2025-a 98.3% decline from the peak. By August 2025, the stock had bottomed at $0.08, representing a 99.1% decline from its artificially inflated high. Between April 14, 2025, when the stock closed at $0.78, and June 26, 2025, the stock had artificially risen 1,175% before the coordinated selloff obliterated those gains. On September 12, 2025, when the criminal indictment was unsealed and NASDAQ imposed a trading halt, OST shares were trading at $1.695, with trading halted indefinitely.

Next Steps

●      The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

●      The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

●      The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Regenxbio, Inc. (RGNX) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Regenxbio, Inc. (NASDAQ: RGNX), asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 10b-5, covering investors who purchased the Company's securities between February 9, 2022 and January 27, 2026, inclusive. According to the complaint, investors allege the Company and senior executives misrepresented the safety and efficacy profile of RGX-111, an AAV gene therapy product candidate for severe MPS I, which received Fast Track designation from the FDA in 2018, by repeatedly highlighting positive biomarker, tolerability, and neurodevelopment results. 

Behind those assurances, the complaint alleges serious safety concerns existed, including the potential for a central nervous system neoplasm, and the program was later de-prioritized. The story culminated on January 28, 2026, when REGENXBIO announced the FDA had placed a clinical hold on RGX-111 after a CNS tumor was identified in a trial participant, and the FDA also placed a hold on RGX-121, a related MPS II product candidate due to shared risk. As the truth surfaced, REGENXBIO's stock fell 17.8% in a single day, harming investors who bought at inflated prices.

“Most RGNX shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Regenxbio, Inc. (RGNX) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Kuik v. Regenxbio, Inc. et al.
Case No.: 8:26-cv-00611-DKC
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, District of Maryland (Southern Division)
Filed on: February 13, 2026

Regenxbio, Inc. (RGNX) Company Profile

Regenxbio is a clinical-stage biotechnology company listed on the NASDAQ as RGNX developing gene therapies that deliver functional genes to cells with genetic defects, including rare lysosomal storage disorders such as Mucopolysaccharidosis Type I (MPS I). Its product candidates use the Company's NAV Technology Platform, featuring the NAV AAV9 vector, a proprietary adeno-associated virus (AAV) gene delivery system designed for one-time administration.

Regenxbio, Inc. (RGNX) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

February 9, 2022 - January 27, 2026, inclusive (the Class Period). 

All investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Regenxbio securities (NASDAQ: RGNX) between February 9, 2022 and January 27, 2026, inclusive, are within the alleged class.

Allegations in the Regenxbio, Inc. (RGNX) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The lawsuit targets REGENXBIO, INC. and three executives: former CEO Kenneth T. Mills, current CEO Curran Simpson, and Executive Vice President and Chief Medical Officer Stephen Pakola, alleging they disseminated false and misleading statements. The complaint alleges they told investors RGX-111 was progressing well, emphasizing safety, biomarker improvements, and neurodevelopmental gains, overstated efficacy based on interim biomarker data, and positioning it as a key program in the Company's pipeline while concealing material safety data. 

The narrative begins on February 9, 2022, when Dr. Pakola announced early data from a Phase I/II clinical trial and said "RGX-111 has been well-tolerated with emerging evidence of CNS biomarker activity and improvements in neurodevelopmental function," while planning to enroll more patients. 

The message continued on February 24, 2023, as CEO Mills called RGX-111 the Company's second-most advanced neurodegenerative candidate and part of the "5x'25" strategy, touting overwhelmingly positive results, stating the therapy "continues to demonstrate compelling evidence of CNS biomarker activity" and that most trial patients showed "continued skill acquisition across multiple neurodevelopmental assessments." 

The optimism persisted into January 14, 2025, when CEO Curran Simpson, announcing a partnership with Nippon Shinyaku, asserted that "RGX-111 has demonstrated very promising results in Phase 1/2 study" for Hurler syndrome. According to the complaint, these upbeat statements concealed material adverse facts about RGX-111's safety, including the potential for a CNS neoplasm, a serious adverse event risk. The pleading further alleges that, despite the public positivity, the Company abruptly decided in November 2023 to de-prioritize RGX-111 and pursue "strategic alternatives" for the program, a corporate strategic pivot.

The Truth Emerges

The picture shifted on November 8, 2023, when management acknowledged a change in course, signaling de-prioritization of the RGX-111 program. Dr. Pakola stated the Company was "no longer moving forward with our RGX-111...rare neurodegenerative programs," and CEO Mills added there would be a "discontinuation of any clinical development work," effectively de-prioritizing the product candidate with only short-term partnering efforts anticipated and no meaningful contribution to operating plans going forward. 

Then, on January 28, 2026, REGENXBIO issued a press release announcing the FDA had placed a clinical hold on RGX-111 after a routine MRI revealed an intraventricular CNS tumor in a five-year-old participant in the Phase I/II study who had received intracisternal RGX-111 four years earlier. The Company reported preliminary genetic analysis of the resected tumor detected an AAV vector genome integration event associated with overexpression of a proto-oncogene (PLAG1), an oncogenic safety signal, and noted the investigation into causality was ongoing. The FDA simultaneously placed a clinical hold on RGX-121, an investigational treatment for MPS II due to "the similarities in products, study populations, and shared risk between the clinical studies." These disclosures addressed earlier representations that RGX-111 was well tolerated with no drug-related serious adverse events, contradicting prior safety and tolerability claims.

Market Reaction

Investors reacted immediately to the January 28, 2026 disclosure. REGENXBIO's stock on NASDAQ: RGNX fell $2.40, or 17.8%, from a prior close of $13.41 on January 27, 2026 to close at $11.01 on January 28, 2026, reflecting a significant stock price decline.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to uniQure N.V. (QURE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been filed against uniQure N.V. (NASDAQ: QURE) covering investors who bought ordinary shares from September 24, 2025 through October 31, 2025. Investors allege the company and senior executives told the market the FDA agreed with key parts of the AMT-130 pivotal program and downplayed the risk of delays to a Biologics License Application (BLA) and the accelerated approval pathway. The story unraveled when, in November and December 2025, uniQure disclosed the FDA no longer agreed that AMT-130 Phase I/II data compared to a control from the ENROLL-HD external historical dataset could provide the primary evidence for a BLA and admitted the BLA timing was unclear. The market reaction was swift: after soaring on September 24, 2025, shares later fell $33.40 (49.33%) on November 3, 2025. According to the complaint, investors suffered significant losses as shares traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period when the truth surfaced.

“Most QURE shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

uniQure N.V. (QURE) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Scocco v. uniQure N.V. et al.
Case No.: 1:26-cv-01124
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York
Filed on: February 10, 2026

uniQure N.V. (QURE) Company Profile

uniQure is a biotechnology company headquartered in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and publicly traded on the NASDAQ exchange developing gene therapies for rare diseases, including Huntington's disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis caused by SOD1 mutations, refractory mesial temporal lobe epilepsy, and Fabry disease. Its leading drug candidate is AMT-130, a novel gene therapy being developed to slow the progression of Huntington's disease, currently in Phase I/II clinical trials.

uniQure N.V. (QURE) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

September 24, 2025-October 31, 2025, inclusive (38 days).

All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired uniQure (NASDAQ: QURE) ordinary shares during the Class Period may be eligible to join the uniQure N.V. (QURE) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the uniQure N.V. (QURE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The lawsuit targets uniQure N.V. and four individuals: Chief Executive Officer Matthew Kapusta, Chief Financial Officer Christian Klemt, Chief Medical Officer Walid Abi-Saab, and lead investigator Sarah Tabrizi, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. 

According to the complaint, they presented AMT-130's pivotal program as aligned with FDA expectations and suggested the company had clear, supportive regulatory feedback, setting the stage for a BLA based on comparisons to an external control dataset from ENROLL-HD and, during the Class Period, conducted a September 25, 2025 stock offering of 5.7 million ordinary shares and 500,000 pre-funded warrants that generated approximately $345 million in proceeds including a potential accelerated approval pathway.

The narrative begins months before the class period. 

On June 2, 2025, Kapusta told investors the FDA had agreed that the primary efficacy analysis would compare three-year cUHDRS changes between high-dose AMT-130 patients and an adjusted using propensity score matching methodology control group from the ENROLL-HD database , an external historical control dataset. Then on July 29, 2025, he said on the second quarter earnings call that "all of our interactions with the FDA have been very encouraging and very supportive" and that the company had "very clear and unambiguous feedback" from the agency.

As the class period opened on September 24, 2025, the company amplified these themes. At an investor conference that day, Kapusta said, "we believe these findings provide compelling and clinically meaningful evidence of AMT-130 disease modifying potential," while Abi-Saab stated the FDA agreed cUHDRS could serve as an acceptable registrational, intermediate clinical endpoint for accelerated approval and that ENROLL-HD may be acceptable as the external control dataset matched on baseline characteristics.

Behind these statements, investors allege a different reality. The complaint asserts the pivotal study design-including comparison to ENROLL-HD-was not fully approved by the FDA, and defendants downplayed the likelihood that uniQure would have to delay its BLA timeline to conduct additional studies. As a result, the complaint alleges that statements about the company's business, operations, and prospects lacked a reasonable basis, artificially inflating the stock price during the Class Period.

The Truth Emerges

The picture shifted after the class period closed. On November 3, 2025, uniQure announced the "FDA currently no longer agrees that the data from the Phase I/II studies of AMT-130 in comparison to an external control... may be adequate to provide the primary evidence in support of a BLA submission," and management acknowledged "the timing of the BLA submission for AMT-130 is now unclear," displacing the previously discussed plan for a Q1 2026 BLA submission. 

A week later, on November 10, 2025, Abi-Saab said the FDA's recent feedback "has introduced uncertainty into the path forward," including the feasibility of an accelerated approval pathway based on external control comparisons.

The company followed with a December 4, 2025 confirmation that "the FDA conveyed that data submitted from the Phase I/II studies of AMT-130 are currently unlikely to provide the primary evidence to support a BLA submission," underscoring the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's view that the ENROLL-HD external control could not serve as primary evidence. These disclosures directly contradicted prior assurances about FDA agreement on study design, use of ENROLL-HD as an external control for the primary analysis, and the implied BLA timeline.

Market Reaction

The market first responded to the company's September 24, 2025 messaging. After uniQure announced topline results of the Pivotal Study that day, the stock jumped from a close of $13.66 per share on September 23 to close at $47.50 on September 24, a nearly 250% increase, on the NASDAQ market, and by October 29, 2025, shares were trading above $70.00 per share, closing at $67.69 on October 31.

When the company revealed on November 3, 2025 that the FDA no longer agreed the Phase I/II external-control data may be adequate to support a BLA, the stock fell $33.40 per share, or more than 49%, from the October 31 close of $67.69 to close at $34.29 on November 3.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A federal securities class action has been filed against Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: INO), alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Sections 10(b) and 20(a) covering October 10, 2023 through December 26, 2025. Investors allege the company misrepresented the readiness of its CELLECTRA device, the timing of its INO-3107 Biologics License Application (BLA), and the drug's regulatory path, including the accelerated approval pathway of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. During the period, Inovio repeatedly pointed to an accelerated approval route and a second-half 2024 BLA submission. The truth surfaced when the company disclosed a CELLECTRA manufacturing issue that pushed the filing into 2025 and later revealed the FDA had accepted the BLA, placing it on the standard review timeline and flagged inadequate information for accelerated approval. On these disclosures, Inovio's stock (NASDAQ: INO) fell on August 9, 2024 and again on December 29, 2025, harming investors.

“Most INO shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Carlson v. Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al.

Case No.: 2:26-cv-00803

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Filed on: February 6, 2026

Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) Company Profile

Inovio is a biotechnology company, publicly traded on the NASDAQ exchange developing DNA-based medicines for diseases associated with human papillomavirus (HPV) and other HPV-associated diseases. Its medicines use DNA plasmids and the company's proprietary investigational device, CELLECTRA electroporation device, to help deliver those plasmids into cells; the lead candidate is INO-3107 for recurrent respiratory papillomatosis (RRP), a rare condition.

Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

October 10, 2023-December 26, 2025, inclusive.

All persons and entities other than Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Inovio securities, including common stock during the Class Period may be eligible to join the Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (INO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

According to the complaint, Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc., its President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director Jacqueline E. Shea, and its Chief Financial Officer Peter Kies are sued for statements about INO-3107's regulatory path and the company's device manufacturing, including alleged manufacturing deficiencies in the CELLECTRA device. The case centers on what they told investors about regulatory prospects and a near-term BLA submission, including use of the accelerated approval pathway and projected regulatory approval timing.

The story begins on October 10, 2023, when Inovio issued a press release stating it had received FDA feedback that data from the completed Phase 1/2 trial of INO-3107 "could support" a BLA under the accelerated approval program of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. That same day, CEO Jacqueline Shea said the company would "focus[] on streamlining our development plan to support submission of a BLA for accelerated approval." As the narrative continued into the new year, on January 3, 2024, Shea told investors that, based on productive FDA discussions, Inovio believed it had "established a path" to submit a BLA under accelerated approval. Then on May 13, 2024, Inovio reiterated in another press release that it "remains on target to submit its BLA seeking accelerated approval for INO-3107 in the second half of 2024."

Meanwhile, the complaint alleges a different reality. Manufacturing for the CELLECTRA device was deficient, including a component deficiency, making a second-half 2024 BLA submission unlikely. The company also lacked sufficient information to justify accelerated approval or priority review, overstating INO-3107's regulatory and commercial prospects, under FDA standards for accelerated approval. As a result, investors allege these public statements were materially false and misleading, and maintained artificial stock price inflation during the class period.

The Truth Emerges

The first break came on August 8, 2024, when Inovio disclosed in a press release and earnings call that it now expected to submit the INO-3107 BLA in mid-2025, approximately a one-year delay in the regulatory timeline, because of "a manufacturing issue" with the single-use disposable administration component of CELLECTRA, part of the CELLECTRA delivery system. CEO Jacqueline Shea acknowledged, "we've recently identified a manufacturing issue ... that we believe is resolvable, but will take additional time to rectify."

The second reveal landed on December 29, 2025, when Inovio announced the FDA had accepted the INO-3107 BLA for standard review (not accelerated approval). The company quoted the agency's file acceptance letter for the Biologics License Application noting a potential review issue: the FDA's preliminary conclusion that Inovio "has not submitted adequate information to justify eligibility for the accelerated approval pathway." These disclosures directly undercut prior assurances about both timing and accelerated approval prospects, placing INO-3107 on the standard review timeline.

Market Reaction

Investors reacted as the disclosures hit. Following the August 8, 2024 announcement, Inovio's stock (NASDAQ: INO) fell $0.27, or 3.1%, to close at $8.44 on August 9, 2024, reflecting a disclosure-driven decline. After the December 29, 2025 news that the FDA had accepted the BLA for standard review and flagged inadequate information for accelerated approval, the stock dropped $0.56, or 24.45%, to close at $1.73 that same day.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

Investigation History

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Introduction to Paysafe Limited (PSFE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Paysafe Limited (NYSE: PSFE) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York covering trades between March 4, 2025 and November 12, 2025. Investors allege the company misrepresented its exposure to a high-risk client, the adequacy of credit loss reserves and write-offs, and the stability of its banking relationships while promoting 2025 guidance, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. On November 13, 2025, Paysafe reported third quarter results that missed expectations, slashed full-year guidance, and revealed a client shutdown tied to higher-risk Merchant Category Codes in payment processing that were difficult to bank. Management's comments and the filings contradicted earlier assurances about growth and banking strength. The stock fell sharply, leaving investors with significant losses, with NYSE: PSFE dropping 27.6 percent that day.

“Most PSFE shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Paysafe Limited (PSFE) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Singh v. Paysafe Limited et al.
Case No.: 1:26-cv-01048
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York
Filed on: February 6, 2026

Paysafe Limited (PSFE) Company Profile

Paysafe provides end-to-end payment solutions (end-to-end payment processing) in the United States and internationally, and is incorporated in Bermuda, including services that allow consumers to purchase online without a bank account or credit card and with alternative methods such as cryptocurrencies, serving the payment solutions/fintech industry and e-commerce transactions. The company operates through two segments: Merchant Solutions, which processes card transactions for merchants, including e-commerce merchants and other high-volume payment processing clients, and Digital Wallets, which includes alternative payments and prepaid vouchers in its digital wallet segment.

Paysafe Limited (PSFE) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

March 4, 2025 - November 12, 2025, inclusive. 

All persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Paysafe securities (NYSE: PSFE) between March 4, 2025 and November 12, 2025, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the "Class"), including purchasers of PSFE shares. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest.

Allegations in the Paysafe Limited (PSFE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint names Paysafe Limited, Chief Executive Officer Bruce Lowthers, and Chief Financial Officer John Crawford. Investors allege these defendants made materially false and misleading statements and failed to disclose material adverse facts about the company's business, operations, and prospects during the Class Period, including its financial guidance for fiscal year 2025. 

On March 4, 2025, Paysafe issued a press release presenting its 2025 outlook. The company stated reported revenue growth would be 0% to 2%, with organic revenue growth of 6.5% to 8.0%, an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 27.1% to 27.6%, and Adjusted EBITDA growth in the mid-teens. Paysafe also noted that this outlook incorporated the impact of a disposed business and modest headwinds from currency and interest revenue. That same day, in its Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Paysafe highlighted a "strong global banking infrastructure," citing a network of nearly 100 commercial banks across 34 countries and relationships with top-tier institutions including J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, BBVA, BMO, and PNC. 

According to investors, the reality was different. Paysafe's ecommerce business allegedly had significant exposure to a high-risk client, reflecting a single-client concentration risk; the company's credit loss reserves and/or write-offs were understated, including reserves for expected chargebacks; and Paysafe faced undisclosed issues with higher-risk Merchant Category Codes, a merchant category code compliance issue that strained banking relationships. These conditions were likely to materially hurt revenue growth and the revenue mix, rendering Paysafe unlikely to meet its own 2025 guidance and leaving the company's positive statements without a reasonable basis, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.

The Truth Emerges

The story turned on November 13, 2025, when Paysafe issued a press release and filed a Form 6-K with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission reporting third quarter results for the quarter ended September 30, 2025. The company posted revenue of $433.8 million, a $5.8 million variance, below analyst estimates, and a net loss of $87.7 million compared to a $12.98 million net loss in the prior-year period. 

Paysafe dramatically cut its full-year 2025 guidance, slashing expected revenue to $17 million and adjusted EPS to $0.50 at the midpoint (a reduction of $17 million at the midpoint). On the earnings call the same day, CEO Bruce Lowthers acknowledged, "We had a last-minute client that had to shut down that caused several million-dollar write-down in Q3," and described operating "in kind of a lower-tier market" with "higher risk MCC codes" that are "a little difficult to bank." He explained that some banks were not open to the additional risk, creating challenges with those MCC codes. These admissions came after Paysafe had touted a "strong global banking infrastructure" and issued its 2025 guidance and assured investors of stable banking relationships.

Market Reaction

The market reacted immediately. On November 13, 2025, before trading began, Paysafe issued its release; by the close, the PSFE stock price fell $2.80, or 27.6%, to $7.36 per share on unusually heavy trading volume on the NYSE. The decline followed the missed results, the guidance cut, and management's disclosures about a client shutdown and high-risk MCC banking challenges, a single-day drop reflecting the corrective disclosure.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a Motion to Dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against BlackRock TCP Capital Corp.  (NASDAQ: TCPC) for investors who bought securities between November 6, 2024 and January 23, 2026. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, investors allege the Company overstated the strength of its portfolio and net asset value (NAV) by failing to timely and properly value investments and by claiming progress on fixing troubled loans. The complaint asserts that, in reality, unrealized losses were understated and NAV was overstated while portfolio "stabilization" claims lacked a reasonable basis. The truth began to surface on February 27, 2025, when the Company revealed a sharp rise in accounts on (non-accrual status), a 22.44% year-over-year NAV drop to $9.23, and large losses; it was reinforced on January 23, 2026, when BlackRock TCP disclosed NAV per share of just $7.05 to $7.09. On these disclosures, the stock fell 9.64% to $8.44 on February 27, 2025, and later dropped 12.97% to $5.10 on January 26, 2026, leaving investors with significant losses.

“Most TCPC shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Burnell v. BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. et al.

Case No.: 2:26-cv-01102

Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Central District of California

Filed on: February 3, 2026

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) Company Profile

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. is a business development company that raises capital from investors and lends primarily to small and midsize, middle-market companies as an alternative to bank financing, with its common stock trading on the NASDAQ under ticker symbol TCPC. It seeks returns from interest and fees on largely senior secured, first-lien loans, as well as mezzanine debt and junior tranches, and to a lesser extent equity appreciation, with portfolio valuation conducted quarterly.

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

November 6, 2024 – January 23, 2026, inclusive. 

Eligible investors include all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired BlackRock TCP securities (ticker symbol TCPC) during the Class Period, and who were damaged thereby; excluded are Defendants, the Company's officers and directors at all relevant times, their immediate families and representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants had or have a controlling interest. Eligible investors may be eligible to join the BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. (TCPC) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The lawsuit targets BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. and senior executives Raj Vig, Phil Tseng, and Erik L. Cuellar for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. According to the complaint, they told investors the portfolio was improving and that valuations were handled appropriately, while presenting NAV figures that signaled stability, and that portfolio restructuring was resolving challenged credits. On November 6, 2024, the Company reported NAV per share of $10.11 as of September 30, 2024, down slightly from $10.20 as of June 30, and stated that the portfolio showed "signs of improvement" as non-accruals declined, even as certain markdowns nudged NAV lower. That same day, BlackRock TCP's Form 10-Q told investors all investments were valued at least quarterly, except for a small portion priced by a valuation designee that comprised less than 5% of assets. 

As 2025 unfolded, management continued to stress progress. On May 8, 2025, CEO Phil Tseng said the Company made meaningful progress strengthening the portfolio and was "pleased to see signs of portfolio stabilization." On August 7, 2025, he highlighted a reduction in accounts on (non-accrual status) to 3.7% of fair value of the investment portfolio, down from 4.4% the prior quarter and 5.6% at year-end 2024. And on November 6, 2025, Tseng said the Company was encouraged by progress on priorities like resolving challenged credits and improving portfolio quality to return to historical performance levels through portfolio restructuring. 

The complaint alleges a different picture beneath these statements: investments were not being timely and/or appropriately valued; portfolio valuation and NAV calculations were materially inaccurate; portfolio restructuring was not effectively resolving challenged credits or improving portfolio quality; non-performing debt investments increased; unrealized losses were understated; and, as a result, NAV was overstated. Investors allege that the positive statements about stabilization and improvement lacked a reasonable basis and misled the market during the Class Period, in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

The Truth Emerges

The first break came on February 27, 2025, when BlackRock TCP issued a press release revealing that the portfolio had "significantly weakened" during 2024. The number of companies on non-accrual had more than doubled, pushing debt investments on non-accrual at cost from 3.7% to 14.4%-a 289% increase. NAV fell 22.44% year over year to $9.23 per share, and total losses, realized and unrealized, jumped to $194,895,042, a 186% year-over-year increase, including an unrealized loss of $72.3 million in Q4 2024. Management acknowledged it was working with borrowers and sponsors to resolve portfolio issues that had impacted results in recent quarters, but restructuring efforts were not effectively resolving challenged credits. 

Then, after market hours on January 23, 2026, the Company disclosed fourth-quarter and full-year 2025 results showing NAV per share in a range of $7.05 to $7.09-19% lower (quarter-over-quarter) and 23.4% below (year-over-year). Plaintiffs cite these disclosures to support their claim that earlier statements about quarterly valuation practices, portfolio stabilization, and progress on challenged credits lacked a reasonable basis, and that the Company had overstated net asset value while understating unrealized losses.

Market Reaction

Investors reacted swiftly to the February 27, 2025 disclosure. On that news, BlackRock TCP's stock (NASDAQ: TCPC) fell $0.90, or 9.64%, to close at $8.44 per share on unusually heavy trading volume. After the January 23, 2026 after-hours disclosure of the steep NAV decline, the stock dropped the next trading day, January 26, 2026, by $0.76, or 12.97%, to close at $5.10 per share, again on unusually heavy volume on the NASDAQ.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a motion to dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A federal securities fraud class action, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been filed against Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (NASDAQ: RARE) in the Northern District of California. The proposed class covers investors who acquired Ultragenyx common stock, traded on the NASDAQ under ticker RARE, between August 3, 2023 and December 26, 2025, inclusive. 

According to the complaint, investors allege the company and senior executives repeatedly touted setrusumab (UX143) for Osteogenesis Imperfecta, claiming strong bone mineral density gains, a secondary endpoint, would translate into fewer fractures and that the Phase III Orbit and Cosmic randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study designs would reliably show that effect. The truth emerged when the company later disclosed that the Phase III studies failed to achieve statistical significance on their primary fracture-reduction endpoints (annualized clinical fracture rate reduction), and management acknowledged uncertainty about the data. Investors experienced sharp stock declines following the corrective disclosures.

“Most RARE shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Bailey v. Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. et al.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01097
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
Filed on: February 4, 2026

Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) Company Profile

Ultragenyx is a biopharmaceutical company, a Delaware corporation headquartered in California focused on rare and ultrarare genetic disorders (orphan diseases), with product candidates typically in-licensed from partners or academic institutions, and it develops gene therapies using a proprietary HeLa cell manufacturing platform. One key program during the period was setrusumab (UX143), a drug that targets bone metabolism for Osteogenesis Imperfecta.

Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

August 3, 2023-December 26, 2025, inclusive.

All investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Ultragenyx common stock, ticker RARE, during the Class Period may be eligible to join the Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. (RARE) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The complaint names Ultragenyx, Founder/President/CEO/Director Emil D. Kakkis, and Chief Medical Officer/EVP Eric Crombez. Investors allege these defendants promoted setrusumab’s prospects in the Phase III Orbit and Cosmic studies by linking early bone mineral density gains to expected reductions in fracture rates and by expressing confidence in study design and control of variability, in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 

The narrative begins on August 3, 2023, when CEO Emil Kakkis told investors on an earnings call that the bone mineral density increases, a secondary endpoint seen at three months were “sufficient enough to improve the strength of bones” and would “translate into fracture improvements.” He followed on May 2, 2024, stating on another earnings call, “I really don’t see any uncontrolled factors,” signaling strong control over study variables. On August 1, 2024, Kakkis said the effect was “very large” and that he felt “pretty confident” stronger bones would compensate for activity changes in patients. 

That tone continued into November 5, 2024, when Kakkis discussed powering assumptions, citing an assumed 50% reduction in the annualized clinical fracture rate and suggesting results closer to 67%, concluding they felt “pretty comfortable” with the study design. On August 5, 2025, he again assured investors that, based on Phase II data, even though the Phase II predecessor studies lacked a placebo control, UX143 would be a “transformational treatment” for pediatric and adult patients with Osteogenesis Imperfecta. 

Meanwhile, the complaint alleges that these positive statements concealed material adverse facts: while setrusumab increased bone mineral density, that increase did not correlate to a reduction in annualized fracture rates with statistical significance, and the Phase III Orbit and Cosmic studies, including the placebo-controlled Orbit study and the bisphosphonate-comparator Cosmic study were far less likely to demonstrate such a link than management claimed. Investors allege defendants created the false impression they had reliable information pointing to Phase III success and minimized risks from study variability and from the clinical endpoint’s sensitivity to low placebo-group fracture rates, artificially inflating the stock price during the class period.

The Truth Emerges

The story turned on July 9, 2025, when Ultragenyx issued a press release stating the randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind Phase 3 portion of the Orbit study (with a primary endpoint of annualized clinical fracture rate reduction) was progressing toward a final analysis around year-end. According to the complaint, this revealed the study had not achieved a second interim analysis that prior confidence had led investors to expect. 

The full picture arrived on December 29, 2025, when Ultragenyx filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission announcing that both Phase III Orbit and pediatric Cosmic studies failed to achieve statistical significance on their primary endpoints of reducing annualized clinical fracture rates versus placebo or bisphosphonates. Management attributed the outcome in part to a low fracture rate in the Orbit placebo group and conceded that bone mineral density changes, a secondary endpoint, were not accompanied by corresponding fracture reductions. On January 12, 2026, CEO Emil Kakkis added that the company needed to understand “why it is the way it is,” noting long bone results did not appear better to a statistically significant degree and questioning whether increased activity or other factors explained the fractures.

Market Reaction

The market reacted swiftly as disclosures unfolded. From a closing price of $41.44 per share on July 9, 2025, Ultragenyx fell to $31.03 on July 10, 2025, a one-day decline of $10.41 or about 25.12% after investors learned the Phase 3 Orbit study had not achieved the expected second interim analysis and was moving to a year-end final analysis, as the market digested a corrective disclosure and artificial inflation dissipated. The selloff deepened when the company disclosed the Phase III failures. 

From a closing price of $34.19 per share on December 26, 2025, Ultragenyx fell to $19.72 on December 29, 2025, a one-day drop of $14.47 or approximately 42.32% as the market absorbed that neither Orbit nor Cosmic met the primary fracture-reduction endpoints, and investors suffered substantial losses.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a motion to dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitutelegal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A securities fraud class action has been filed against Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (NASDAQ: MREO) in the Southern District of New York, under federal securities laws. The case covers investors who bought Mereo American Depositary Shares ticker MREO on the NASDAQ between June 5, 2023 and December 26, 2025. Investors allege the company and its executives misled the market about expected results from the Phase 3 ORBIT and COSMIC studies of setrusumab for osteogenesis imperfecta, while concealing adverse facts and making material misrepresentations. 

The complaint states that, contrary to those representations, the ORBIT study failed an interim statistical hurdle on July 9, 2025, and on December 29, 2025 the company announced that neither ORBIT nor COSMIC met their primary endpoints of reducing annualized clinical fracture rates (versus placebo in ORBIT and bisphosphonates in COSMIC). Shares fell sharply on both disclosures, including single-day drops of 42.52% and 87.7%.

“Most MREO shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Dodge v. Mereo Biopharma Group Plc et al.
Case No.: 1:26-cv-988
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York
Filed on: February 4, 2026

Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) Company Profile

Mereo is a NASDAQ-listed biopharmaceutical company developing therapeutics for rare diseases (rare disease therapeutics), including setrusumab for osteogenesis imperfecta, evaluated in Phase 3 clinical trials ORBIT and COSMIC and alvelestat for Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Deficiency-associated lung disease. Its strategy is to acquire and develop clinical-stage programs with substantial prior data packages.

Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

June 5, 2023 –December 26, 2025, inclusive.

All investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Mereo ADS during this period, inclusive, are included in the proposed class, including purchases on the NASDAQ exchange, and may be eligible to join the Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Mereo Biopharma Group Plc (MREO) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

According to the complaint, the lawsuit targets Mereo Biopharma Group Plc, its co-founder and CEO Denise Scots-Knight, and its Chief Scientific Officer John A. Lewicki. During the class period, investors allege these defendants provided upbeat information about expected Phase 3 results for investigational setrusumab in the ORBIT and COSMIC studies while disseminating false and materially misleading statements and concealing adverse facts about the true state of those programs. 

The narrative begins on June 5, 2023, when a company press release quoted Gary Gottesman, MD, describing "striking" increases in bone mineralization on DXA scans (bone mineral density) and the potential for denser, stronger bone. On July 6, 2023, Ultragenyx's Chief Medical Officer, Eric Crombez, said Phase 2 Orbit data showed increases in bone formation and bone mineral density and highlighted a comprehensive Phase 3 program designed to study clinical fracture risk reduction. 

As the program advanced, the complaint alleges defendants continued to issue upbeat statements about setrusumab and its Phase 3 studies. On April 30, 2024, Crombez said interim Phase 2 Orbit results showed a rapid and clinically meaningful decrease in fractures (annualized fracture rate). At the JP Morgan Healthcare Conference on January 16, 2025, CEO Denise Scots-Knight told investors there was a "medium 67% reduction in annualized fracture rate," identifying that measure as the Phase 3 metric and primary endpoint for Orbit, while CSO John Lewicki said fractures became "very infrequent" on treatment and expressed confidence in the IA-2 analysis. 

Meanwhile, the complaint alleges the ORBIT and COSMIC Phase 3 programs were not on track to reach statistical significance on their primary endpoint: reduction in annualized clinical fracture rate versus the placebo control group or a bisphosphonate comparator. Investors allege defendants concealed material adverse facts and misrepresented the viability of these trials and the underlying efficacy data.

The Truth Emerges

The first break in the story came on July 9, 2025, when Mereo issued a press release stating the Phase 3 ORBIT study failed to achieve statistical significance at the second interim analysis (IA-2) on the primary endpoint and would continue toward a final analysis. In the July 9, 2025 joint press release, Ultragenyx CEO Emil D. Kakkis stated that the companies had ‘hoped to be able to stop the study early’ before the full 24-month dataset became available. 

The full picture arrived on December 29, 2025. In a press release, Mereo disclosed that neither ORBIT nor COSMIC achieved statistical significance and that neither met its primary endpoint of reducing annualized clinical fracture rates versus their control groups (placebo and bisphosphonates). CEO Denise Scots-Knight acknowledged disappointment and said the company would conduct additional analyses to assess next steps, contradicting prior confidence in setrusumab's ability to reduce clinical fractures.

Market Reaction

The market reacted in two sharp moves tied to these disclosures. After the July 9, 2025 interim failure update, Mereo's ADS (ticker MREO) fell on July 10, 2025 from a prior close of $2.94 to $1.69, a single-day stock price decline of $1.25 or 42.52%. When the company announced the complete Phase 3 failures on December 29, 2025, the stock fell from a December 26 close of $2.31 to $0.29, a decline of $2.02 or 87.7% in one day, reflecting substantial investor losses. These declines reflect investor reassessment once the alleged truth became clear.

Next Steps:

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a motion to dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

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Introduction to Oracle Corporation (ORCL) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

A federal securities fraud class action has been filed against Oracle Corporation (NYSE: ORCL) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case covers investors who acquired Oracle common stock (NYSE: ORCL) between June 12, 2025 and December 16, 2025, inclusive. Investors allege Oracle and senior executives misled the market by touting AI data center and artificial intelligence infrastructure contracts and assuring that heavy capital spending would quickly drive accelerating revenue and profit growth. 

The story that followed featured ratings and analyst warnings, disappointing results showing revenue below expectations, far higher capital expenditures including a fiscal year 2026 projection of $50 billion, negative free cash flow exceeding $10 billion in Q2 FY2026, massive long-term commitments such as $248 billion in lease obligations, project delays (pushing certain data center completion dates to 2028), and funding strain after a reported $10 billion financing withdrawal by Blue Owl Capital. The Complaint alleges that Oracle’s stock price declined in response to the September and December 2025 disclosures, including single-day percentage declines cited in the pleading.

“Most ORCL shareholders never file or join the class action, which means they miss out on potential recovery funds,” said Attorney Joseph Levi.

Oracle Corporation (ORCL) Securities Lawsuit Case Details

Case Name: Barrows v. Oracle Corporation et al.
Case No.: 1:26-cv-00127-UNA
Jurisdiction: U.S. District Court, District of Delaware
Filed on: February 3, 2026

Oracle Corporation (ORCL) Company Profile

Oracle is a technology company, a Delaware corporation based in Austin, Texas that offers database software, enterprise applications such as customer relationship management and supply chain management, and cloud infrastructure and hardware, operating large-scale data centers and AI infrastructure for high-intensity workloads, including infrastructure for operating AI programs used by customers such as OpenAI.

Oracle Corporation (ORCL) Securities Lawsuit Class Period

June 12, 2025 – December 16, 2025, inclusive.

All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Oracle common stock (NYSE: ORCL) during the Class Period may be eligible to join the Oracle Corporation (ORCL) class action lawsuit.

Allegations in the Oracle Corporation (ORCL) Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The lawsuit targets Oracle Corporation and executives Lawrence J. Ellison, Safra A. Catz, Clayton Magouyrk, Michael Sicilia, Douglas Kehring, and Maria Smith. According to the complaint, they told investors that Oracle’s AI infrastructure push-and the significant capital expenditures behind it-would swiftly translate into accelerating revenue and profits, supported by major contracts and growing demand, thereby materially overstating AI revenue potential. 

The narrative began on June 11, 2025, when CEO Safra Catz declared that FY26 would be “even better” than FY25, with total cloud growth expected to top 40% and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure growth to exceed 70%, while Executive Chairman and CTO Larry Ellison said OCI consumption revenue grew 62% in Q4 and would grow even faster in FY26. That same day, Catz told investors that most CapEx was revenue-generating equipment going into data centers and that bringing capacity online would further accelerate revenue and profit growth. The message was clear: spend now, reap revenue quickly from AI infrastructure.

 As the Class Period progressed, on September 9, 2025, Catz announced four multi-billion-dollar contracts, credited them with driving a 359% jump in remaining performance obligations to $455 billion, and again linked the backlog to “accelerating revenue and profit growth,” through a press release and earnings call. She reinforced timing, saying Oracle had “very good line-of-sight” to deploy capacity and would “spend on that CapEx right before it starts generating revenue.” These statements painted a near-term payoff from AI infrastructure investment, linking spending to immediate revenue realization.

Meanwhile, investors allege the truth was different: Oracle’s AI infrastructure strategy would require massive increases in capital expenditures to a projected $50 billion in fiscal year 2026 without equivalent near-term revenue, and the substantially increased spending posed serious risks to Oracle’s debt and credit rating, free cash flow, and ability to fund its projects, including potential pressure on its BBB/Baa2 credit rating. As a result, the complaint alleges the Company’s statements about its business, operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Truth Emerges

The curtain began to lift on September 24, 2025, when S&P Global Ratings warned that OpenAI could account for more than a third of Oracle’s total revenues by fiscal 2028-and even more by 2030-citing concentration risk. The next day, September 25, 2025, Rothschild & Co. Redburn initiated coverage at Sell, stating the market was materially overestimating growth from Oracle’s AI deals and that the promised massive new revenues were unlikely to materialize, setting a $175 price target. 

Reality crystallized on December 10, 2025, when Oracle announced second quarter fiscal 2026 results: revenue growth came in below analysts’ consensus, quarterly CapEx was well above estimates, and free cash flow was negative by more than $10 billion. On that call, Principal Financial Officer Douglas Kehring revealed Oracle now projected $50 billion of CapEx in FY26-$15 billion above its September 2025 projection-while Co-CEO Clayton Magouyrk declined to give a specific funding figure, saying only that spending would be “less” than $100 billion. 

The next day, December 11, 2025, Oracle’s Form 10-Q disclosed $248 billion of additional lease commitments, substantially all for data centers and cloud capacity over terms of fifteen to nineteen years. On December 12, 2025, Bloomberg reported Oracle had pushed back some OpenAI-related data center completion dates to 2028 from 2027 due to labor and material shortages, and on December 17, 2025, the Financial Times reported that Blue Owl Capital had backed out of funding a $10 billion Oracle data center intended to serve OpenAI. 

These disclosures contradicted earlier assurances about rapid revenue generation, capital efficiency, funding capabilities, and project timelines tied to Oracle’s AI infrastructure program, collectively serving as corrective disclosures.

Market Reaction

Investors reacted in real time. On September 24, 2025, after S&P’s warning, Oracle’s stock fell $5.37, nearly 2%, closing at $308.46 from $313.83 the prior day. The next day, September 25, 2025, following Rothschild & Co. Redburn’s Sell initiation, shares dropped another $17.13, more than 5.5%, to close at $291.33. 

Earnings landed after the market closed on December 10, 2025, and on December 11 the stock declined $24.16, nearly 11%, to close at $198.85 from $223.01. After Oracle filed its Form 10-Q following the close on December 11 and Bloomberg reported delays, the stock fell $8.88 on December 12, approximately 4.5%, to close at $189.97. On December 17, 2025, after the Financial Times reported Blue Owl Capital withdrew from funding a $10 billion data center, shares declined $10.19, approximately 5.4%, to close at $178.46 from $188.65 on December 16, bringing the cumulative stock price decline during the Class Period to roughly 26%.

Next Steps

• The Court will issue its order for lead plaintiff and counsel in the weeks after submissions are due.

• The Court will then consider motion for class certification.

• The Court will later consider a motion to dismiss.

Disclaimer: This shareholder alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for personalized guidance. No specific outcomes are guaranteed.

Frequently Asked Questions